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ON FREEDOM

BY

G. LOCKER LAMPSON

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"Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and the more steadily we reflect on them: *the starry heavens above and the moral law within*" (*Critique of Practical Reason*).

7.C.75

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PROLEGOMENA

IMMANUEL KANT has demonstrated in the *Critique of Pure Reason* that the idea of freedom and *the law of nature* taking part together in the same human action is one that does not involve any necessary contradiction. This was truly an epoch-making achievement, and had that great man left nothing else behind him for the instruction and inspiration of posterity than his exposition of the intelligible and empirical characters, he would still be remembered through the ages as one of the mighty thinkers of the earth. No one can study that part of the *Critique* with an honest desire to appreciate its significance without being convinced that *mechanism*, as the undisputed overlord of the realms of faith and knowledge, has finally been driven from the stronghold where so many had imagined it to be irrevocably and impregnably entrenched. Not that mechanism was shown to be false—mechanism was only false, if mechanism was to be all in all—but the very idea that law and freedom could participate in the same action without contradiction drew the teeth of the sensualistic theory, the intrinsic brutality of which

lay in the assumption that if natural law held good universally, as indeed was maintained, then no such thing as freedom had any chance of survival. During the latter half of the eighteenth century the general position in respect of the problem was, therefore, as follows:—Until Kant appeared upon the scene, the ideas of freedom and natural law had, so far as conscious human activity was concerned, remained unreconciled, and, indeed, appeared to be unreconcilable. They were obviously antithetical and admittedly contradictory. If a man clung to the tenets of the one school, it was as much as to acknowledge that he repudiated those of the other. Kant was the first to grapple with the difficulty successfully, and, with the insight of genius, to reconcile the apparently immitigable antagonism within the duality by proving that the parallel action of freedom and nature in the same effect could be an idea which did not necessarily contain an insoluble contradiction.

There was, however, a further question. As far as can be gathered from the general trend of his dialectic, he would presumably have attributed man's *feeling of freedom* to that part of the non-contradictory duality which is opposed to natural law. In other words, he would probably have maintained that the feeling of freedom was the direct consciousness of the *free* side of the duality

and, as such, neither the outcome nor the expression of natural law—a proposition which lands us in inextricable difficulties. Whether this problem can ever be brought a step nearer to any satisfactory solution is a matter of considerable doubt, but a school of thought has now been in existence for some time which finds itself less and less able, as the years go by, to admit the supersensuous in any shape or form within the region of phenomenality. Some day it may be proved to the world at large, and without prejudice to human aspirations, that it is at least not contradictory to suppose, in fact, that it is not at all improbable, that man's *feeling of freedom* appertains to that part of the non-contradictory duality which is opposed to freedom. In other words, that the feeling of freedom which every one experiences in the daily walk of life is not the feeling of the free side of the duality, but belongs to, and is the result of, that part of the duality which is represented by the law of nature.

However this may be, it is in humble and experimental continuation of the enquiries of this school that an attempt has here been made (Part II) to suggest how it may be possible that our *feeling of freedom* is empirical and altogether natural. If any success, however moderate, should attend the effort, the time spent in putting these pages together will not have been wholly thrown away;

for the more perfect the homogeneity that can be shown to rule throughout the conscious life of man, the more wonderful will it be seen to be in the exquisite interplay of all its provisions, and ever deeper will belief grow in the existence of a purpose in the Universe. It is inevitable that the transcendent, in years to come, should more and more be relegated to an incommunicable world of its own beyond the limits of the phenomenal, and humanity constrained to admit that neither in thought nor in feeling can it hold any converse with the supernatural. This need not destroy faith in the Infinite nor weaken the belief in man that, though he moves in a contracted sphere, with imperfect knowledge and finite sensibilities, he possesses, for that very reason, a completer aspect, could he but envisage it, and that hemmed in, and incomplete, and blind though he may be, there is a divinity about him that no philosophy can reason away nor any shadows that may envelop him in this life in the least diminish.

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PART I

IMMANUEL KANT ON THE PROBLEM OF TRANSCENDENTAL FREEDOM

"THE life of Immanuel Kant is hard to describe: he has indeed neither life nor history in the proper sense of the words. He lived an abstract, mechanical, old-bachelor existence in a quiet, remote street of Königsberg, an old city at the north-eastern boundary of Germany. I do not believe that the great cathedral clock of that city accomplished its day's work in a less passionate and more regular way than its countryman, Immanuel Kant. Rising from bed, coffee-drinking, writing, lecturing, eating, walking, everything had its fixed time; and the neighbours knew that it must be exactly half-past four when they saw Professor Kant in his grey coat with his cane in his hand step out of his house door, and move towards the little lime-tree avenue, which is called after him the Philosopher's Walk. Eight times he walked up and down that walk at every season of the year, and when the weather was bad or the grey clouds threatened rain, his servant, old Lampe, was seen anxiously following him with a large umbrella under his arm, like an image of Providence.

"Strange contrast between the outer life of the man and his world-destroying thought. Of a truth, if the citizens of Königsberg had had any inkling of the meaning of that thought, they would have shuddered before him, as before an executioner. But the good people saw nothing in him but a professor of philosophy, and when he passed at the appointed hour, they gave him friendly greetings and set their watches." (Heine, translated by Edward Caird in his *Critical Philosophy of Kant.*)

INTRODUCTORY NOTE TO PART I

THE final difficulty that confronts a student of Kant, although from the point of view of the chief problems discussed in his philosophy it is not really a vital matter, is what answer to give the following question :—Did he, somewhat like Fichte after him—who supposed the *ego* (the human soul) to receive its first excitation by an impulse (*Anstoss*) from without, caused by what he terms the "absolute ego," and, in reacting against this shock or check, to become conscious of itself and of the non-ego which it produces out of itself [1]—hold (*a*) the subjective idealistic doctrine that the ego or knowing subject supplies the matter as well as the form of knowledge and experience (the form being supplied by our intellectual, the matter by our sentient ego), but that it acts upon, or is excited to action by, something outside itself, which unknown and unknowable something is the real nature and essence behind the phenomena; in which case Kant's thing-in-itself would be this excitatory Unknown; (*b*) the objective idealist doctrine propounded by

[1] See Fichte's *Science of Knowledge* (*Wissenschaftslehre*)—IV. Practical Part of the Science of Knowledge—Fundamental Principle. See also (in the same part) *Addenda*. (Translation by A. S. Kroeger.)

Schelling, that the ego and non-ego are existences equally real or ideal, but that they are nothing less than manifestations of the Absolute or Universal Nature which produces the non-ego from out of us, and becomes conscious of itself in us, in which case Kant's thing-in-itself would be this self-manifesting Absolute or Infinite; (*c*) a special critical intellectualism of his own, according to which the knowing subject out of itself supplies the matter as well as the form of knowledge and experience, which as phenomena have no nature of their own, unknowable or otherwise, outside the knowing subject, but whose real nature as phenomena is in the knowing subject behind them; in which case the pure knowing subject would be Kant's thing-in-itself; or, lastly, (*d*) the absolute idealistic doctrine, for which Hegel, who was vastly indebted to Fichte,[1] has generally been given the credit, that although the things of which we have direct consciousness are mere appearances or phenomena, there is nothing whatever outside them as their substrate, either in the knowing subject or apart from the knowing subject, which could be the real nature and essence of them *as reparate and limited phenomena*, but that the true and proper case of these phenomena, finite as they are, is to have their existence founded, not in themselves or any sub-

[1] See, for instance, the *Wissenschaftslehre*: IV. Practical Part of the Science of Knowledge—"Second Remark" and "Results."

strate belonging to them *as phenomena*, but in the universal divine Idea. That is to say, as limited phenomena they are not only phenomena for us, but in their own nature, for, *as limited phenomena*, they have no real substrate. Their only reality and existence is in the universal divine Idea, or the *relations* between the two terms, subject and object, separated from which, as phenomena, they have no reality behind them. In this latter case, Kant's thing-in-itself would be this universal divine Idea, this *relation*, which Hegel termed the absolute, living, self-conscious Spirit.

The first position (*a*) is in some respects divided from (*b*) and (*d*) by a wider cleavage than that which separates it from (*c*), but all four of them may be ultimately not wholly irreconcilable one with the other. No completely satisfactory answer, however, can be given to this question, inasmuch as Kant seems to incline to each of them in turn in various parts of his published writings. It is possible that he was himself undecided, or regarded the matter as of no real interest to mankind, when once he had proved that the world, *as we know it*, is nothing but a fabric of our own construction.

There is another feature of his system which tends to obstruct the apprehension of the reader. He seems to have had an unconquerable aversion to any concrete illustrations that might have rendered the meaning of many of his passages a little clearer.

No one, consequently, has suffered more misinterpretation at the hands of exegetes. Whether the argument was not always sufficiently clear in his own mind to admit of illustration, which is hardly to be supposed, whether he thought that no one could fail to understand it as it stood, or feared lest any concrete example might exclude from it some essential or introduce into it some alien element to the detriment of its perfect appreciation, the result at any rate has frequently been a fallacious interpretation on the part of students, and a loss therefore of the truth which lies perhaps in the particular demonstration.

The books primarily used in the compilation of this Part (Part I), with the exceptions of Sections I, III, and V, are Immanuel Kant's *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft* (text of the First Edition), and especially the translation of it by F. Max Müller.

The explanatory paragraphs interpolated in the translation, and the ampler development of some of Kant's arguments, have been introduced solely for the purpose and in the hope of rendering the latter's meaning as little abstruse as possible for those, who, perhaps, have never had the inclination to study the *Critique of Pure Reason*, of which the remarks on Transcendental Freedom form only a very small part. The reader, therefore, who turns these pages may rest assured that a disinterested attempt has been made in his behalf

to convey the great philosopher's meaning clearly, and no other.

Sections II and IV have been gleaned from different parts of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, as it was thought that, although they do not bear so directly upon the problems of Transcendental Freedom as Sections VI, VII, VIII, and IX, they would serve nevertheless to elucidate some of the passages in the later sections, and, as it were, help to unlock the vast treasure-house of Kant's mind.

Sections I, III, and V, which have likewise been included merely as a propædeutic to Kant's dissertation on Transcendental Freedom, have been compiled from other portions of the same *Critique* after due comparison and consideration of numerous exegetic works, the following eight perhaps proving the most useful :—Georg Simmel's *Kant—Sechzehn Vorlesungen gehalten an der Berliner Universität* (from which several very valuable suggestions have been taken), Friedrich Paulsen's *Immanuel Kant, Sein Leben und Seine Lehre* (translated by J. E. Creighton and Albert Lefevre), Edward Caird's *Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant*, James Hutchinson Stirling's *Text-Book to Kant*, W. Windelband's *Die Geschichte der neueren Philosophie* (translated by James H. Tufts), Richard Falckenberg's *Geschichte der neueren Philosophie* (translated by A. C. Armstrong), Kuno Fischer's

Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (translated by J. P. Mahaffy), and H. A. Prichard's *Kant's Theory of Knowledge*.

Section X, containing Kant's doctrine of *Practical Freedom*, has been added, in order that the reader may obtain by means of it, and in connection with the previous four sections, a view of Kant's doctrine of Freedom as a whole.

Finally, it may be said that no attempt has here been made to suggest any criticisms of any part of Kant's doctrine. The preliminary sections, as well as those that follow them, doubtless afford opportunities for criticism, but the grandeur of the central thought must be admitted by every reader, and a tribute of gratitude paid to the great thinker, who, by his genius, has justified the faith of those, who, seeing in nature nothing but necessity, have believed nevertheless in the ultimate freedom of man.

SECTION I

A PORTION OF THE KANTIAN TERMINOLOGY

It is not often in any metaphysical discussion that genuine thought is difficult to grasp—and we use the term "genuine thought" for any case where it is possible for a conceptional image to be fitted to any purposive collocation of words that may be used. What, however, is frequently difficult in the extreme is the phraseology in which that thought happens to be clothed. In Hegel there are two conspicuous obstacles that confront the student. In the first place, his terminological system, apparently simple and familiar in themselves though the actual words employed by him may generally be, is as hard as, if not harder than, that of any previous or succeeding philosopher. Secondly, he constantly intends his words in their combination to convey what cannot, in the present state of our finitude, be thought at all by the understanding. Where they do convey genuine thought, this thought is in most cases not difficult to grasp, when once the unyielding crust of the Hegelian terminological system has been broken through. With Kant it is different. His phraseology too

is hard, a good deal more so indeed than that of most metaphysicians, but it is by no means so peculiarly forbidding and obscure as that of Hegel. Moreover, what Kant intends to convey by his words is nearly always genuine thought, as defined above, that is to say, thought whose content falls within the compass of the cognitive faculties. Unlike Hegel, it is very rarely, if at all, that he strings words together which, though verbally comprehensible in the arbitrary order of their juxtaposition, produce in their colligation no corresponding conceptual image in the mind as their combined equivalent. But, as a set-off to these comparative advantages, the genuine thought of the great Königsberger is harder to seize and to exhaust than the genuine thought of Hegel. It requires a deeper plummet, and, when sounded, will be found to have a richer meaning in it. It is pregnant with weightier consequence, and more abiding and irresistible in its conclusions. It is on account of the enduring value of the solutions arrived at by the Critical Philosophy and the stubborn terminological shell which envelops many portions of Kant's doctrine, that a short elucidation of part of the Kantian nomenclature has been attempted here, in the hope of facilitating for the general reader a better understanding of the pages of Part I that are to follow.

A PRIORI or PURE.—The *a priori* or *pure* is the term applied by Kant to one of the factors in all experience. That factor must not be regarded, however, as preceding or arising prior in time to the other according to the law of cause and effect. It is merely an active reality in us which fashions our experience. For the law of cause and effect does not work in us as a known principle, because we happen to interpret our perceptions according to that law. In the case of the law of gravitation, for instance, we transfer a reality, which, so to speak, knows nothing of this law, and as such reality is not able to be grasped by us, into the uncertain language of our ideas. In fact, the formula in which the law of cause and effect is known to us is, as in the case of every law of nature, only the interpretation by us of that soul's reality in us, which reality it is that exercises the function of fashioning experience. This reality is therefore the real *a priori*, and of its contents we can know nothing. It is merely the condition of that arrangement and interpretation of the data of sense which yields *a posteriori* or empirical knowledge. In short, it is the very condition of the possibility of any experience, and is nothing at all apart from the latter. In other words, the *a priori* is whatever is presupposed by experience; or, again, whatever is contributed by the subject itself to a knowledge of objects out of its pure thinking self, irrespective

of anything that it has learnt from or which has been given to it in experience.

A POSTERIORI or EMPIRICAL.—*A posteriori* or *empirical* is in direct contrast to *a priori* or *pure*, being whatever constitutes any experience; that is, whatever has been given to the subject and worked up into an experience by those pure forms of the subject alluded to above.

VORSTELLUNG = IDEA in general.—Kant states in the *Critique of Pure Reason* that there are plenty of terms adequate to express every kind of *Vorstellung* or *idea*, and gives a graduated list of them. The whole class, he says, may be called *idea* (*Vorstellung*). *Vorstellung*, in fact, is any kind of intimation in consciousness or impression on sensibility.

PERCEPTION (German) = conscious idea or PERCEPTION in general.—Under the heading of *Vorstellung* or *idea* in general there stands conscious idea or *perception* in general (German *Perception*).

EMPFINDUNG = SENSATION, or subjective or crude perception.—A subjective or crude perception, that is, a perception referring to the subject only as a modification of its state, is *sensation* (*Empfindung*).

ERKENNTNISS = KNOWLEDGE, or COGNITION, or objective perception.—An objective perception is called *knowledge* or *cognition* (*Erkenntniss*).

ANSCHAUUNG = PERCEPTION OF AN OBJECT or formed perception.—Cognition is either *perception of an object* (*Anschauung*) or Conception (*Begriff*).

By perception of an object is meant whatever special sensations (*Empfindungen*) are, from mere feelings, raised and concreted into what we regard as an actual object apart from us. Kant sometimes seems to use the German words *Wahrnehmung* and *Anschauung* indifferently, and therefore no absolutely defined division can, in his case, be drawn between the two. It is probable, however, that he intended to use *Anschauung* for *pure perceptions* (space and time), and *Wahrnehmung* for *empirical perceptions*—*i.e.* perceptions other than space and time.

BEGRIFF = CONCEPTION.—Perception of an object refers immediately to an actually present individual object, and is singular; whilst *conception*, which we have seen to be the other kind of cognition, refers to an object mediately, that is, by a characteristic mark that can be shared by several things in common, or, in other words, to a *genus*. Thus the conception of "gold" is *mediate* or indirect (*mittelbar*); that is, we frame this conception through a variety of individual go-betweens. But the perception of a gold pencil-case, which is the perception of an object, is *immediate* and direct (*unmittelbar*), and wholly without intervention or mediation of anything else. It is for this reason that Kant calls an *Anschauung* or perception of an object an *unmittelbare Vorstellung* or immediate idea.

ERFAHRUNGSBEGRIFF = EMPIRICAL CONCEPTION.—A conception is either *empirical*, that is to say, given *a posteriori* (like the conception of "gold"), or pure.

NOTIO (Kant's text) = NOTION or PURE CONCEPTION. A *pure conception*, in so far as it has its origin in the understanding only, that is to say, is *a priori*, is called *Notion* (the *Notio* of Kant's text).

IDEE = IDEA or CONCEPTION OF REASON.—A conception formed of notions and transcending all possible experience, as, for instance, the conception of "perfect virtue," is an *Idea*[1] or *conception of Reason*. In the *Critique of Judgment* Kant calls this kind of Idea a *rational Idea* or *indemonstrable* conception of Reason, in contrast with the above-described empirical and pure *conceptions of the Understanding* which are always *demonstrable* (if by demonstration we understand, as in anatomy, merely *presentation*), *i.e.* the object corresponding to a conception of the Understanding being always capable of being given in intuition (pure or empirical) and authenticated by means of an empirical intuition, that is, the thought of it demonstrated or verified by an example. The conception of *magnitude*, for instance, can be given *a priori* in the pure intuition of space, *e.g.* of a right line, and conse-

[1] The German word *Idee* is translated *Idea* with a capital *I* in order to differentiate it from *idea* with a small *i*, which latter is, on the whole, perhaps the least inadequate rendering of the German *Vorstellung*.

quently can be authenticated by an empirical intuition, *i.e.* the thought of it can be demonstrated by an example.

ERSCHEINUNG = PHENOMENON.—A *phenomenon* is the durable object of possible sensations or perceptions. That is to say, it is an aggregate of possible sensations or perceptions for a subject of a certain intellectual constitution, or, in other words, for the all-embracing consciousness of such a subject, or, in Kant's phrase, " for consciousness in general " (*für ein Bewusstsein überhaupt*).[1] An actual perception of the object is not necessary in order to constitute it a phenomenon, for a phenomenon can be real, and recognised as real, without its ever having been given in immediate perception, as, for instance, the centre of the earth. Thus phenomena as a whole are the objective world of appearance, or the aggregate of all possible sense-perceptions for an all-embracing consciousness.

TRANSCENDENT.—*Transcendent* is that which is altogether beyond experience; in other words, that which transcends or steps out beyond the categories of the understanding.

TRANSCENDENTAL.—*Transcendental* is that which is the necessary condition of experience. What is transcendental is, although beyond sensation, not beyond experience, but *in* experience; in fact, is

[1] For an explanation of the term "consciousness in general" see the last paragraph but one of Section III.

precisely that mental element which out of mere subjective sensations renders experience possible. As, therefore, what is transcendental is found in experience, and cannot possibly be found outside experience, there is always room for inquiry into the manner in which it takes part in our various kinds of experience. A *transcendental* inquiry, then, concerns an inquiry into the possibility of experience through certain *a priori*, general mental forms or categories, which, so to speak, transform our *a posteriori* or given sensations into *objects* of experience. *Transcendental* as a whole, then, may be said to be the entire *a priori* that out of any *a postcriori* makes an experience possible. The same thing, however, may be *transcendent* as well as *transcendental.* Thus Kant assumes *things-in-themselves* as underlying the sensations which we combine into the only things (phenomena) actually known to us. These things-in-themselves we, as sensible creatures, can never know, and they are therefore *transcendent* for us. But, notwithstanding this, they may also be called *transcendental,* inasmuch as, though we cannot know them, we assume them to be the actual stimuli of experience.

IMMANENT.—The *immanent* use of anything (of the categories, for instance) is the use of it where it is valid, namely, within the limits of possible experience or the phenomenal world.

METAPHYSIC.—If it be found that our knowledge

of objects is not merely knowledge of them as they would exist anyhow, whether we ourselves existed to know them or not : that is to say, if objects do not merely tell us what they are in-themselves independently of any contributive knowledge on our part, but, on the contrary, that objects, as we know them, would not exist at all without *us*, and that we contribute to our knowledge of them by means of certain *a priori* forms within us, then a systematic exposition of that transcendental, *a priori* contribution is the science of *Metaphysic* (immanent rationalism) in contradistinction to the old spurious metaphysics which dealt in problems merely transcendent. Kant, in fact, will have nothing to do with that so-called metaphysic which on the objective side transcends experience, and he maintains that the only permissible metaphysic is that pure rational knowledge which develops from principles the grounds of experiential knowledge existing in the subject.

CONTINGENT *versus* NECESSARY.—What is *a posteriori*, that is, *given to us* in sensation, is *contingent* : what is *a priori*, or, in other words, contributed or *given by* our own mental forms, is *necessary*. Thus our various sensations, which are *a posteriori*, are, as such, merely contingent. That is to say, they are the result of forces or objects of which we know nothing, and, therefore, as far as we know, the resulting sensations given to us might be

quite different to and in quite another order from that in which they happen to be; or, to repeat, they are *contingent*. Our *a priori* mental forms, however, impart a necessity to those sensations, that is, connect them in various (for us) necessary ways into objects of perception, so that we perceive these objects in a *necessary* order and manner, and no other.

EMPIRICAL REALITY and TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALITY.—The *empirical reality* of space, for instance, means that space, which is an *a priori* mental perceptive form, imposes on *a posteriori* sensations, that is, on sensations *given to* us by powers we know not what, its own structural peculiarities. That is to say, it imposes its own form on what becomes external experience for us, and in this act is for us *empirically real*. At the same time, it is also *transcendentally ideal*. That is, it is the condition itself of all our external experience, and would be nothing at all if the *a priori* condition of the possibility of all external experience were withdrawn, and if it, space, were regarded as belonging to things-in-themselves, or, in other words, to things independently of their relation to our perception. In short, space does not possess *absolute reality* (neither subsistent reality nor the reality of inherence). Thus, for example, I see a table. That table I perceive with the form of space imposed upon it. As regards that table,

therefore, space is *empirically real* to me, that is, real in experience, and only in experience. But when I inquire into the matter, I find that space does not belong to a thing-in-itself called table, but is the very condition of my being able to make the thing I call table an object of experience, and, if I did away with that *a priori* condition, no table, as an object of experience, would exist for me. So that space is also *transcendentally ideal.*

A POSSIBLE EXPERIENCE OR THE POSSIBILITY OF EXPERIENCE.—*The possibility of experience* means those *a priori* mental conditions which enable us to transform our contingent, *a posteriori*, given sensations into objective perceptions, that is, into the necessity of a ruled and regulated objective universe, called experience.

Transcendental Æsthetic.				
Transcendental Logic.	I. Transcendental Analytic.	1. Analytic of Conceptions.	*a.*	Metaphysical Deduction of the Categories.
			b.	Transcendental Deduction of the Categories.
		2. Analytic of Principles.	*a.*	Schematism of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding.
			b.	System of all Principles of the Pure Understanding.
	II. Transcendental Dialectic.			

TRANSCENDENTAL ÆSTHETIC.—The *transcendental Æsthetic* (the critique of sensibility) is that portion of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* in which he deals with those *a priori* forms which he attributes

to general sense, and which he calls our pure perceptions, namely, time and space. These *a priori* forms, according to him, are the *a priori* judgments of mathematics, which relate to the sensibility, and these pure judgments, or *a priori* knowledge, are concerned with space and time. Kant therefore makes it his business to demonstrate that our apprehension of space and time is *a priori* and that this apprehension belongs to the sensibility and not to the understanding, or, in his own terminology, that space and time are pure forms of perception. Without these *a priori* principles he shows that sensible experience is not possible at all. In fact they are the conditions of sensible experience, and in the sphere of sense correspond to the Categories in the sphere of understanding.

TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. — The *transcendental Logic* (the critique of the faculty of thought) is that whole portion of the same *Critique* in which Kant deals with those *a priori* elements in us which he attributes to the understanding, and calls the *Categories*. These pure logical elements of the understanding or universal and necessary rules of thought, which solely concern the *form* of thought and have nothing to do with the *matter* of thought, act upon the pure perceptive elements of time and space, and produce principles which, when applied to the *a posteriori* data of sense, enable us to have experience of objects.

THE TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC.—The *transcendental Analytic* deals with the *a priori* principles of physics, which originate in the understanding. The problem it sets itself to solve is the answer to the question—"How is pure natural science possible?" or, in other words, "What justifies the assertion that the presuppositions of natural science are true?" The first necessary step is to discover all these presuppositions upon a definite principle. In this Kant is assisted by a clue drawn from his own *transcendental æsthetic*, for he finds that just as the perceptions of space and time originate in the sensibility, so do the *a priori* conceptions and laws which underlie natural science originate in the understanding, and he therefore concludes that the discovery of all the conceptions and laws which originate in the understanding will be at the same time the discovery of all the presuppositions of natural science. A twofold problem therefore presents itself for solution in the *transcendental Analytic*. In the first place, the pure conceptions and laws which belong to the understanding as such, *i.e.* the categories or *a priori* logical elements of the understanding, have to be discovered and tabulated; and secondly, their application to individual things has to be vindicated, that is to say, shown to be valid. The *transcendental Analytic* is subdivided into the *Analytic of Conceptions* and the *Analytic of Principles*.

THE ANALYTIC OF CONCEPTIONS.—The *Analytic of Conceptions* again is subdivided into—

THE METAPHYSICAL DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES, the aim of which is to discover and tabulate the pure conceptions of the understanding (*i.e.* the categories) by inquiring whether the forms of judgment (the subject matter of formal logic) really presuppose the categories ; and,

THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES which aims at vindicating the validity of the categories, that is to say, their applicability to individual things. A *transcendental deduction*, in fact, is a verification of *a priori* mental powers by showing, from the necessities of the case, that those powers are actually the conditions of the very possibility of having any experience. That is to say, the necessity of the *a priori* mental machinery employed by us in the fabrication of our experience is deduced, justified, and demonstrated by an exposition of its principles of action in regard to that experience, an exposition which shows that without that *a priori* action the world of facts and experience would not exist for us at all. In short, a transcendental deduction shows the legitimacy of the claim made by facts in our experience to a validity which, merely as facts, independently of those *a priori* mental elements, they would not possess.

THE ANALYTIC OF PRINCIPLES.—The object of the *Analytic of Principles* is to determine the use

of the categories in judgment. It is subdivided into—

THE SCHEMATISM OF THE PURE CONCEPTIONS OF THE UNDERSTANDING, which aims at determining the sensuous conditions under which the categories or pure logical elements of the understanding are used, that is to say, the manner in which these pure elements combine the *a priori* perceptive elements of general sense, time and space, and so render experience possible, when they are applied to the *a posteriori* data of sensation (in short, the *Schematism* shows how, that is, under what conditions, the categories are applied to the data of sense so as to form experience, whilst the *transcendental Deduction* justifies this applicability), and

THE SYSTEM OF ALL PRINCIPLES OF THE PURE UNDERSTANDING, which has for its aim the discovery of the *a priori* principles involved in the categories, as exercised under these sensuous conditions, such, for instance, as the law that all changes take place according to the law of cause and effect.

THE TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.—The *transcendental Dialectic* (critique of "reason" in the narrower sense in which Kant uses it) is that portion of the *Transcendental Logic* in which Kant deals with the *Ideas* which he attributes to *Reason*.

THE CATEGORIES.	
SCHEMA.	
AFFINITY.	
TRANSCENDENTAL UNITY OF APPERCEPTION.	
OBJECTIVE VALIDITY or OBJECTIVE REALITY OF THE CATEGORIES (see also the last paragraph of Section II, and the 3rd, 4th, and 5th paragraphs of Section V).	
CONSCIOUSNESS IN GENERAL, or, EIN BEWUSSTSEIN ÜBERHAUPT (last paragraph but one).	See Section III.
IMAGINATION.	
A PRIORI SYNTHETIC PROPOSITIONS.	
A PRIORI ANALYTIC PROPOSITIONS.	
MATHEMATICAL AND DYNAMICAL CATEGORIES.	
ANALOGIES OF EXPERIENCE.	
POSTULATES OF EMPIRICAL THOUGHT.	
AXIOMS OF PURE PERCEPTION (see also the last paragraph of Section II).	
ANTICIPATIONS OF EMPIRICAL PERCEPTION.	
TRANSCENDENTAL OBJECT and THING-IN-ITSELF.	
AN OBJECT IN GENERAL.	See Section IV.
NOUMENON.	
INTELLIGIBLE WORLD.	
UNDERSTANDING.	
REASON.	
PARALOGISMS OF PURE REASON.	See Section V.
ANTINOMIES OF PURE REASON.	
IDEAL OF PURE REASON.	

SECTION II

TIME AND SPACE[1]

HOWEVER knowledge may reach its objects, there is one means by which it reaches them directly, namely, by *Perception*, which forms the ultimate material of all thought. Perception takes place only so far as an object is given us, and the object can only be given to human beings on condition that it affects the mind in a certain manner. This receptivity or capability of receiving intimations or ideas (*Vorstellungen*) through the mode in which we are affected by objects is *Sensibility*. Objects therefore are *given* to us through our sensibility, and sensibility alone supplies us with perceptions. It is through the *Understanding*, however, that these perceptions are *thought*, and thus from the Understanding there arise *Conceptions*. All thought, therefore, must at last, directly or indirectly, go back to perceptions, that is, to sense, because it is only through our sensibility that objects can be

[1] Herbert Spencer in his *First Principles* rejects Kant's doctrine of Time and Space. In a recently published memoir, however, it appears that Spencer himself once confessed in a letter that he had never even taken the trouble to read beyond the *Transcendental Esthetic*, a confession which tends somewhat to diminish the seriousness of any Spencerian criticism of the Kantian philosophy.

given to us. The actual affection of our sensibility or susceptibility of impression, so far as we are affected by an object, is *Sensation*. A perception of an object through sensation is an *empirical perception*. The undefined object of such an empirical perception is a sense-appearance or *Phenomenon* (*Erscheinung*). The element in a phenomenon that corresponds to the sensation or mere feeling may be called its *matter ;* while that element, which makes it possible that the units of impression or manifold matter of the phenomenon should be perceived as arranged in a certain order, may be called its *form*. Now it is evident that that without which sensations can have no order or form cannot itself be sensation. The matter of all phenomena, as defined above, is given to us *a posteriori* by powers we know not what, that is, empirically by means of sensation ; but their form must lie ready for them *a priori* in the mind, and can therefore be considered as separate from all sensation. All ideas in which there is nothing found that belongs to sensation may be called *pure*, as distinguished from empirical. The pure form, therefore, of sensuous perceptions, that form in which all the manifold elements or content of the phenomena are seen as arranged in certain ways relatively to one another, must always be found in the mind *a priori*, and may be called the *pure perception*.

Now, it will be found that there are two pure

forms of sensuous perception which constitute principles of *a priori* knowledge, namely, *Time* and *Space*. Neither of these is an empirical conception derived from experience, but a necessary idea lying within the mind *a priori*. In order that certain of my *a posteriori* sensations should be referred to something out of me, that is, to something in a different part of space from that in which I myself am ; again, in order that I may be able to be conscious of them as outside of and beside one another, that is, not merely as different, but as in different places, the idea of space must already be present as a foundation in my mind. The consciousness of Space, therefore, cannot be borrowed through experience from relations of external phenomena to one another and to myself, but, on the contrary, this external experience of the relations of phenomena becomes possible only by means of the *a priori* idea of space in my own mind. By no effort of imagination can we realise to ourselves the conception of there being no space, though we can quite readily think of space as empty of objects.[1] Space must therefore be regarded as a condition of the possibility of external phenomena, and not as a determination or form dependent on them. It is thus an idea *a priori* in

[1] Kant does not mean an absolutely empty infinite space, which seems to be unthinkable, but, regarding space as itself divisible into an indefinite number of other spaces, he probably means any one of those limited spaces as empty of objects.

the mind, or a pure perception, which necessarily underlies or supplies the basis of all experience of external phenomena. Space, in fact, is nothing but the *a priori* form of all external phenomena, that is, of all appearance of objects to external sense, and objects in themselves, that is, apart from and outside space, are not known to us at all.

Time, again, is a pure perception, which lies within the mind *a priori*, and a necessary idea which supplies the basis of all other perceptions. Only in it is all actuality of things possible. It is only because this idea of time lies *a priori* within the mind that we can observe that certain things happen at the same time or at different times ; that is to say, without this *a priori* idea, succession and co-existence or simultaneity could not enter into our perception.

As space is the *a priori* form of the external sense, so time is the *a priori* form of the internal sense, that is, of our perceptions of our own selves and our own inner states. This distinction, however, must not lead us to suppose that the internal sense is totally distinct from the external ; for all that we perceive or feel is *within* us. A particular thing only appears to be without us, in that we distinguish it spatially, and by this means it becomes an external object of perception, and by this means only does our perception become an external one. The *a priori* perception of time, unlike the *a priori* perception of space, supplies no shape, but we

represent to ourselves the succession of time, which is its only dimension, by a line progressing to infinity, a consequence of the fact that time is in a constant flux, while space has its parts permanently determined in relation to each other. Space, as the pure form of all external perception, is an *a priori* condition of external phenomena only, but time is the formal *a priori* condition of all phenomena without exception. For all ideas, whether they have external things for their object or not, nevertheless as determinations of the mind belong to our inner state, and this state falls under the formal condition of inner perception, which is time. Therefore time is a condition of all phenomena—immediately of internal or psychical, and mediately also of external phenomena. We cannot say indeed that all things are in time, because when we speak of things in this unqualified way we are thinking of things in abstraction from the manner in which we perceive them, and therefore in abstraction from the condition under which alone we can say that they are in time. But we can maintain that all things "as phenomena," that is, as objects of sensuous perception, are in time, because without that *a priori* perception of time no phenomena could come within our experience. Time, however, in the same way as Space, has no claim to absolute reality, in the sense that, without taking into account the *a priori* form or subjective

condition of our sensuous perception, it should by itself be a quality or condition inherent in things. For, if we abstract the *a priori* form or subjective conditions of our sensuous perceptions, or, in other words, the manner in which we immediately perceive our inner state, and mediately all external phenomena, time is nothing, and cannot be reckoned as subsisting or inhering in objects as things-in-themselves, that is, independently of their relation to our perception. Time, therefore, is a purely subjective condition of all human perception. Take away this peculiar condition of our sensibility and the conception of Time vanishes, because it is not inherent in the objects, but in the subject only that perceives them.

The famous doctrine thus set forth, and which is to be found in the *Transcendental Æsthetic*, is known as the *ideality* or subjectivity of Time and Space.

Kant, however, and this is an important consideration, does not intend us to look upon space and time as mere empty forms in the subject which are always waiting ready for anything that may enter or be put into them, but he regards them as active functions for placing our sensations in a certain order, and insists that they only have reality therefore when actually engaged in this manner. For, if space and time are looked upon as receptacles existing in themselves within the

subject, we are at once confronted with the insoluble problem as to whether they are finite or infinite. Whereas, if they are real only in the active function of synthesis, that is, when actively engaged in gathering our sensations into a certain order, the problem loses its meaning for the understanding from the point of view of space and time, although our thought is doubtless still confronted with the problem as to the finitude or infinity of the contingent data of sense to which these active functions can be applied. Kant, no doubt, is himself partly responsible for any misunderstanding that may have arisen in this respect, for he employs the term "space" in two different ways. At one time he denotes by it the spatial character of things, that is to say, the form of concrete sensations, which makes them objects of experience for us; and at another, following the usage of ordinary language, that vast, empty receptacle, which seems to exist independently of all particular things and in which these things appear to stand. What is called "perceiving," however, is merely the bringing together of sensations into the order which we term "space." In fact, space is nothing but the function which, exercised upon sensations, is called "perceiving." In other words, it is the process of perception, a form of movement of the soul's activity. The action, therefore, of the subject's perceiving does not, properly speaking, produce space, but

rather it is space. Consequently, the *infinity* of space denotes nothing but the boundlessness of the process of perception, that is, the absolutely limitless possibility of continuing ever further and further the process of space-forming perception. For our perception, certainly, there can be no limits to space, because wherever we look we see space, that is to say, because what we call "perceiving" is nothing but what may be termed the spatialisation of sensations.[1]

A second point which must be borne in mind is the following. Kant does not wish to maintain that the *special* empirical form of external phenomena is due to space; that is, that a chair, for instance, is a chair for us and not a table, merely because of this pure perception of space within us. For there must always be something in the thing-in-itself which is the determining ground of the contingent or *special* empirical form, and no other. All Kant wants to emphasise is that, notwithstanding this, the *special* empirical production

[1] Schopenhauer in his *World as Will and Idea* (*i.e.* World as Thing-in-itself and Phenomenon) does not seem to have completely realised this truth about space and time. He appears to have regarded them more as receptacles waiting for phenomena to be put into them. (See the 2nd Book, for instance, the 24th paragraph from the end; also the 18th paragraph from the end in the same Book, where he applies the term, "*framework of the phenomenal world*"—"*Grundgerüst der erscheinenden Welt*"—to time and space. See also the 4th Book, where he uses the expression, "*endless time and space.*")

must obey the universal conditions of space and become—but only in its own way—*spatial*.

There is a third point which must not be forgotten. Although time and space are themselves wholly *a priori* and mental, they still hold of sense, not intellect. They are perceptions, not pure conceptions. Determinate periods of time arise in the human mind through limitation of the one, fundamental time. This original time, therefore, must be unlimited or infinite, and the idea of it a perception, not a conception. Time contains in itself an endless number of ideas (its parts, times), but this is never the case with a generic conception, which is contained as a partial idea in an endless number of ideas (those of the individuals having the same name), and consequently comprehends them all under itself, but never contains them in itself. Thus the general conception *horse* is contained in each particular idea of a horse as a general characteristic. Time, however, is not contained in the different times, but they are contained in it. It is similarly the case with space. For this reason, the term *general sense* has occasionally been employed, in the next section dealing with the Categories, for the *a priori* perceptions of time and space, in contradistinction to what has there been called *special sense*, or the contingent, *a posteriori* units of sensation given to us by powers we know not what.

Before we leave the subject of time and space

we ought to glance, too, at yet another problem of which Kant has discovered the solution. This problem is—How is it thinkable that that which pure thought establishes as truth which is evident to it, is binding also for objective reality that exists independently of the understanding? Or, in other words, how can propositions that are not based on experience, but on pure thought, possess, nevertheless, validity for the world of objects or external phenomena—the truth, for instance, that two parallel straight lines, if produced, never meet? Kant discovers the answer to this question in mathematics. Geometrical propositions are, without doubt, pure truths of the understanding, and not generalisations obtained through experience. But at the same time they possess objective validity; for what the mathematician discovers by abstract calculation holds good for the world of external phenomena, and is verified by measurement. Now, how does this anticipation of reality by the understanding come about? That is to say, how is the objective validity of mathematical judgments to be explained? The answer is because the space in which geometry projects its *a priori* constructions, that is to say, the space in our idea, is precisely the same space in which external phenomena are. Consequently, everything that geometry establishes for space and spatial ideas in general holds good also for filled space or the world of external pheno-

mena. For, since no object can be given to the senses unless it is in conformity with the axioms of space and the *a priori* propositions derived from those axioms by geometry, all objects must necessarily agree with these axioms and propositions, although the principles of these axioms and propositions lie only in the subject that perceives the objects. In this way the laws of sense become at the same time laws of nature, for nature is in the minutest detail subject to the rules of geometry. The same principle is true of the understanding in general. The phenomenal world, as thought by the understanding, is merely the construction of the understanding itself; and the laws of the understanding are consequently laws of nature too. This is a profound thought, and for him to whom it is presented for the first time can be nothing less than a revelation and the discovery of a new world.

SECTION III

THE CATEGORIES

THE *Categories*, according to Kant, are the pure, radical conceptions, or forms of combination or synthesis of the Understanding, in other words, the specific modes in which the Ego refers to itself the multiplicity or miscellany of sense and unites it there in one consciousness. Just as the pure forms of perception, time and space, are the conditions under which alone objects can be perceived, so the pure conceptions of the understanding are the conditions under which alone objects can be thought. For, if all empirical or *a posteriori* content is removed from phenomena, and the pure forms of perception, time and space, are left out of consideration, there still remains a pure residue by which alone those phenomena can be thought. It is these pure residual elements which Kant terms the Categories. They are the conditions of all our experience, for without their application to the data of sense we should have no objects of experience whatever. This is what is meant when it is said that the categories possess *Objective Validity* or *Objective Reality*. But they are valid for experience, and experience only; for they are mere

Forms for relating, and as such are themselves empty. They can refer to an object only through the medium of perceptions, which present a manifold to be combined. This perception, however, is, in the case of human beings, only the sensuous perception in the forms of time and space, and as a content for the synthetic function of the categories we have therefore only that given in sensations, that is to say, the categories can only be used by us for purposes of a possible experience, and not for transcendent purposes. In other words, their use is *immanent*. They " serve only to spell phenomena, that we may be able to read them as experience," and lose all their significance if applied to things-in-themselves.

The way in which Kant discovered the categories was as follows. Every thinking of an object is an act of judgment, or, in other words, all objective thinking is judging, for in the judgment the relation thought between subject and predicate is asserted as holding objectively. If, therefore, the categories are the relating forms of the synthesis by which objects arise, there must be as many categories as there are kinds of judgment, and every category is the mode of connecting subject and predicate which is operative in its own kind of judgment. This led him to suppose that he could deduce the table of the categories from that of the judgments which he borrows with slight

modifications from Formal Logic. He distinguishes from the four points of view of—1. Quantity; 2. Quality; 3. Relation; and 4. Modality (*i.e.* the degree of certainty of a proposition), three kinds of judgment for each:—1. Universal, Particular, Singular or Individual; that is to say, according as the judgments make an assertion about all, more than one, or only one of the members of a kind; 2. Affirmative, Negative, Infinite; 3. Categorical, Hypothetical, Disjunctive; 4. Problematic (A may be B), Assertoric (A is B), Apodictic (A must be B). To these twelve kinds of judgment he somewhat artificially, as many critics have thought, makes the twelve categories correspond:—1. Unity, Plurality, Totality; 2. Reality Negation, Limitation; 3. Inherence and Subsistence (substance and accident), Causality and Dependence (cause and effect), Community or Reciprocity (action and reaction); and 4. Possibility and Impossibility, Existence and Non-Existence, Necessity and Contingency.

Now, how is it that these categories, being non-sensuous themselves, can be applied to sensuous matter? The answer is to be found in the *Imagination* or Imaginative Faculty of the Understanding, which *unconsciously* combines or synthetises the manifold of sense (*i.e.* the special *a posteriori* data of sense and the general *a priori* perceptions of time and space) into a perception or image, thus making it capable of being brought by the understanding

under the *conscious* unity of thought; while on the side of the Understanding, the same imaginative faculty, by means of the *Schema* of Time which it finds to hand (this schema having been generated by the action of the categories on the first pure form of general sense, *i.e.* the *a priori* perception of time), brings the pure categories into potential relation with the manifold of sense. In virtue of the former imaginative synthesis, time, space, and all the manifold empirical, *a posteriori* elements given under both these pure forms of perception, are unconsciously combined into definite images or perceptions; whilst in virtue of the latter, the categories or pure conceptions, which are pure forms of judgment, become principles of unity which (a schematism having been generated by the action of the categories on the pure perception of time) can be applied (by the imagination) to those images, and in relation to which, therefore, those images may be brought to conceptions, or recognised as containing a unity that corresponds to conceptions.[1]

[1] Kant appears to regard the Imagination as the Understanding working unreflectively or unconsciously. When the unconscious synthesis by the Imagination has taken place, the Understanding becomes conscious of the procedure, and this consciousness takes shape as the conception of the synthesis which the Imagination has unconsciously performed. In fact, in the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant says that it is one and the same spontaneity which at one time under the name of Imagination, at another under that of Understanding, introduces connection into the mainfold of perception.

It is necessary to explain here a little more fully what Kant means by *Schema.* Five points, five counters, or five fingers are severally a *type* or image of the number five ; but any triangle, horse, dog, man, or house in general, which we can construct in our imagination, cannot represent a type. Each of the latter can only be a *schema.* The general conception "triangle" is simply a conceived formula out of which a particular type of triangle can be *constructed.* But the general conception is itself a schema, for the triangle thus conceived is of no single form ; it is rather of an infinitude of forms. For, in order to be an absolutely general conception, it must be neither scalene, isosceles, nor equilateral ; neither right-angled, obtuse-angled, nor acute-angled : but merely a triangle in general ; that is, not a type of any particular sort of triangle, but just a schema of all triangles. In the same way horse, man, dog, house are general conceptions ; not types, but schemata, out of each of which a particular type of man, house, &c., can be constructed. The *type,* in fact, is a single image or figure set up by the imagination ; whereas the *schema* is an absolutely general formula for the production of a whole family of types.

Now, Kant conceives the Categories or *a priori* logical forms of judgment as acting on the multiples of *a priori* general sense, that is, on the pure per-

ceptions of time and space, and, through these again, on the multiples of *a posteriori* or given, empirical, special sense. Of these pure perceptive forms (time and space) the inmost and most general is time, for, as we have seen in the previous section of this Part, time is the *a priori* condition of all phenomena whatsoever, both internal and external, and into it all matters of sense must be received. If, then, the multiples of time are susceptible to the connecting influence of the categories, it is evident that there is a possibility established of conveying this uniting influence through the medium (or schema) of those multiples of time to the whole of those *a posteriori* particulars of special sense that present themselves to us. We can thus understand how a system of *schemata* may be brought about by the operation of the categories or pure logical forms of the understanding on the *a priori* forms of general sense (*i.e.* the pure perceptions of time and space). This operation may be termed the *schematism* of the understanding; and to that *schematism*, to these schemata, it is evident that all other data of sense, namely, the *a posteriori* particulars of contingent, special sense must submit themselves. We can conceive, then, the possibility of the conjunction of the pure understanding (*i.e.* the categories or pure logical forms of judgment belonging to the understanding) with the forms of pure general sense (*i.e.* the *a priori* per-

ceptions of time and space), and this conjunction producing *schemata ;* and we can further conceive the conjunction of these schemata with empirical multiples of *a posteriori* special sense (*i.e.* particular sensations given to us by powers we know not what), and this further conjunction producing the arranged world of experience. Now, although it is *imagination* that by its unconsciously combining or synthetising faculty and by means of the schema which it finds to hand, and which is generated by the action of the categories on the multiples of *a priori* general sense, *prepares* the way for conjunction, that is, brings the categories into potential relation with the data of *a posteriori* special sense, it is *judgment* that in both cases actually *produces* the conjunction ; for it is judgment that subsumes or brings the particular data of *a posteriori* special sense, synthetised by the imagination, under their respective schemata ; just as it is judgment that subsumes or brings the pure multiples of general sense (*i.e.* the pure perception of time) under the pure logical forms of the understanding to the production of the schemata themselves.

As regards *causality,* for instance, the category or pure logical form of thought—" If A is, B is "—which is a hypothetical judgment, has no reference to any time determination. That is, we do not think of B as necessarily succeeding A as an effect of the latter. The imagination, however, makes

that pure thought relation or hypothetical judgment—"If A is, B is"—applicable to the data of sense by means of the pure perception of Time. For by blending that thought relation with the *a priori* perception of time, we obtain the idea of *cause* as that in phenomena which must precede something else in phenomena, which something else necessarily follows as its effect. In other words, in the case of *causality*, self-consciousness or, as Kant terms it, the unity of apperception, possesses a category or logical function which we name antecedent and consequent (*i.e.* the hypothetical judgment—"If A is, B is"). Time, again, which is only an *a priori* form of general sense within us, possesses, on its side, a multiple or series, which is the type of *change*. The category or pure logical function of unity and the pure sense-multiple of Time coalesce by an action of judgment into a *schema*. This schema is brought by the imagination to bear upon such multiples of special *a posteriori* sense as present an analogous order or *affinity* (see last paragraph but one of this section), and thus it is that certain phenomena are perceived by us as objects bearing to each other the mutual relation of cause and effect. In fact we arrive at the proposition—"A is the cause of B." This *causality*, or necessary order in experience, is, as Kant shows, merely the form in which experience is arranged. That form is not necessary for thought,

and is not to be proved from pure logic ; but it is nevertheless necessary for experience. It is independent of experience only because experience is dependent upon it. The geometrical axioms likewise are as little logically necessary as the law of cause and effect. One can think of spaces and geometries in which quite other axioms than ours are valid, as the anti-euclidian geometry proved in the nineteenth century, and tried to make use of as a refutation of what Kant maintained were the universality and necessity of the euclidean axioms. But, although not logically necessary, they are, like the law of causality, unconditionally necessary for our experience, for the good reason that they first bring that experience into being, and indeed can only exercise their function at all—*viz.* the formation of experience—in their application to the data of sense. In fact, the Kantian *a priori* signifies universality and necessity for the world of experience only, no logical, absolute validity, but a universal validity for the sphere of sensible objects alone.

The foregoing paragraph contains, in fact, Kant's answer, in brief, to the celebrated question he himself puts in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, namely, " How are synthetic judgments *a priori* possible ? " *A priori* judgments alone are apodictic, universal, and necessarily valid ; while *a posteriori* judgments are subjectively valid merely ; they lack necessity,

and, at best, yield only relative universality. All analytic judgments are *a priori*, all empirical or *a posteriori* judgments are synthetic. Between the two lies the object of Kant's search—Do *synthetic judgments a priori* exist, and how are they possible? The proposition, for instance—"a body is extended"—is an *a priori, analytic,* and apodictic or necessary proposition, that is to say, a proposition which is bound up with the consciousness of its necessity, since extension is *implied* in body, that is to say, is *implicit,* and the proposition is explicative, that is, it merely analyses what already is present in our conception of body. The universality and necessity of this proposition, in fact, are very easily to be explained, for its truth is inferred by analysis of the mind according to the law of contradiction, since a body having no extension would be contradictory in thought. Again, "all bodies possess weight" is a synthetic and empirical or *a posteriori* judgment. It goes beyond the mere conception of body and adds a predicate which had not been thought in it, for it is only experience which teaches us that weight is joined to matter, a fact which cannot be derived merely from the conception of matter. But "A is the cause of B" (*causality*) is an *a priori, synthetic,* and apodictic or necessary proposition, since cause is *not implied* in change, that is to say, it is *explicit,* and the proposition extends knowledge, that is,

adds by means of synthesis something not already present in our conception of change. For it will easily be seen, if we analyse our mind according to the law of contradiction, that change without a cause is not in itself contradictory. Now, it is the possibility of this kind of *a priori*, synthetic, and necessary proposition, such, for instance, as "A is the cause of B," and the machinery by which it is constructed, that an attempt has been made to describe in the present section.

Reciprocity is another *a priori*, synthetic, apodictic proposition. We have just seen that there are phenomena in which we cannot return from the second to the first ; that is to say, in which we have to recognise a necessary order and which we are bound to regard as connected by the link of causality, taking the causing phenomenon as prior to the phenomenon that follows it as its effect. So, too, there are other phenomena whose express distinction is that we can take them in any order we please. Thus, in the case of a stone becoming warm in the sun, we regard sun and stone in a certain necessary order, the sun, as cause, being prior to the warm stone, as its effect. Whereas, in the case of a house, I can go from cellar to garret or garret to cellar, not feeling that one part of the house is connected with any other part in any necessary order as cause or effect. The former class of phenomena presenting an analogy (see last para-

graph but three of this section on "affinity") to a particular *a priori* logical mental function (*i.e.* the relation between antecedent and consequent, or the hypothetical judgment—"if A is, B is") have been shown to be brought by an action of judgment under that particular logical form or category, and that pure logical process applied to those phenomena is named *causality*. The latter class of phenomena, on the other hand, presenting an analogy to a different *a priori*, logical mental function (*i.e.* the disjunctive judgment—"either A or B") are brought by an act of judgment under that particular logical form or category, and that pure logical process applied to those phenomena is named *reciprocity*.

We have now seen the schematic machinery employed in the cases of causality and reciprocity. The procedure is similar in respect to any others that we may select. Taking the categories one by one, we have simply to find out what multiples of time respectively correspond to them, and the relative schematic machinery will at once appear. The machinery employed for the production of the schema *Number*, for instance, is as follows. The succession of time is a *sensible* multiple of what *intellectual* multiple is employed in the conception of *quantity*: it is the homogeneous coming together of like with like, but that is number. The category of quantity is simply the homogeneous addition of pure to pure, and this addition is sensualised in

the succession of time as a homogeneous addition of bare moment to bare moment. Therefore, the intellectual multiple in this case, namely, the pure logical form or category of *quantity*. is brought, through the medium of the schema of number which is obtained from the pure perception, Time, and by the help of the imagination which unconsciously combines or synthetises the various units, into relation with the *a posteriori* data of sense. Thus *quantity* is the category or pure conception of the understanding under which any such *a posteriori* multiple as that which is represented in the succession of time will be brought or subsumed ; which pure logical form or conception is, it is equally evident, essential to produce *conscious* unity in any such multiple, for otherwise the mind would only be passively filled with a perpetually fleeting succession. We have, however, to remember that each category is itself merely one function of the general principle of unity, namely, self-consciousness or the unity of apperception. So that we finally have the various units, connected with one another in the *unconscious* synthesis of imagination, collapsing into the unity of self-consciousness through the pure conception or category of quantity.

In the case of the schema of *Degree*, the machinery is of the same kind. The category in this case is *quality*. Now, no multiple in time itself can be found to correspond to that category. We are

quite justified, however, in taking the absolute universal of sensation as sensation and conceiving time filled by it. But the process in this filling may be from any amount down to zero, or, equally, from zero up to any amount. This, however, is *degree*, or the coming together of filled moment of time with filled moment of time. In other words, the category of quality is brought into relation with the *a posteriori* data of sense by means of the unconsciously combining or synthetising imagination and the schema of degree, which is, as usual, obtained through the pure perception. Time, and this category or pure logical function, imposes conscious unity on the *amount* exhibited in the *filling* of time, just as the category of quantity, as we have seen, imposes conscious unity on the *bare* multiples in the *succession* of time. In the same way filled time (being in time) is the schema of the category of reality; empty time (not being in time) the schema of the category of negation; permanence in time the schema of the category of substance; existence at any time whatever (whensoever), existence at a definite time, and existence at all times the schemata respectively of the categories of possibility, actuality or existence, and necessity.

The present place offers a convenient opportunity for explaining what Kant meant by *mathematical*, as distinguished from *dynamical* categories. The mathematical categories are those which come under

the first or second heads of quantity and quality, the dynamical categories those which come under the third head of relation (see second paragraph of this section). He considered mathematical categories to be the more important, as actually constituting our perceptions; whereas the dynamical categories merely deal with the *relations* of those perceptions, arranging them mutually in a certain manner and order. Take, for instance, the example of the sun and a stone exposed to it. The categories of quality and quantity act formatively on both sun and stone: they give them for the senses extensive magnitude (quantity-number) and intensive magnitude (quality-degree), and actually enable us to perceive each of these objects as we do; whereas the category of causality merely connects the warm stone with the sun as an effect of a cause, and is therefore a dynamical category. The mathematical categories, in fact, act in such a way as to give us a direct perception, and they are therefore unconditionally necessary; apodictic, not contingent; constitutive, not regulative. The dynamical category of causality, on the other hand, is, as it were, regulative and, in a manner, contingent. For, although we have shown causality to be a necessary, synthetic proposition and, in so far, containing necessity, it is only conditionally necessary, since it is applied to empirical objects already found and thought of in an experience. In fact, it is only the *analogy* of the connection in the empirical facts,

sun and warm stone, with that pure logical mental connection between antecedent and consequent (hypothetical judgment) that raises the former into the force of the latter, and produces the necessary synthetic proposition that the sun is the cause of the stone becoming warm. And this is what Kant means when he speaks of the *Analogies of Experience*, which are three in number: 1. "In all changes of phenomena the substance is permanent, and its quantum is neither increased or diminished in nature"; 2. "All changes take place according to the law of connection between cause and effect"; 3. "All substances, in so far as they can be perceived in space as co-existent, stand in complete community or interaction, that is, reciprocity, one with another." On the other hand, the mathematical categories of quantity and quality having more of necessity in them give birth respectively to *Axioms of pure perception*, the principle of which is—"All perceptions are extensive quantities" (*e.g.* extensive magnitude of the sun and stone), and *Anticipations of empirical perception* with their principle—"In all phenomena, the real, which is an object of sensation, has intensive magnitude, that is to say, a degree" (*e.g.* intensive magnitude of the sun and stone), the axioms, with their principle that an object of perception is always recognisable as an aggregate or extensive magnitude, containing the most unconditional necessity of the two. In the case of the categories that come

under the fourth head of Modality (see the second paragraph of this section), there result only definitions of (1) the *possible*—viz., that which agrees with the formal conditions of experience (according to perception and conception), (2) the *actual*—viz., that which is connected with the material conditions of experience (sensation), and (3) the *necessary*—viz., that which, in its connection with the actual, is determined by universal conditions of experience, that is to say, exists as necessary ; and Kant calls these definitions *Postulates of Empirical Thought.* The term " postulate " he borrows from geometry, for the reason that the *Postulates of Empirical Thought* do not add to our knowledge of the nature of objects, and a postulate in geometry (*e.g.* that it is possible with a given line to describe a circle from a given point) does not enlarge the conception of the figure to which it relates, but merely asserts its possibility.

To return to the part played by the imagination. In unconsciously synthetising or combining the *a posteriori* data of special sense into perceptions or images it operates according to certain rules which make its products, the perceptions, associable or capable of being united with the unity of apperception or self-consciousness, that is to say, rules which insure the *Affinity*, to employ Kant's phrase, of these perceptions to one another. This affinity seems to be nothing but a restraint laid upon these perceptions from within us by the necessary condition itself of the unity of self-consciousness under which

condition alone can I be conscious of these perceptions as mine. In other words, ideas, as received into the mind, are subjected to an unconscious synthesis of imagination, a synthesis which is subdued *a priori* to the unity of self-consciousness. *Affinity*, however, is a difficult term, and it is not easy to define what Kant precisely meant by it. Some have suggested, in contradistinction to the above interpretation, that he meant by affinity some rule proper to *a posteriori* sense-units themselves, whereby one rather than another enters into combination with a third in imagination. That is to say, that there must be some *empirical* condition for the *a priori* synthesis, whereby the *a posteriori* matter of sensation is capable of being fitted into the particular *a priori* form. It will easily be seen that, although these two interpretations are different, it is not impossible to reconcile them, and that there may be truth in both. For the unity of self-consciousness may be brought to bear upon units of sensation which, as *a posteriori* units, have already been prepared in a certain way for the action of imagination and that uniting or synthetic consciousness of self.

By these means, then, the Categories, which collectively are the entire systematic tree of the logical functions of judgment, turn these images or perceptions, which have resulted from the unconscious synthetic activity of the imagination, into objects of experience or an ordered world of objects.

Self-consciousness, which is merely the mind's consciousness of the unity of its own action in determining its objects, has, as it were, to impose its own unity of thought upon the various perceptions presented by the imagination. They have to be united in *one* self-consciousness, and it is owing to these perceptions already, by means of their *Affinity*, standing in relation to the unity of consciousness, as well as to the fact of this one, unchangeable, identical consciousness, or, in Kantian phraseology, this *Transcendental Unity of Apperception*,[1] that the Categories (which are simply particular logical functions of judgment under the single general principle of the unity of apperception) are able to produce an ordered world of experience for us, or what we know as *Nature*. In fact, we can unite perceptions into an organised system of objects only in so far as we can unite them with the consciousness of self; but we can unite them with the consciousness of self only if we can recognise the identity of the individual self during the act of so combining them; and therefore nothing can be an object for us unless it conforms to the conditions under which we can be conscious of ourselves as self-identical subjects in apprehending it. Thus the unity of the intelligence with itself is the prerequisite of all objects for the intelligence; since it is only through

[1] *Apperception* is a term borrowed by Kant from Leibnitz, and denotes the consciousness of self.

their conformity to that condition that they can become objects for us, or that we can be conscious of ourselves in relation to them.[1]

The Kantian term, *Transcendental Apperception*, requires, perhaps, a little further elucidation. Man is not *conscious* of the co-operation of the categories in the production of objects of experience, but accepts the result of this co-operation as something given to his apprehension from outside and independently of himself. This co-operation is only discovered through metaphysical investigation. In other words, the production of objects does not go on in the individual consciousness, but lies already at the basis of this consciousness. For this production a higher common consciousness has to be assumed, which comes into the empirical consciousness of the individual, not with its functions, but only with their result. This higher and common consciousness is what Kant sometimes terms *consciousness in general*, at others, *transcendental apperception*, or the *I*.[2]

This doctrine, which has here been very shortly described, is one of the great landmarks in the history of philosophy, and contains some of the profoundest of Kant's creative thoughts.

[1] For an ampler elucidation of this doctrine see Section V.

[2] Hegel does not appear to have appreciated this deeper meaning of the Kantian phrase, *transcendental unity of self-consciousness*, for he interpreted the latter as the consciousness merely of the individual (see § 42 of his smaller *Logic*).

SECTION IV

THE TRANSCENDENTAL OBJECT AND THE CONCEPTION OF THE NOUMENON

THE idea of a Body contains nothing in perception that could belong to an object in itself, but is merely the phenomenal appearance of something, and the manner in which we, as subjects, are affected by it, and, even if we could see to the very bottom of a phenomenon, would remain for ever altogether different from the knowledge of the thing-in-itself. If we drop our own subjective nature, which, as has been shown, is the *a priori* necessary condition of all our experience, the object, as represented with the qualities ascribed to it by sensuous perception, is nowhere to be found, and cannot possibly be found; because its form, as phenomenal appearance, is determined by this very subjective condition. We know nothing, therefore, of the *transcendental object* or thing-in-itself, that is, of the object apart from the manner in which we, as subjects, are affected by it.

But if, notwithstanding this, I insist upon admitting things which are objects of the understanding only, and which nevertheless, as such, can

be given as objects of a perception, though not of a sensuous perception, such things would be called *Noumena* (i.e. *intelligibilia* or things of the intellect). If we thus accepted Noumena as possible, there would be a kind of knowledge in which there is no sensibility, and which alone possesses absolute objective reality, representing objects as they *are;* while through the empirical use of our understanding, which has regard only to the manner in which these objects affect our sensibility as phenomena, we know things only as they *appear*. In this manner an entirely new field would seem to open before us, a world, as it were, realised in thought. It is no doubt perfectly true that the understanding refers all phenomena, that is, all ideas, to something, *i.e.* a *transcendental object* or thing-in-itself. But this transcendental object cannot be separated from the sensuous data, that is, from the manner in which we are affected by it, because in that case nothing would remain by which it could be thought. It is not therefore an object of knowledge in itself, but only the thinking of something in general, without taking account of the form of sensuous perception. In fact, it is merely the representation of phenomena under the conception of what Kant terms *an object in general.* That is to say, if we think of a particular object, every object being constituted by a certain number of ideas, we think that these ideas must possess a unity as parts of a

related whole or system, viz., a unity represented phenomenally by the particular object they refer to. It is this conceived unity of those ideas, this related whole or system of which we think they are parts, which constitutes the conception of *an object in general*, in distinction from the conception of the particular object of our sensuous perception. In other words, the conception of *an object in general* is generated by the introduction by a particular object, constituted by various ideas, of a systematic unity into those ideas, the correspondence of these ideas with the particular object to which they relate involving that unity. Indeed, this *object in general* is even a necessary thought; for the understanding recognises the accidental and subjectively-conditioned nature of sense-knowledge, and therefore frames for itself the two correlative conceptions of that which is merely appearance subjectively conditioned, and that which is apart from appearance, namely, the thing-in-itself. The latter may thus be called an *intelligible* entity, for it is a something which is opposed by the understanding to the phenomenal as being of a different character. But in order that a noumenon should signify a real object that could be distinguished from all phenomena, I must not only free my thought from all conditions of sensuous perception, but I must have some reason besides for admitting another kind of perception besides the sensuous,

in which such a real object can be given, or my thought would otherwise be empty, however free it might be from contradictions. Now, although we cannot prove that the sensuous is the only possible perception, though it is the only one for us, neither can we prove that another kind of perception is possible. Therefore, although our thought may take no account of any sensibility or sensuous perception, the question always remains whether, after that, it is not a mere form of a conception, and whether any object would then be left.

The object which the understanding frames for itself in contradistinction to the phenomenon is, as has been said, the *transcendental object* or thing-in-itself, that is, the entirely indefinite thought of something in general or a thought without content, a mere X. This cannot be called the *noumenon*, for I know nothing of what it is in itself, and a noumenon would have to be something definite which could be distinguished by some sort of perception (although non-sensuous) as a real object. Notwithstanding this, the conception of a noumenon, that is, of a thing which can never be an object of sense, but is thought by the pure understanding alone, is certainly not self-contradictory, for the simple reason that we cannot absolutely maintain that sensibility is the only possible mode of perception, although we cannot affirm the contrary. In fact, the conception of a noumenon is even necessary in order to prevent

sensuous perception from claiming to extend to things-in-themselves, that is, to restrain it within the bounds of phenomena, and thus to set a limit to the objective validity of sensuous knowledge. For all the rest to which sensuous perception does not extend is called noumenon, for the very purpose of showing that sensuous knowledge cannot extend its domain over everything that can be thought by the understanding. But we cannot understand how such noumena are possible at all, and the realm beyond the sphere of phenomena is for us empty. We have indeed an understanding which *problematically* stretches beyond that sphere, but we have no perception by means of which objects outside the field of sensibility could be presented to us, and by which our understanding could extend beyond that sensibility and *assert* that objects existed. Nor can we conceive how such a perception is even possible.[1] The conception of a noumenon is therefore merely the conception of a *limit*, intended to keep the claims of sensibility within proper bounds, and therefore of negative use only. Our understanding acquires in this way a kind of negative

[1] Schopenhauer was more confident. He considered the most important step in his philosophy, "the transition from the phenomenon to the thing in itself, a transition which Kant gave up as impossible," and, he might have added, Fichte as well. (*World as Will and Idea*: Supplements to the second Book: Chapter xviii).

Hegel likewise maintained in his smaller *Logic* (*Encyclopaedia*), § 60, that the phenomenal world was "not the terminus of thought": that there was 'another and a higher region,' which "to the Kantian philosophy was an inaccessible other world."

extension; for, by calling things-in-themselves *noumena*, and regarding them as not objects of sense, it rather limits the sensibility than is itself limited by it. At the same time, in setting limits to sensibility it has also to set limits to itself, for it is obliged to admit that it cannot know these noumena or things-in-themselves by means of the categories, but can only think of them under a name that indicates something unknown.

The conception of a noumenon, therefore, is not the conception of an object, but only a problem which is inseparable from the limitation of our sensibility; the problem, namely, whether there may not be objects quite independent of that sensibility's perception. This problem can only be answered in an uncertain way, by saying that as sensuous perception does not embrace all things without exception, a place is left open for other and different objects, which problematical objects cannot therefore be absolutely denied, but neither can be asserted as objects for our understanding, because there is no definite conception for them, the categories being unfit for that purpose. Thus a noumenon in a positive sense can only exist for an understanding which does not have to depend upon sense-perception for its material, that is to say, for the divine intellect only. For the human understanding this Idea, like that of the divine intellect itself, remains a problematical conception.

When Kant, therefore, applies the term " cause " to things-in-themselves, he does not, as some of his critics have supposed, indulge in a contradiction of his own doctrine by the application of a category to what is outside the subject and transcendent. By the " causing " or " occasioning " of our sensations is merely meant an inner quality which belongs to them. That is to say, they enter consciousness in a particular manner, which we describe as " passivity " or " receptivity," in contrast to the colouring activity of thought, which is accompanied by a creative, spontaneous feeling. This colouring of the sensations by thought is expressed in such a way that the former are " caused " by something purely outside of them. In other words, the manner in which we interpret our sensations in contradistinction to our thought, which fashions them into objects of experience for us, is due to the peculiar characteristic of receptivity possessed in common by them, that is to say, to a particular quality which they all have, or the way in which they enter consciousness. But their method of entry into consciousness we express as " effect "; that is, the sensations are for us " occasioned " or " caused " by something outside of them. Indeed, it is only in order to express this character of receptivity, that we speak of things-in-themselves, as of that which stimulates or excites this receptivity. Hence it is clear that this " causing " or " occasion-

ing" does not really belong to something outside ourselves, but appertains to the general nature and character of the sensations themselves, that is, to the subject as effected. The relation of this "something outside," or, in other words, of things-in-themselves, to the subject is therefore grasped exclusively from the side of the subject. How, indeed, this outside thing may behave, the significance of this behaviour for us, can only be expressed as "causing of sensation." This is our share, and our only share, in the relation between us and it. When, therefore, we describe this outside thing as "cause," we do not mean any nature of behaviour belonging to *it*, but to *us*. Whilst, therefore, as has already been explained, the character of certain ideas (viz. of sensations coloured by thought) appears, according to purely inner psychological signs, as "effect," the cause outside of them is a mere correlate constructed by those ideas. Consequently, when Kant employs the category of cause in this connection, the "cause" must not be regarded as denoting something indeed outside the subject, the thing as it is in-itself, but only what it is for us, that is to say, in us.[1]

[1] See the Sixth Lecture in Georg Simmel's *Kant—Sechzehn Vorlesungen* for the suggestion contained in this last paragraph. That the interpretation given there is probably correct may be inferred from a couple of passages in the *Critique of Judgment* (see the *Kritik der Urtheilskraft*—Introduction, § 9 and footnote—translation by J. H. Bernard).

SECTION V

THE UNDERSTANDING AND REASON

In considering man and the Universe in which he finds himself, a distinction must be drawn between (*a*) The content of subjective consciousness, or the actual sense-perceptions and ideas in a particular individual consciousness ; (*b*) the objective world of appearance, or the aggregate of all possible sense-perceptions for consciousness in general ; and (*c*) the reality which exists in itself without any relation to a perceiving object, or, in other words, the intelligible world or things-in-themselves. The first (the domain of psychology) is immediate only for the individual subject that has these perceptions ; the relations between the constituent elements being accidental sequences in time, conditioned either empirically or through association. The second (the domain of natural science) is the same for all subjects of like organisation ; the relations between the elements being natural laws, that is, universally valid rules for the connection of objects in space and time. The third, which, as Kant has shown in the preceding section, would be the object of a divine intellect, lies altogether

outside the forms of sense-perception, and is therefore unattainable by human knowledge, which can only proceed through the medium of sense-perception. It is, as we have seen, only comprehensible in human thought as a necessary conception or regulative Idea for the critical determination of the limited nature of our knowledge, and to make it the object of speculative reason is a completely barren undertaking. These three stages or forms of reality, the subjective, objective, and absolute reality, may be said to be the correlates of the three stages or forms of intelligence—the animal, human, and divine; or, in other words, sense-perception, understanding, and reason. In man, the being intermediate between the animal and *God*, all three are to be found; while the animal possesses sense-perception alone, and *God* may be held to possess reason alone.

(*a*) *Sense-perception* is the capacity for receiving sensations, or the receptivity for affections, the *a priori* forms of that receptivity being, as already explained in Section II, time and space, and the product of sense-perception a plurality of sense-perceptions in space and time.

(*b*) *The Understanding* is the faculty of producing ideas spontaneously and of connecting them, of thinking by means of conceptions, of bringing or subsuming under certain rules, and of determining the particular by means of the universal, the in-

dividual by means of the genus, that is, of judging. It operates under the forms of logical judgment or synthesis belonging to it, and we have seen that the pure conceptions corresponding to these forms are called "categories." But the understanding cannot free itself from the sensuous matter in which it works (*i.e.* space and time), and the categories which enable us to synthetise or combine the matter of sense in different relations, and thus to develop for ourselves the consciousness of a unitary world, are therefore categories of the *finite*, which cannot be used to determine the *infinite*. Thus the conception of causality, while it enables us to determine successive phenomena in time as necessarily connected with each other, cannot enable us to connect the phenomenal as such with the noumenal, that is, with the thing-in-itself. The *spontaneity* of the understanding stands in contrast with the *receptivity* of sense. The understanding introduces law and systematic connection among the given individual sense-perceptions, and the product of sense-perception and understanding together is the system of nature, arranged in space and time in conformity with law, as science presents it to us. In fact the laws of the activity of the understanding are at the same time laws of nature, and thus the categories or pure logical forms of judgment of the understanding have, as before explained, what is known as *objective validity*, on account of this very

fact, namely, that they really make possible and determine for us all objects of possible experience.

Kant himself tells us that it was the demonstration of this particular truth which entailed upon him the greatest amount of labour, and it is the one which forms the central thought of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. He bases his proof on two points: (1) All synthesis or combination into different relations of the manifold in sensation, that is, of the plurality of sense-perceptions in space, proceeds from the spontaneous activity of the subject; the faculty of this spontaneous synthetising being called "understanding." (2) Objective reality, or nature as a unity of objects, first arises when the understanding reduces the manifold in this manner to the unity which we find in experience; the conclusion of the whole matter therefore being that the functions of the understanding are *constitutive* for objective reality, or, in other words, that the formulæ (*i.e.* the categories) which express the activity of the understanding are at the same time *objectively valid* laws of nature.

To put it in an even simpler way. If there were no understanding, there would be no nature for us either, but only a throng of fleeting sensations or plurality of unrelated and isolated impressions of sense. The fact that we perceive reality as a unitary plurality of permanent things, as a cosmic whole, subject to laws, is not a consequence of the con-

stitution of reality *in itself*, which may or may not be unitary and regular ; for reality *in itself*, with its conformity to law, does not pass over into our ideas at all, since we only know it *as we are affected by it*. Neither is it a consequence of our sensibility, which rather conveys to us quite separate elements in all kinds of order or disorder. It is rather the act of the understanding, which imposes [1] its own unity and regularity, that is to say, its own laws, upon the given elements of sense-perception, and thereby creates for us the unitary world of experience. In this manner it will easily be seen that the thinking ego is really a presupposition of the possibility of the corporal world, which is a product of its own activity.

All knowing, therefore, consists in the formation of sense-given material by means of the energies which we call "Understanding"; and this is possible, because it is by this very formation or synthetisation that the object of knowledge or objective image is brought about. We first form this object out of the given impressions of sense, and this is called "knowing it"; but both are

[1] This word *imposes* is the explanation of the Kantian term, *constitutive*, in the previous paragraph. The understanding is constitutive by reason of its being able to impose in this manner. It is also an explanation of the words *objective validity* or *objective reality*, for the fact of the understanding being able to impose its categories upon the *a posteriori* data of sense, and so turn them into objects of experience, is the same thing as to say that those categories are objectively valid.

only two different expressions for one and the same thing, and for this reason the laws, according to which our intellect goes to work, must be the unconditionally necessary laws of apprehendible things. The object of knowledge thus coincides with the knowing of the object. We recognise the object when we produce it as an object. It is, however, the unity of our self-consciousness, that is to say, the "I," which is the active force that enables us to synthetise sense-units in this manner into objects of knowledge. The objectivity of things, in contradistinction to the "I," lies in that very unity of the "I," a unity which the latter itself lends to them and with which they repeat its own form; a unity, however, which on the side of the "I" itself, only wins its existence by means of those separate contents of the represented world and as their form. That is to say, the "I" only becomes conscious of itself and of its own unity in the production of its objects of knowledge. Indeed, what we call the "I" is nothing but the function of bringing about the unity, the objective character, and the knowableness of things.

Kant, therefore, cannot be said to have subjectified the world; rather has he objectified the "I." Moreover, when the sovereignty of the "I" makes the object above all the product of the subject, the similarity in principle of the synthetising reality in all subjects guarantees that the

object legitimated by this reality, because created out of it, is really objective, that is to say, necessary and universally valid for all.[1]

(*c*) *Reason* is the faculty of passing beyond the empirical or sensible world, which is the domain and product of the understanding, to the non-empirical, and its product is the ideal or intelligible[2] world. The understanding, although it pertains to the empirical world, cannot refrain, as we have already seen in dealing with the conception of the Noumenon in the previous Section, from granting the reality of the intelligible or super-sensuous world, although only as a limiting Idea, towards which it strives, without being able to give it positive content in thought. Human reason is only a feeble reflection of the divine, absolute reason. In man, reason is primarily employed in the *practical* sphere, that is, in the creation of practical Ideas or, in other words, thoughts about something that *ought* to be real, although it does not exist in the empirical world, and that can and *ought* to be realised by reason's own activity, as, for instance, "the perfect state." In the *theoretical* sphere, reason acts as the principle which (*a*) limits and (*b*) regulates the employment of the understanding. It accomplishes

[1] See the Fifth and Seventh Lectures in Georg Simmel's *Kant—Sechzehn Vorlesungen* for the suggestions contained in these last two paragraphs.

[2] It need hardly be pointed out that the term "intelligible" is not employed by Kant in the sense of "comprehensible." It is derived from the word *intelligibilia*—"things of the intellect."

(*a*) by employing the Idea of an absolute knowledge, or the knowledge of things-in-themselves, in order to bring the understanding to the consciousness of its necessary limitation to the phenomenal world or world of appearance. It accomplishes (*b*) by holding out the Idea of the *Unconditioned*, whereby the unity of knowledge may be completed. The problems connected with Reason are dealt with by Kant in that portion of the *Critique of Pure Reason* which he calls the *Transcendental Dialectic*. In it he criticises the attempts which have been made at various times to construct a metaphysics out of noumena, that is to say, to turn the supersensuous, which indeed is a necessary thought, into an object of possible knowledge, which is quite another matter; and he discovers the illusion which lures mankind into regarding the noumenal or intelligible world from this latter point of view, and thereby into indulging in, what he terms, *transcendental dialectic*. His argument is as follows :—

Human thought, which obeys the law of the categories, arranges the given sensuous data in certain relations, so that every phenomenon is conditioned by other phenomena. The result of this is that, if the understanding is to comprehend a phenomenon to the bottom and in its completeness, it must grasp the *whole of the conditions* by which that phenomenon is determined in its con-

nections with the whole experience. That is to say, it must grasp an absolute *unity* of the entire universe in one homogeneous whole; a complete enumeration or *specification* of differences in the universe; and a perfect *continuity* of unity and difference, that is, a complete system of links between the highest unity and the greatest multiplicity. But this the understanding finds impossible in view of the endlessness of the world of phenomena in its relation to time and space, and therefore this peculiar relation between understanding and sensibility results, as may easily be understood, in necessary but insoluble problems. It is these problems that Kant calls *Ideas*, and it is *Reason*, in its *theoretical* as contrasted with its practical sense, as explained above, which, according to him, is the faculty requisite for this highest synthesis of the cognitions of the understanding. But, if reason represents a problem of this kind to itself as indeed solved, it must needs regard the totality of conditions as something *unconditioned*, that is, something which, although containing within itself the conditions for an infinite series of phenomena, is not itself determined by any conditions. This completion of an infinite series is no doubt contradictory for the knowledge of the understanding, but it must nevertheless be thought, if the task of the understanding, which aims at such completion, is to be pursued.

The Ideas, therefore, are merely mental representations of the *unconditioned*, which must necessarily be thought, but cannot ever be an object of knowledge, and the transcendental illusion into which metaphysics falls lies in this, that the unconditioned is regarded as given, whereas it is only *imposed* or set as a task in its various forms by the Ideas of reason. In fact, these Ideas are not constitutive principles through which, as through the categories which act upon the sense data of our experience, objects of knowledge are produced, but merely *regulative* or heuristic *principles* which are always constraining the understanding to seek ever farther afield for more and more of the connecting links in the conditioned world of experience. In the slightly different phraseology of the *Critique of Judgment*, they are valid only for the reflective, not for the determinant Judgment. Unlike the categories, which can act constitutively, because the data of sense are given upon which they can impose their pure forms, and which they can thus transform into objects of knowledge, the Ideas cannot be applied as constitutive principles, because the *full* data of sense which would be requisite (*i.e.* the totality of conditions) are not given in their case upon which they could impose their forms and which they could thereby transform into an object of knowledge (*i.e.* the unconditioned). The whole of the transcendental dialectic indulged in by

human beings is thus merely due to the fact that they attempt to use productively or constitutively the pure transcendental machinery of thought in its own *a priori* seclusion, that is to say, without the realisation of the *a posteriori* of sense.

Of these Ideas of Reason in its theoretical sphere Kant finds three: (1) The unconditioned for the totality of all phenomena of the inner sense is thought as *the soul*; (2) the unconditioned for the totality of all data of the outer sense is thought as *the world*; and (3) the unconditioned for the totality of all the conditioned in general is thought as *God*.

(1) The first transcendental illusion (the soul) is dealt with in that part of the *Critique of Pure Reason* which he calls the *Paralogisms of Pure Reason*, a paralogism being the mistake of confounding one kind of truth with another, or employing one and the same word in the two premises of a syllogism with a different meaning. In it he shows that the scientific conception of substance is bound to our perception of that which persists in space, and is therefore applicable in the domain of external sense only; so that the old metaphysicians in attributing simplicity and permanence to the soul assumed that the qualities of the phenomenal soul, as given in experience, formed part of its own real essence, and thus based their method on a Paralogism. But

although he maintains that the Idea of the soul as an unconditioned real unity of all phenomena of the inner sense is indeed as little capable of proof as of refutation, he nevertheless admits that it is a regulative principle of Reason which incites the understanding to investigate mental phenomena or the inter-connections of the psychical life.

(2) The second transcendental illusion (the world) is dealt with in that well-known portion of the *Critique of Pure Reason* which Kant terms the *Antinomies of Pure Reason.* There are four such antinomies, a number which rests upon the list of the categories, that list being taken as the basis of his argument. He shows that when the universe *as an unconditioned whole* is treated as an object of knowledge, propositions which are mutually contradictory can be maintained with equal warrant and necessity, in so far as we follow, on the one hand, the demand of the understanding for a completion of the series of phenomena, and, on the other, the demand of the sensuous perception for their endless continuance. Thus he proves that the world must have a beginning and end in time and space; that, as regards its substance, there is a limit to its divisibility, or, in other words, that it consists of atoms; that events in it must be traceable to originally free (*i.e.* unconditioned) beginnings, in other words, that there must be absolute initial points of action

in it ; and that to it, as a whole, there must belong an absolutely necessary cause, God ; and he proves respectively the contradictory opposite for all four cases. Illusion, however, though it be, the Idea of the World as an unconditioned whole serves nevertheless to prompt the understanding to an ever-increasing appreciation of the unity and inter-dependence of external phenomena.

(3) The third transcendental illusion (God) is criticised in that part of the same *Critique* which he calls the *Ideal of Pure Reason*, the Ideal which the Reason puts before it being the union of abstract identity (that is, something without any defining terms which as such seem to the understanding to be only a limit and a negation—something therefore limitless and undefined and thus most real) and Being (the only term under which that most real of real things can be defined) ; a union, in other words, which is *God*. He shows that all proofs of God's existence, including the three stock proofs that follow, are illusory. Thus in a trenchant argument, criticised rather feebly by Hegel, he refutes the *Ontological proof* employed by Descartes and Jacobi, and indirectly by Spinoza, which seeks to infer the existence of God from the conception alone of God's being, on the ground, so the proof runs, that one of the attributes of a perfect being must be existence ; he shows that the *cosmological proof* or argument *e contingentia mundi*, which seeks the first

cause of all that is contingent in an absolutely necessary being, contains a *petitio principii*, in that the procedure involves taking a first cause for granted, which is itself incapable of proof; and that the *physico-thcological argument*, or Argument from Design, which tries to prove God's existence from the ordered scheme of the universe, leads at best, not to the conception of a Creator, but merely to that of a wise and good Architect. But in spite of this, he lays strong emphasis upon the fact that the belief in a living, real unity of all reality constitutes the only powerful motive for empirical investigation of individual groups of internal and external phenomena and the discovery of new relationships between them, and is therefore a most useful regulative principle of Reason.

Hence we see that Reason as the faculty of inference, as contrasted with the understanding as the faculty of judgment, is always urging the understanding to push ever farther afield in every department of knowledge, and to bring all things under laws, and thus to arrive at a perfect completeness of knowledge, and it tempts the understanding to strive after this impossible ideal by dangling before it the Idea of the Unconditioned. In fact, the mind's impulse is to bring all the objects of the world under its own unity, but the laws of the understanding are not such as to permit of its perfect attainment. The logical nature

(understanding and reason) is really the ego-in-itself ; time and space belonging merely to sense, since they are only the sensuous material in which the ego-in-itself works, and which being phenomenal can pass away at death. But the ego-in-itself remains, a spaceless, timeless, pure-thinking spirit ; and this, though unrealisable in perception, is nevertheless a true and necessary thought.

SECTION VI

THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL

Practical Freedom distinguished from Transcendental Freedom

KANT points out that there are always two ways in which we can conceive events to be due to a cause. Either the causality, in other words, the causal activity or active power or faculty of causing, which produces the event as its effect is *natural*, or it springs from *freedom*.

By natural causal activity is meant the connection of one state in the world of sense with a preceding state in that same world, and in which the second state follows the first in conformity with a rule. Now, as the *causal activity* of phenomena depends on conditions of Time; in other words, as the effect *follows* the cause; as also the preceding state, if it had always existed, could not have produced an effect which first takes place in Time (because, if the cause had always existed, the effect must have always existed along with it, and could not have begun as an effect in time), it follows that the causal activity possessed by the cause of

that which happens or arises, that is to say, of that which is caused (*i.e.* an event), must, according to the principle of the understanding, have itself *arisen* as an event in time and itself require another cause to account for it.

By freedom, on the contrary, in its cosmological meaning, that is, in the sense of there being an unconditioned or primal cause of all the causal connections of the universe, we understand the faculty of bringing a state into existence *spontaneously*. The causal activity therefore of this freedom does not depend, according to nature's law, on another preceding cause which determines it in time. Taken in this sense, freedom is a purely transcendental Idea, that is, an Idea which neither contains in it anything derived from experience, nor the object of which can be given in any experience ; because it is a universal rule, even of the possibility of any experience, that everything which happens or comes into being must have a cause, and that therefore the causal activity possessed by that cause, which activity itself has happened or arisen, must itself also have a cause to account for it. As, however, it is impossible within the limits of a possible experience to arrive at an absolute completeness of causal relations in the world, that is, the complete sum of all phenomena, which, *as a whole*, could be then regarded as itself without a cause, that is, unconditioned and free ; reason

creates for itself the Idea of a spontaneity, or a power of beginning to act purely of itself, without being determined to activity by another cause, as the law of natural causal activity demands. That is to say, as we cannot gather together all causal connections under our view, but must ever be seeking for a further cause within the limits of experience, we cannot get the entire sum of the causal connections of the world into a *whole*. If we could do so, we might look upon this *whole* as itself without a cause, and thus as unconditioned and complete in itself, and so free. We therefore have to fall back upon our reason, which creates for itself a free, active, unconditioned, supreme, first cause, as a cause of all the causal connections in the world.

Now the *practical* conception of freedom is founded on the *Transcendental* (*theoretical*) *Idea of freedom*,[1] and the question of the possibility of the former is difficult only as it involves the consideration of the possibility of the latter. The difficulty which thus arises is due to our confusing two different things: (1) The consciousness in every man of a faculty of determination, independent of necessitation by sensuous impulses, that is to say, freedom in its *practical* meaning. For freedom, in its *practical* sense, is the independence of our will of *coercion* by

[1] See the previous section, 8th paragraph, for the *practical* and *theoretical* spheres of Reason.

sensuous impulses. Will is sensuous, so far as it is *affected pathologically* (*i.e.* by sensuous impulses), and *animal*, if *necessitated pathologically*. It is *free* if it is affected, but not *necessitated* pathologically. The human will is certainly sensuous, but not *animal*. On the contrary, it is *free*, because sensuous impulses do not necessitate its action, there being in man a faculty of determination independent of coercion through sensuous impulses. And (2) the *transcendental* (*theoretical*) idea of freedom; that is, our imagining that we have a conception of such a thing as freedom by itself, in other words, of something unconditioned, without a cause, and also that such a thing as freedom is possible in the world; neither of which we can under any circumstances maintain, since freedom, as such, that is, something active without itself a cause, cannot come within the limits of any possible experience.

In fact, the real problem before us is not *psychological*, but *transcendental*. It is not *practical freedom*, but *transcendental freedom* which is the problem. The question of the possibility of freedom concerns psychology, it is true; but as it rests on dialectical arguments of pure reason, its solution must engage the attention of transcendental philosophy only. Every man, no doubt, is conscious of a faculty of determination independent of coercion by sensuous impulses, that is, of practical freedom. But that is all that he can say with truth; and he

cannot out of this psychological truth produce the possibility of freedom; that is, he cannot assert that freedom really exists in and by itself as an active, unconditioned cause without having itself a cause. The solution of this problem must, therefore, be settled in another manner, that is, by means of transcendental philosophy.

SECTION VII

INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM OF TRANSCENDENTAL FREEDOM

In the question of nature and freedom we are at once confronted with the difficulty, namely, whether freedom is possible at all, and if it is, whether it can exist along with the universality of the natural law of causal activity. Can we, in fact, affirm that every effect in the world must arise, *either* from nature, *or* from freedom, or must we say that in different relations the same event could be due both to nature and to freedom. That every event in the world of sense is connected with a preceding event according to an unchangeable law of nature, admits of no exception. The question, therefore, can only be whether, in spite of that principle, the same effect may not only be determined in accordance with natural law, but may also depend upon freedom; or whether freedom is entirely excluded by that inviolable rule. Here the common but false presupposition of the *absolute reality* of phenomena, as things-in-themselves, shows at once its pernicious influence in embarrassing reason (see Section IV). For, if phenomena are things-in-

themselves, freedom cannot be saved: because, if there is *nothing* outside phenomena, as the ground of these phenomena, *freedom* cannot be outside phenomena as their cause, that is, freedom cannot be non-phenomenal and outside the limits of experience. The conditions, in fact, would always be members of exactly the same series as the conditioned. Nature in that case would be the complete and adequate cause of every event, and the cause of every event would always be contained in that series of phenomena only, which, with its effect, is necessary according to the law of nature. If, on the contrary, phenomena are taken for no more than they really are, namely, not things-in-themselves, but ideas only or impressions on sensibility, that is to say, merely objects connected with one another in consciousness according to empirical laws, they must themselves have their source in that which is not phenomenal, that is, their ground or cause must be intelligible only and outside the limits of a possible experience. The causal activity of such an intelligible cause, however, is not determined with reference to its causal activity by antecedent phenomena, although the *effects* of that intelligible causal activity are presented to us as phenomena, and, as phenomena, must therefore be regarded by us as determined by and linked up with other phenomena in the causal connection of natural law. That intelligible cause, therefore, with its

causal activity, is itself *outside* the series of phenomena and natural causal connection, though its *effect* (a phenomenal action) is to be found *in* that series. The effect, therefore, can, with respect to its intelligible cause, be considered as free, and yet at the same time be viewed on its phenomenal side as not free, but as resulting from previous phenomena according to the necessity of nature. What has already been remarked will now very clearly be seen, namely, that, as the unbroken connection of all phenomena in the woof of nature is an unalterable law, it would necessarily destroy all freedom if we were to defend obstinately the absolute reality of phenomena as objects-in-themselves. Those persons, therefore, who adhere to the common opinion on this subject, can never succeed in reconciling nature and freedom.

It may be as well to reiterate what is contained in this last paragraph in order to make Kant's meaning still clearer to the reader. Our experience shows us that phenomena in the world of nature are governed by an unchangeable law of nature, namely, the law of causal connection, that is, the law of cause and effect. Therefore, in respect of these phenomena, we cannot hold that there can be such a thing as freedom. If, however, we allow, as we should do, that phenomena are merely ideas or impressions on our sensibility, that is to say, the effects of *transcendental objects* which are the grounds or causes

of these phenomena and themselves outside the series of phenomena, in other words, outside the limits of experience, we may then maintain that phenomena are governed by the law of nature as between themselves in the world of nature, and yet hold at the same time that the causes of those phenomena, that is, the causal activity possessed by these transcendental objects, which for us are things-in-themselves and outside the limits of possible experience, are not governed by the law of nature, but are free and unconditioned, *i.e.* without a cause themselves. But if, on the contrary, we do not allow phenomena to be mere ideas or impressions on our sensibility, that is, if we maintain that phenomena are things in and by themselves, we must then abandon the transcendental Idea of freedom, and with it the practical conception of freedom. For in this latter case we do away with the two series which enabled us to hold the Idea of freedom, namely, the series of phenomena as mere impressions on our sensibility, and the series of transcendental objects as the free ground or cause of those phenomena ; and we are left with only one series, namely, that of phenomena, which we assert are objects in themselves. In this latter case, therefore, we cannot possibly adhere to the Idea of freedom ; because in these phenomena, which, we assert, are things-in-themselves, experience only shows us the iron law of nature working through causal connec-

tion, and we cannot in one and the same series have freedom and at the same time not freedom. It follows, therefore, that if we wish to be able to adhere to the Idea of freedom, we must admit that phenomena are mere ideas or effects upon our sensibility of the causal activity of transcendental objects outside the phenomena, which activity may be considered free and unconditioned, since the transcendental objects with their causal activity are outside time and space and possible experience, and are therefore not governed by the law of causal connection which is found everywhere in nature.[1]

[1] For a reply to the objection that Kant, inconsistently with his own doctrine, applies the category of cause to things as they are in themselves outside the subject, see the last paragraph of Section IV.

SECTION VIII

THE PROBLEM OF TRANSCENDENTAL FREEDOM

The empirical character of a subject of the world of sense (man) distinguished from its intelligible character; this distinction being considered with reference to the possibility of a free causal activity in harmony with the Universal Law of Natural Necessity.

WHATEVER in an object of the senses is not itself phenomenal may be called *intelligible*. If, therefore, what in the world of sense must be considered as phenomenal, possesses in itself a faculty which is not an object of sensuous perception, but by means of which faculty this phenomenal being can become the cause of other phenomena, the causal activity of this phenomenal being may be regarded from two points of view: (*a*) It is *intelligible* as regards its *action*, as the causal activity of a thing-in-itself, that is, of something which is not phenomenal, but free and unconditioned; (*b*) it is *sensible* as regards the *effects* of its action, as the causal activity of a phenomenon in the world of sense. Of the causal faculty of such a phenomenal being (man, for in-

stance) we should have to form both an *empirical* and an *intellectual* conception, both of which exist together in one and the same effect; and this twofold way of conceiving the causal faculty of a sensuous object does not contradict any of the conceptions which we have to form of phenomena and of a possible experience. For as all phenomena, not being things-in-themselves, but merely ideas or impressions on sensibility, must have for their ground a transcendental object, determining them as mere ideas, there is nothing to prevent us from attributing to that transcendental object, besides the property through which it becomes phenomenal, a *causal activity* also which is not phenomenal, although its *effects* appear in other phenomena. Every effective cause, however, must have a *character*, that is, a rule according to which it manifests its causal activity, and without which it would not be a cause. According to this, we should have in every subject of the world of sense (such as man), first, an *empirical character*, through which its acts, as phenomena, stand with other phenomena in unbroken connection according to permanent laws of nature, and could be deduced as effects from those other phenomena as their causes or conditions, and in connection with them form the links of one and the same series in the empirical order of nature, that is, in the order which our experience teaches us that nature always

preserves. Secondly, we should have to allow to this phenomenal being or subject of the world of sense an *intelligible character* also, by which, it is true, it becomes the cause of the very same phenomenal acts or effects as were mentioned in the last sentence, but which itself is not subject to any conditions of time and space and so of sensibility, and is therefore never phenomenal. The empirical character of every such subject of the world of sense might be called the character of the thing as a phenomenon, and its intelligible character the character of the thing-in-itself.

This active subject (man) in its intelligible character would depend on no conditions of time, for time, we have seen (Section II), is only the condition of phenomena and not of things-in-themselves. In its intelligible character none of its activity would ever *begin to be* or *perish* in time; that is, none of its activity would be initiated by a cause or ended through the cessation of a cause, because its activity would be outside all the laws of nature, and thus spontaneous and free. Thus it would not be subject to the law of determination in time and of all change, namely, that everything which *begins to be* must have its cause in the *phenomena* of the previous state. In a word, its causal activity, so far as it is *intelligible*, would not have a place in the series of empirical conditions by which the event is rendered necessary in the world of sense as following upon a

phenomenal cause according to the law of nature. It is true that this intelligible character could never be known immediately, because we cannot perceive anything except in so far as it appears as a phenomenon in nature, but it would nevertheless have to be conceived in accordance with the law of our empirical state, as we must always admit in thought a transcendental object at the basis of phenomena, though we know nothing of what such an object is in itself.

In its *empirical character*, therefore, that subject of the world of sense would, as a phenomenon, obey the law of causal connection in all its acts or effects, and in that respect it would be nothing but a part of the sensuous world, and its effects, like those of every other phenomenon, would arise without fail according to the law of nature. As soon as external phenomena began to influence that subject, and as soon as its empirical character, that is, the natural law of its causal activity, had become known through observation and experience, all its actions ought to admit of explanation as effects of those external phenomena according to the laws of nature, and all that would be requisite for the complete and necessary determination of its causal activity would be found in a possible experience.

In its *intelligible character*, however (though we could only have a general conception of it), the same subject would have to be considered free from all

sensuous influences and phenomenal determination, that is to say, from all natural necessity. Moreover, as in it, so far as it is a *noumenon* (that is, so far as the transcendental substratum of that subject or the thing-in-itself is concerned), nothing happens, that is, nothing arises in time as an effect of a preceding cause, and as consequently no change which requires the serial order of an effect following upon a cause in time, nor therefore any connection with phenomena as causes, can exist in it, that active being or subject of the world of sense would so far be quite independent and free in its activity from all natural necessity, which natural necessity can exist in the world of sense only. One might say of it with perfect truth, from the point of view of its intelligible character, that it originates its phenomenal effects in the world of sense *by itself*, that is, without any previous temporal condition determining it to activity, and being itself outside the world of sense; though these resultant sensuous acts or effects do not begin *in itself*, that is, do not begin in the intelligible faculty outside the world of sense, but in the world of sense or phenomena. And this would be perfectly true, for we should not be affirming that these effects in the world of sense originate by themselves, because in the world of sense they are always connected with previous causes in time according to natural laws, though only by means of the empirical character, which

is merely the phenomenal appearance or manifestation of the intelligible character; and therefore they are possible only as constituting a continuation of the series of natural causes. In this way freedom and nature, each in its complete signification, might exist together, and without any contradiction, in the same phenomenal actions, according as we refer those actions to their intelligible or sensible grounds.

These two last paragraphs may therefore be summed up very briefly as follows:—The activity of a subject of the world of sense (man) may be regarded from two points of view, namely, its phenomenon and the transcendental object of that phenomenon. That transcendental object has the faculty of becoming phenomenal, that is, of becoming the actual phenomenon, man, as well as of causing the phenomenal actions by that man. The causal activity belonging to this transcendental object is original and spontaneous, and so free; that is to say, it is not itself subject to any cause, being outside temporal and natural conditions. However, although it is the free, spontaneous cause of these phenomenal actions, the latter have, nevertheless, to be linked up in our experience with their natural causes by the law of necessity, and to take their place in the causal nexus of the universe, and therefore appear to us as neither free nor original, but as actions by the phenomenon, man, who is moved

to commit them by empirical influences. When we have learnt the manner in which these phenomenal actions are linked together by the law of natural necessity, we have learnt what is known as the man's empirical character, that character being merely the law of the connection of his actions as phenomena in nature.

To put it in still another way—The subject of the world of sense (man) in its intelligible character spontaneously originates actions. These actions, however, can only become known to us in the sensuous world of phenomena. But in the sensuous world all phenomena are joined in a causal nexus according to natural laws. Therefore these actions or effects, which are originated by the subject in its intelligible character, appear to us as phenomena dependent upon the empirical character of the subject or, in other words, as governed by natural laws. Therefore we may say that the empirical character of the subject is the phenomenal manifestation of its intelligible character.

SECTION IX

THE PROBLEM OF TRANSCENDENTAL FREEDOM (*continued*)

Reason as the free cause of actions not contradictory to the Laws of Nature, if reason's causal activity is regarded as a transcendental Idea only.

THE only question, therefore, here is whether, granting that in the whole series of events there is nothing to be found but the necessity of nature, we may yet regard the very same event, which on one side is merely an effect of nature, on the other side as an effect of freedom; or whether there is a direct contradiction between these two kinds of causal activity? We require the principle of causal connection in nature in order to be able to look for and to present natural conditions of natural events, that is, phenomenal causes of events in the phenomenal world. Indeed, it is by this means alone that phenomena become a system of *Nature* and objects of experience. If this is admitted and not weakened by any exceptions, the understanding which in its empirical employment, that is, in its employment within the limits of a possible experi-

ence, recognises in all events nothing but nature, and is quite justified in doing so, has really all that it can demand, and the explanations of natural phenomena from their natural causes may proceed without let or hindrance. The understanding would not be wronged in the least if we assumed, though it be a mere fiction, that some among the natural causes (man, for instance) have a faculty which is not empirical, but *intelligible* only (*i.e.* the faculty of originating without any previous phenomenal cause itself), and the determination of which to activity does not rest on empirical conditions, that is, on the natural laws of causal connection which our experience teaches us, but on mere grounds of the intellect, if only the *phenomenal activity* of those causes is in accordance with all the laws of empirical causal activity, that is, if only those causes with their phenomenal activity are admitted to have a phenomenal cause themselves according to natural laws.

In this way the active subject (man, for instance), as a phenomenal cause, would be joined with nature through the indissoluble dependence of all nature's actions, and the noumenon only of that subject would contain certain faculties of causing which, if we want to ascend from the empirical or phenomenal to the transcendental object, would have to be regarded as intelligible only. For, if only we follow the rule of nature in the inquiry as to

what may be the causes of any particular phenomena, we need not trouble ourselves as to whether a non-phenomenal and purely intelligible ground of those phenomena and their connection in nature may be conceived to exist in the noumenon or transcendental subject, which is completely unknown to us because outside the limits of a possible experience. This intelligible ground or cause does not touch the empirical questions, that is, does not affect the fact of the unchangeable law of nature as everywhere met with in experience, but concerns only, as it would seem, the thought in the pure understanding. And, although the effects of that thought and action of the pure understanding may be discovered in the phenomena, that is, although the effects of so-called free-will, for instance, may seem to be so discovered, these phenomena have nevertheless to be completely explained as derived from their phenomenal cause according to the laws of nature, by taking the empirical character of that cause as the highest ground of explanation, and passing by its intelligible character (which is the transcendental ground of the empirical character) as entirely unknown, except in so far as it is indicated by the empirical as its sensuous sign.

Man, for instance, is one among the phenomena of the sensuous world, and, in so far, one of the natural causes whose causal activity must be

subject to empirical laws, that is, to those laws of causal connection which our experience teaches us are everywhere observable in nature. Like all other things in nature, therefore, he must have an empirical character. We learn about this character through observation of the powers and faculties which he exhibits in the production of phenomenal effects. Now, in the inanimate or merely brute nature we see no ground for admitting any faculty except such as is sensuously conditioned, that is, as takes its place in the series of phenomenal, causal connection in accordance with the law of nature. But Man, who knows all the rest of nature through his senses only, knows himself not only so, but also through mere self-consciousness, and this in actions and inner determinations, which he cannot regard as due to impressions of sense. He is thus to himself partly a *phenomenon*, partly, however, namely, with reference to certain faculties or powers of causing felt within himself, a purely *intelligible* object, because the action of these faculties in him cannot be attributed by him to the receptivity of sense. These faculties we call *understanding* and *reason*. It is the latter in particular which we distinguish in quite an especial way from all empirically conditioned forces or faculties, that is, from all forces or faculties which are governed by the law of nature as known to us in experience, because reason estimates its objects solely in the

light of Ideas which transcend the limits of possible experience, and determines the understanding accordingly, which then makes an empirical use of its own conceptions in conformity with the law of nature.

Now, that this reason of ours actually possesses causal activity, or at least that we are forced to think so, is clear from the *imperatives*, such as "I ought," which we impose upon ourselves as rules for our conduct. The *ought* expresses a kind of necessity and connection of phenomenal actions with their grounds or causes which we do not find elsewhere in the whole of nature. For, when we say that an action ought to have happened, we mean that reason ought to have brought that action about; that is, we connect what we say ought to have happened with our reason as its preceding cause. But the understanding can know in nature only what is, has been, or will be. It is impossible that anything in nature *ought to be* different from what it in fact is, was, or will be. Nay, if we only look at the course of nature, the *ought* has no meaning whatever; for we can as little ask what *ought* to be in nature, as what properties a circle ought to have. The only question we can properly ask is what happens in nature, and what properties that which happens has.

This *ought*, in fact, expresses a possible action, the ground or cause of which cannot be anything

but a mere conception, for a free, unconditioned reason as a cause is something outside the limits of all possible experience and merely intelligible; while, in the case of every merely natural action that is, has been, or will be, its ground or cause must always be a phenomenon preceding that action in time in accordance with the law of nature. No doubt the action to which the imperative *ought* applies, that is, the action required of us by duty, must be possible under conditions of nature, or we could not say that it ought to happen in experience; but these natural conditions have no influence in determining the will itself, but only in determining its effects among phenomena. That is to say, the so-called free-will or causal activity belonging to our reason, which we are conscious of when we say that something *ought* to happen, is not governed by the law of nature, although the *ought* as conceived to be translated into possible practice as a necessary effect of that free causal activity, that is to say, the action to which that *ought* refers cannot be imagined except as taking its place in the series of natural phenomena, where the law of nature prevails. There may be ever so many natural influences and sensuous stimuli which urge me to an act of will, but they can never produce the feeling of *ought* in my mind. They can only produce a willing or impulse which is always conditioned (*i.e.* always caused by some natural

phenomenon, such, for instance, as these sensuous stimuli or temptations), but which need by no means *necessarily* be translated into actual practice (because human will is not animal, and can resist sensuous impulses), and which impulse the "ought" of reason either authorises, prohibits, or sets a measure to. For reason does not yield to the impulse that is given empirically, that is, to the impulse given by some object in the sensuous world, and does not follow the order of things as they present themselves as phenomena, but frames for itself, with perfect spontaneity, an order of its own in accordance with Ideas to which it adapts the empirical conditions or order of nature, and according to which Ideas it declares actions to be necessary, even although they have not taken place and, maybe, never will take place. Yet, although they may not have taken place and never will, perhaps, take place, reason assumes that it can exert causal activity in respect of them, that is to say, originate them, for otherwise it would not expect effects in the world of experience to result from its Ideas.

To sum up the last two paragraphs—When I say that "a thing did happen," I mention a past event or effect in the world of nature which had its phenomenal cause, which cause was in the series of natural conditions and discoverable by investigation according to natural laws. When, however, I say that "something else ought to have happened in-

stead," I maintain that there *ought* to have been an event or effect, and I attribute to that effect a cause. That cause, however, with its causal activity, does not exist in the series of natural conditions, but only in my own reason. The event which I say *ought* to have happened is merely a possible event or action, which, nevertheless, must be considered as being *able* to happen under natural laws and conditions, that is, with a phenomenal ground or cause preceding it in time, or else I could not imagine it as happening in experience. These natural laws do not govern this causal activity of my reason, although the effects of that activity, that is, the event that I say ought to have happened, cannot be imagined except as taking its place in the series of causes or conditions which are governed by the natural laws of cause and effect. These imperatives, therefore, such as *ought*, prove that we represent our reason to ourselves as possessing a spontaneous, unconditioned causal activity or free-will, which is able to have as its result various effects in experience, that is, in the phenomenal world of nature, although these effects must at the same time be connected in that world of nature with their previous phenomenal and natural causes.

Let us therefore admit it to be at least possible for reason to possess causal activity with respect to phenomena. It will be remembered that every

efficient cause must have a *character*, that is to say, a *rule* according to which it manifests its causal activity, and without which it would not be a cause. It will also be remembered that the empirical character of a cause is that through which its acts, as phenomena, stand with other phenomena in unbroken connection according to permanent laws of nature and could be derived as effects from those other phenomena as their causes or conditions, and in connection with them form the links of one and the same series in the order of nature. If, therefore, we admit that reason possesses a faculty of causing with reference to phenomena, in that case, reason though it be, it must yet exhibit an empirical character. For every cause presupposes a rule according to which certain phenomena follow as effects, and every rule requires uniformity (*Gleichformigkeit*) in the way of effects on which the conception of cause as a faculty, that is, as possessing a power of causing, is founded. This uniformity of effect, as learned from simply observing phenomena, may be called the empirical character of a cause, and this empirical character is permanent, although the effects, according as the accompanying conditions vary, appear in changeable forms.

Thus the will of every man has an empirical character, which character is simply a certain causal activity belonging to his reason, in so far as

that activity exhibits, in its effects in the phenomenal world, a rule according to which one may infer the motives of his actions and judge of the subjective principles of his will. As this empirical character must itself be gathered from observation of the effects of his causal activity in the phenomenal world, and from the rule or order of those phenomena which is supplied by experience, all the acts of a man, so far as they are phenomena, are effects of and traceable to his empirical character and the other causes that co-operate with it in conformity with the order of nature. Moreover, if we could trace all the phenomenal manifestations of his will to the very bottom, there would not be a single action of his which we could not predict with as great certainty as a lunar or solar eclipse, and recognise as necessarily resulting from its preceding causes in the order of nature. So long, therefore, as we look only at a man's empirical character we cannot find any trace of freedom. In fact, viewed from this phenomenal side, no human action can be free, and yet this empirical character is the only thing that comes before us when we are merely *observing* man, and trying to investigate the motive causes of his actions from an anthropological point of view.

But if we consider the very same actions in their relation to reason, not, however, with reference to speculative reason in order to *explain* their origin, but solely so far as reason *is* the cause which pro-

duces them. That is to say, if we do not inquire whether indeed reason *has* a free causal activity which produces effects, and try to explain how this can be possible and what is really the origin of these effects (an inquiry which would be barren of result), but merely consider these effects as *in reality produced* by reason. If, in a word, we view man's actions in their relation to reason as *practical,* we find that they come under a totally different rule and order from the order of nature. For, from this point of view, everything, it may be, in Reason's eye, *ought not to have happened,* which according to the course of nature *has happened,* and which in virtue of the phenomenal causes that preceded it was indeed necessary and inevitable. And, contrariwise, we sometimes find, or believe at least that we find, that the Ideas of reason have really proved their causal activity with reference to phenomenal actions of men, and that those phenomenal actions have taken place, not because they were determined by empirical causes in the order of nature, but because they were determined by grounds of reason alone.

But supposing that one could definitely say that reason does possess a faculty of causing with respect to phenomena, could the action of reason in producing these phenomenal effects be called free in that case, seeing that this action can be accurately derived as an effect of the empirical character (the disposition), and is in fact rendered necessary by it according to laws of nature? That empirical

character again is, as has already been said, merely the phenomenal or sensuous sign of the intelligible character (way of thinking). In other words, the empirical character is determined by or is an effect of the intelligible character. This intelligible character, however, we do not directly know, and hence we have to indicate its nature by means of phenomena, which properly give us an immediate knowledge of the disposition (empirical character) only.[1] A phenomenal action then, in so far as it is to be ascribed as an effect to the way of thinking (intelligible character) as its cause, does nevertheless not result from it according to empirical laws. In other words, it is not, as an effect, *preceded* in time by the conditions of pure reason (*i.e.* by the intelligible character or way of thinking) as its cause, but is only preceded by the effects or sensuous sign of that intelligible character, that is, by the phenomenal form of the internal sense, or, in other words, by the empirical character (the disposition) under which guise only can the intelligible character exert its causal activity in the phenomenal world of human action. For pure reason, as a faculty of causing that is merely intelligible, is not subject

[1] Kant adds a footnote here which Max Müller translates as follows:—"The true morality of actions (merit or guilt), even that of our own conduct, remain therefore entirely hidden. Our imputations can refer to the empirical character only. How much of that may be the pure effect of freedom, how much should be ascribed to nature only, and to the faults of temperament, for which man is not responsible, or its happy constitution (*merito fortunæ*), no one can discover, and no one can judge with perfect justice."

to the form of time nor to the conditions belonging to the succession of time, that is, is not subject to the law of nature which requires that every cause should itself have a cause preceding it in time. The causal activity of reason in its intelligible character does not *begin to be* at a certain time in order to produce an effect, for in that case it would be subject to the natural law of phenomena, in conformity with which causal series are determined in time, and its causal activity would then be natural and not free. What, therefore, we must say, is that, if reason does in truth possess causal activity with respect to phenomena, it is a faculty *by means of which* the sensuous or phenomenal condition of an empirical series of effects first begins to be. For the condition or cause that lies in reason is not sensuous, being non-phenomenal, without a cause preceding it in time, and is thus outside the limits of all possible experience, and cannot therefore itself begin to be, for nothing can *begin* to be where there is no time. In that case we should get what we missed in all empirical series, that is, in all series of phenomena in the world of nature, namely, that the *condition* or cause of a successive series of phenomenal events might itself be empirically unconditioned, that is, without a cause itself in nature. For the condition or cause in its intelligible character would lie *outside* the series of phenomena, and would therefore be subject to no sensuous condition, nor to any time-determination through preceding causes.

Nevertheless the same cause belongs also, in another respect, to the series of phenomena. Man himself is a phenomenon. His will has an empirical character (the disposition), which is the empirical cause of all his actions. That is to say, all his actions can be traced to sensuous impulses which in turn have their own previous causes discoverable in the causal connection of nature. There is no condition or cause determining man to action in conformity with this empirical character (his disposition) that is not contained as itself an effect in the series of natural phenomena and subject to their law, according to which law there can be no empirically unconditioned cause of anything that happens in time. No given action, therefore (since it can be perceived as a phenomenon only), can begin absolutely by itself, that is, spontaneously and without a phenomenal cause preceding it in time. Of pure reason, however, we cannot say that the state in which it determines man's will or, in other words, impels him to action, that is, its causal activity, is preceded by another cause or state in which that activity itself is determined or set in motion. For as reason itself is not a phenomenon, nor subject to any of the conditions of sensibility and the law of nature, there exists in it, even in reference to its causal activity, no succession of time, and the law of nature, which governs the succession of phenomena according to unchangeable rules of cause and effect, cannot be applied to it.

Reason is therefore the constant condition or cause of all free actions by which man takes his place in the phenomenal world. Nevertheless, every one of these actions is determined beforehand in his empirical character. With regard to the intelligible character, however, of which the empirical character is only the phenomenal mask or sensuous sign, there is neither *before* nor *after*, because the intelligible character, being non-phenomenal, is not affected by sensuous conditions of Time; and every one of these phenomenal actions, without regard to the time-relation which connects it with other preceding phenomena in accordance with the empirical character, is the immediate effect of the intelligible character of pure reason. That reason therefore acts freely, without being determined in the chain of natural causes by external or internal conditions anterior to it in time. This freedom, however, must not only be regarded negatively, as independence of empirical conditions (for in that case the faculty of reason would cease to be an active cause of phenomena), but positively also, as a faculty of beginning spontaneously a series of events in nature. Hence nothing begins in reason itself, for reason being intelligible only and non-phenomenal, and thus outside the limits of all possible experience, the sensuous conditions of Time do not apply to it, and nothing can begin except in Time. Reason, also, being itself the uncaused or unconditioned condition of every

free action, admits of no conditions or causes antecedent to itself. But nevertheless the effect of reason, that is, the phenomenal action of which reason is the cause, takes its beginning in the series of phenomena, though this effect can never constitute in that series an *absolutely* first beginning; because, being phenomenal, it has to take its natural place, in conformity with the empirical character, in the causal nexus of the law of nature, and, although a free action of reason, to confess nevertheless to a phenomenal cause preceding it in time.

Thus in the case of a voluntary action, such as a malicious lie, we might proceed to trace all the causes which led to the lie through a man's empirical character, that is, his natural disposition. But although we believe the lie to have been completely determined by all these natural circumstances, yet we blame the offender all the same. Why do we do this? Because we regard his Reason as a cause which, independently of all empirical conditions, could and ought to have determined his behaviour otherwise. Although, as appearance, the lie was sufficiently determined in the past, and in this respect was absolutely necessary; yet it, with all the past which determined it, belongs, so we say, to the one single phenomenon of his character which he makes for himself. The lie, in fact, is imputed to the man's intelligible character. In other words, we regard reason, in spite of all the preceding

causes in the world of nature to which we can trace the lie, as completely free, and the act is imputed entirely to a fault of this free reason.

Such an imputation clearly shows that we imagine that reason is not affected at all by the influence of the senses, and that it does not change, although its phenomenal manifestations do change: that in it no state precedes which determines a following state; in fact, that reason does not belong to the series of sensuous conditions or causes which render phenomena necessary as their effects, according to laws of nature. Reason, it is supposed, is present in all the actions of man, in all circumstances of time, and always the same; but it does not itself exist in time (*i.e.* in the causal nexus of the law of nature), nor does it enter upon any new state in which it was not before. In fact, with respect to any new state it is *determining*, but never *determinable;* that is, by means of its causal activity it can give rise to an effect which takes place in time, but can never itself be an effect of a preceding cause in time. Hence we cannot ask why reason did not determine itself differently, but only why it did not employ its power of causal activity to determine differently those phenomena which appear as its effects in the world of nature. But this is a question that admits of no answer. For a different intelligible character would have given a different empirical character, that is, would have had a different

empirical character as its sensuous sign ; and if we say that, in spite of the whole of his previous course of life, the offender could have avoided the malicious lie, this only means that it was in the absolute power of reason to utter or not to utter the lie, in the latter case, therefore, to effect something quite different to what actually happened according to necessary laws of nature, and that reason, therefore, in its causal activity is, as regards its effects, subject to no phenomenal and temporal conditions.

We thus see that, in judging of free actions, we can, so far as the causal activity which produces them is concerned, get only so far as the intelligible cause contained in reason, but not beyond. We can see that that cause is free, because it is outside the limits of the world of nature ; that it determines its effects independent itself of sensuous causes in time, and that it is therefore capable of being the sensuously unconditioned condition or cause of phenomena. To explain why that intelligible character should, under present circumstances, give these phenomena and this empirical character as its effects, and no other, transcends all the powers of our reason. But the problem which had to be solved does not require us to ask or to answer any such questions. The problem was merely whether freedom and natural necessity can exist together without contradiction in one and the same phenomenal action ; and this has been suffi-

ciently answered by showing that, as freedom may have relation to a very different kind of conditions from those of nature, the law of the latter does not affect the former, and both may consequently exist together in the same action or effect, independent of, and undisturbed by, each other.

It must be carefully noted, however, that Kant, in this examination of the problem of free-will, has had no intention of proving that there *actually is* freedom, and that it is one of the faculties which are the cause of certain phenomena in our world of sense. This would have been impossible, he says, because we can never infer from experience what cannot be thought in accordance with its laws. Therefore, from an effect in experience we cannot infer a free cause, because a cause without itself a cause preceding it in time is outside all the laws of experience, and therefore cannot be thought in accordance with them. Further, he has not even tried to prove that freedom is *possible*, for this attempt also, he says, would have been unsuccessful, because we can never know the possibility of any real ground or causal power by means of mere conceptions *a priori*. Freedom has here been viewed by him merely as a *transcendental Idea*, which leads reason to think that by means of its free causal activity it can absolutely begin a series of phenomenal conditions, the first link in which, although a phenomenon, is sensuously unconditioned, that

is, without a necessary phenomenal cause preceding it in time according to the law of nature. By this illusion reason becomes involved in a contradiction with its own laws. For reason here wrongly prescribes its own laws of free action, which are merely intelligible, to the empirical use of the understanding which has a separate order of laws, namely, the laws of nature which do not allow of any such thing as "freedom." So that in applying one order of laws to a sphere in which another and totally different order prevails there necessarily arises a contradiction. If they are kept distinct and separate, however, there need be no contradiction, for they may then act independently one of the other. Kant has therefore very clearly shown that the contradiction in which people often become involved, when they address themselves to this problem of free-will, rests on a mere illusion, and that nature does at least *not contradict* the causal activity of freedom, considered as a transcendental Idea only.[1]

[1] Schopenhauer, an unsparing and not always a fair critic, has declared that the pages on Transcendental Freedom in the *Critique of Pure Reason* contain the deepest thoughts of Kant's philosophy, and that his exposition of the difference between the empirical and intelligible character is among the most admirable things ever said by man (*Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*—First half of the first Supplement to the First Book). It was from Kant's creative thoughts on this subject that Schopenhauer drew practically the whole of his own philosophic system, in much the same way that a man draws a pail of water from a well.

SECTION X

PRACTICAL FREEDOM

"ACT so that the maxim of thy will can always at the same time hold good as a principle of universal legislation."[1] This, says Kant, is the fundamental law of the Pure Practical Reason. His discourse on *Practical Freedom*, which struck a severe blow at the system of eudæmonism prevalent at the time, is to be found in full in his *Critique of Practical Reason* and is summarised in a shorter form towards the end of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, standing apart in the latter work from his treatment of the question of Transcendental Freedom.[2]

Our will, he says, may be free, but this would only refer to the intelligible faculty of causing (dealt with in the preceding sections) which we imagine our reason to possess, and which, when it comes into play, we call volition. With regard to the

[1] *Critique of Practical Reason.*

[2] In the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant lays himself out to discover the extent of pure or *a priori* in contradistinction to empirical or *a posteriori* knowledge. In the *Critique of Practical Reason* he endeavours to establish the *a priori* principles of Reason in its practical expression as will. In both these works his business is with the *a priori* elements of experience ; but in the first he deals with experience as knowledge and in the second with it as morality.

phenomenal expressions of that will, that is to say, with regard to our actions in the world of nature, we have to explain them (in obedience to an inviolable maxim, without which reason could not be employed for empirical purposes at all) in no other way than that in which all other phenomena of nature have to be explained, namely, according to nature's unchangeable laws of causal connection. The proposition that the will is free remains ever a transcendent one for speculative reason, being outside the limits of nature and of all possible experience, and can therefore have no employment admissible for objects of experience, and is thus of no real utility to ourselves, but by itself an entirely valueless and at the same time extremely difficult exertion of our reason. If, therefore, the proposition that the will is free is of no use to us, so far as *knowledge* is concerned, and is yet so strongly recommended to us by our reason, its true value will probably be found to be connected with our *practical* interests only.

Kant calls *practical* whatever is possible through freedom, that is, whatever can take place phenomenally in a possible experience as an effect of freedom. Now, reason possesses, as it seems, a faculty of causing which is free, and whatever can take place in the phenomenal world as an effect of this faculty, that is, whatever is possible through this freedom he calls *practical*, and reason in this

case has a practical use. When, however, the conditions in which our free-will comes into play are empirical, that is, when our *senses* recommend objects to our reason and our free-will, or the free causal activity belonging to our reason, comes into play with regard to these objects, reason, does not have a practical, but can have no other but a *regulative or pragmatic* use, serving only to bring about the unity of empirical laws as a means to the attainment of those sensuously recommended objects. Such a system of morals is eudæmonistic and *heteronomous*, for it makes the reason dependent upon some thing given outside of itself. In the teaching of prudence, for instance, the whole business of reason consists in concentrating all the objects of our sensuous desires in one, namely, *happiness*, and in co-ordinating the means for obtaining that happiness. Thus my senses desire happiness and recommend happiness to my reason: reason thereupon holds out the transcendental Idea of perfect happiness which, though outside the limits of all possible experience, and therefore unattainable, acts as a regulative principle, that is to say, is always urging on the understanding to unite and systematise with prudence all the means which lead towards, but can never actually reach, perfect happiness. Reason, therefore, can give us none but *pragmatic or material laws* of free action (maxims of *prudence* or hypothetical imperatives)

for the attainment of the objects recommended to reason by the senses, and never *pure practical laws* (laws of *duty* or categorical imperatives), which are determined by reason entirely *a priori* and in its *autonomous* character without any regard to what our senses recommend to it. *Pure practical laws*, on the contrary, which have as their object, not happiness, but duty or the *ought* which is given by reason entirely *a priori*, and which convey commands, not under empirical conditions, that is, not because our senses recommend objects to our reason, but in an absolute, unconditional, imperative way, independently of all sensuous desires, would be products of pure reason—such, for instance, as the *moral laws*, which tell us what *ought* to take place. Prudence, therefore, is not a moral and practical law which *commands*, but a pragmatic and material law or *hypothetical imperative* ("if you will this or that, then you must proceed thus or so"), a maxim of self-love, in fact, which *advises* and directs the means for the attainment of happiness recommended to the reason by the senses. But that we *ought* to do something is a moral and practical law or unconditional, *categorical imperative*, which tells us what ought to take place irrespective of what the senses recommend to our reason.

Kant, therefore, uses here the conception of freedom in its pure *practical* meaning only, that is

to say, when our reason tells us that something *ought* to take place without any regard to what our senses recommend to it. He leaves the pragmatic use of reason out of account. He also takes no account of the other conception of freedom in its transcendental meaning, that is to say, the question as to whether freedom is *real*, as one of the faculties which contain the cause of certain phenomenal appearances in our world of sense, or whether also it is *possible*. For this conception of freedom in its transcendental meaning cannot be presupposed empirically (*i.e.* according to the law of nature as observed in experience) as a cause or explanation of phenomena, but is itself a problem of reason, and has been disposed of already.

Now, a will, as we have previously shown (Section VI), is purely *animal* when it is determined by nothing but sensuous impulses, that is, when it is determined altogether *pathologically*. A will, on the contrary, which is independent of sensuous impulses, and can be determined therefore by motives presented by pure reason alone, is called *Free-will*, and everything connected with this, whether as cause or consequence, is termed *practical*. Practical freedom can be proved by experience. For human will is not determined by that only which excites, that is, affects the senses directly; but human beings possess a power of overcoming the impressions made on the faculty of their sensuous

desires. This we do by means of our reason, which supplies us with Ideas of what, in a more remote manner, may be useful or hurtful to us. These considerations of what is desirable with regard to our whole state, that is, of what is good and useful, are based entirely on reason. Reason, therefore, gives moral laws which are imperatives, that is, objective *laws of freedom*, which tell us *what ought to take place* in the objective world of experience, though perhaps it never does take place, differing in this from the *laws of nature*, which relate only to *what does take place*. These moral laws of freedom, therefore, are called practical laws, once more to be distinguished from pragmatic laws of free action, in that the latter are only material maxims for the attainment of objects recommended by the senses to reason, while pure practical laws are the moral laws given by reason entirely *a priori* without regard to what the senses recommend to it.

Whether reason in prescribing these practical laws of freedom is not in this very action itself determined by other influences, and so not free, and whether that faculty of determination in man which he feels to be independent of sensuous impulses, and is therefore called freedom, may not, with regard to higher and more remote operative causes, be nature again, does not concern us while engaged in these practical questions, and while demanding from reason nothing but the *rule* of our

conduct. This question is a purely speculative one which, while we are only concerned with what we *ought* or *ought not* to do, may be disregarded. We know practical freedom by experience as one of the causes which exist in nature, namely, as the causal activity of reason in determining the will, while transcendental freedom demands the independence of reason itself (with reference to its causal activity in beginning a series of phenomena) from all determining causes in the world of sense. That is to say, transcendental freedom demands that reason should be able *absolutely* to begin a series of phenomena without itself being dependent upon any previous phenomenal condition, thus running counter, as it would seem, to the law of nature, and therefore to all possible experience, and remaining a problem. This transcendental problem, however, does not concern reason in its practical use, but refers to speculative knowledge only, and may be left out of account as quite indifferent when we are dealing with *practical* interests.

It will thus be seen that Kant regards Freedom from three standpoints—(*a*) The *transcendental Idea* of freedom, in dealing with which he proves, not that freedom is real or even possible, but that, if given its proper place, it is not contradictory to the necessity found in nature. He then proceeds to regard freedom more particularly from the point of view of the invincible belief in every individual

that he is a free agent, that is, that his will is not necessitated by sensuous impulses, and he divides this aspect of freedom into two parts : (*b*) First, the choice by this free will of a particular object which has been suggested to reason by the senses and for the attainment of which reason supplies *pragmatic* laws of free action ; and (*c*) secondly, its choice of an object which is prompted by a moral imperative alone, that is, which is not suggested to reason by the senses, but solely on moral grounds, and for the attainment of which reason supplies *moral* laws of free action.

This is not the place to develop the various problems dealt with in the *Critique of Practical Reason.* All that may be said is this—In the *Critique of Pure* (*speculative*) *Reason* Kant conclusively proves that we cannot *speculatively argue* about God, Freedom, or Immortality. They are beyond the reach of the understanding, even as regards their mere possibility. In the *Critique of* (*Pure*) *Practical Reason*, however—*Practical Reason* being understood by him to mean a *thinking* Will, *i.e.* a will that determines itself on universal principles—he shows that it is the moral duty of man to *believe* in them and to pursue the course of his life in harmony with these three great Ideas. —" I was obliged to destroy knowledge in order to make room for faith."

"Returning to Leipsic, his [Fichte's] whole mode of thought was revolutionised by the Kantian philosophy, in which it was his duty to instruct a pupil. This gives to the mind, as his letters confess, an inconceivable elevation above all earthly things. 'I have adopted a nobler morality, and, instead of occupying myself with things without me, have been occupied more with myself.' 'I now believe with all my heart in human freedom, and am convinced that only on this supposition duty and virtue of any kind are possible.' 'I live in a new world since I have read the *Critique of Practical Reason*. Things which I believed never could be proved to me, *e.g.* the idea of an absolute freedom and duty, have been proved, and I feel the happier for it. It is inconceivable what reverence for humanity, what power this philosophy gives us, what a blessing it is for an age in which the citadels of morality have been destroyed, and the idea of duty blotted out from all the dictionaries.'" (*Geschichte der neueren Philosophie*, by R. Falckenberg, translated by A. C. Armstrong.)

"On one of the unbound pages preserved by the Königsberg library stand these words [in Kant's handwriting]:—

"'The existence of the Bible, as a book for the people, is the greatest benefit which the human race has ever experienced. Every attempt to belittle it, or to do away with it entirely, as "the lovers of God and Man" do, is a crime against humanity. And if there are to be miracles, this book, in which the accounts of miracles occur only incidentally, as historical confirmation of the doctrines of rational religion, is itself the greatest miracle. For here we have a system of religious doctrines and beliefs, which has been built up without the help of Greek Philosophy, by unlearned persons, and that has, more than any other, exercised an influence for good upon the hearts and lives of men.'" (*Immanuel Kant, Sein Leben und Seine Lehre*, by Friedrich Paulsen, translated by J. E. Creighton and A. Lefevre.)

PART II

CONCERNING AN EMPIRICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE FEELING OF FREEDOM

"Man is to draw infinitely nearer to the in itself unattainable freedom" (Fichte's *Science of Knowledge*).

INTRODUCTORY NOTE TO PART II

THE study of Metaphysics suffers from two serious disadvantages. In the first place, it is not, in the general opinion of an impatient and commercially-minded world, productive of any fruitful or wholesome result, either material or intellectual; and, secondly, it is so arduous and exhausting an occupation, and for that reason frequently accompanied by so much disappointment and mental anguish, that few can afford the time or have even the desire to indulge in it. The understanding of Kant and Hegel, for example, to mention two conspicuous instances, is, for him who approaches them for the first time, a veritable battle, and, as far as the latter is concerned, possibly not always profitable in any equitable proportion to the labour incurred. In spite of all this, philosophy has always been, and will ever remain, of absorbing interest to a large number of people, and an acquaintance with some of its problems on the part of the more thoughtful of mankind can have none other than a lasting and valuable result, so long as the interests and duties of everyday life are not neglected for the dreams of mere abstract contemplation. The duty of every man is not only to love his neighbour, but to love

himself—Thou shalt love thy neighbour *as* thyself—to develop his own faculties to the utmost and enlarge his intellectual horizon, and therefore every effort which he makes to increase the scope of his knowledge, and refine its quality, is commendable, so long, however, and only so long, as such exertions are likely to ennoble him as a man and deepen his sense of partnership in the great scheme of the Universe. To engage upon an elaborate treatise merely with the object of proving the desolate hopelessness of life—and Schopenhauer, to name one prominent speculator, is not guiltless in this respect—is to do humanity a bad turn, however brilliant the dialectic or apparently conclusive the argument may be. Human nature is not so happily disposed that it can dispense with any spiritual consolations that it may have won. But this does not mean to say that vulgar superstition should be tamely acquiesced in or even tolerated, or that every means should not be employed to expose and weaken the claims of those who would rivet upon the intelligence of the modern scientific world the creeds and formulæ which so often did duty for religion in times past. In the eighteenth century the genius of Hume rendered some service in this direction, and for this very reason his name was long execrated by those who had a vested interest in outworn theologies and the cramped letter of their law. But Hume's day is

over. He did his work and shattered the old image, but then fell himself into the opposite error and became a worshipper of dogmatic scepticism. He thus had to give place to a greater man. Immanuel Kant is the quarry from which, as far as can be seen, many a generation yet will draw its material for philosophic disquisition. Fichte, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and many others have dug laboriously in it, and the results of their industry have been given to the world. But the next great forward move will hardly borrow its impetus from these later thinkers, but will gather its strength directly from the cardinal discoveries of the Kantian philosophy and strike out a line of its own from that basic system. That system has a peculiar claim upon the affection and the gratitude of men. If it marks out with relentless logic the boundaries of the understanding and sweeps away the claims of prelatical and dogmatic domination, it places Faith upon a golden pedestal and enshrines the Moral Law as the highest interest of humanity. Long may such a philosophy live and flourish to strengthen the belief in man that he is of a noble texture, that he has a high and solemn mission to fulfil, and that, however limited the scope and powers of the human mind may be, his *Faith* in the wisdom of the Unseen is fully justified! The following inadequate pages have been written in this self-same spirit and in that of humble inquiry; for whatever explanations, materialistic or other,

may be suggested for the phenomena of inner or outer sense, there must always lie beyond such explanations a veil of mystery and impenetrability which no mortal beings, constituted as we are at present, can ever hope to raise.

A

AN ETIOLOGICAL AS AGAINST AN INDETERMINISTIC INTERPRETATION

THE foregoing pages (Part I) contain the doctrine of Transcendental Freedom as given to the world by Immanuel Kant in his *Critique of Pure Reason*. A more remarkable production of the human intellect, an argument at the same time more alluring to the wonder-loving intelligence of man, would be hard to imagine, and has surely never found its way into the pages of any treatise on the Freedom of the Will. As far as it goes, that argument is sufficient for its main purpose. For Kant sets out to prove, and it is of the first importance to understand this for a proper appreciation of his criticism, not that freedom is *real* or even *possible* as such—neither of these in the present limited state of our cognitive faculties would it be possible to establish—but that the admission that freedom and nature may take part in the same action need in no wise be considered contradictory. This, at least, he does most exhaustively prove in his masterly disquisition. The few sections on this metaphysical problem, which are to be found in

that portion of the *Critique of Pure Reason* known as the *Transcendental Dialectic*, occupy but a very small space in that volume, and have by no means been popularly regarded as one of the more important parts of his great work. But the result of any elaborated study by the deep-sounding mind of this celebrated thinker must always take a foremost place in the history of philosophy, and as the freedom of the will is perhaps the first in importance among the problems of this our mortal life, any light that can be shed upon it, however meagre its beams, is of paramount interest to humanity. Such a sentiment, too, can be the only colourable excuse for the ensuing pages, which have been put together in order to suggest, in a tentative and heuristic fashion, the lines along which any further profitable inquiries into the problem of freedom, as a practical study for the conduct of everyday life, will probably have to proceed.

Although Kant has successfully proved what he laid himself out to prove, namely, that the idea of nature and freedom both taking part in the same action or effect need in no way produce a mental contradiction, there still remain various ancient and importunate questions regarding final ends, none of which can ever hope in this life to be provided with an answer, for the sufficient reason that the realm to which they refer lies in its entirety outside the empirical conditions of our nature and conscious-

ness, and therefore wholly beyond the limits of our finite understanding. There is, however, at any rate one question to which perhaps it is not impossible that an answer should be found, the sphere to which it refers being well within the pale of a possible knowledge and therefore open to methodological investigation. The question is as follows : What is the natural reason, if any, of that distinct and perennial consciousness within every man of what he is accustomed to term " free-will " ? Or, in other words, whence arises the feeling within him that he possesses a faculty of determining many of his conscious actions independently of the sway of sensuous or natural inclinations ?

Now, whatever validity the following train of argument may possess consists in this, that we start our inquiry, however insufficient the results of that quest may prove at its conclusion to be, from the sure and stable vantage ground of an incontestable fact of consciousness. For we are not about to rack our reason as to whether such a thing as *free-will* really exists, or whether any such state as *freedom* be even possible. But we commence with the indubitable fact of the perpetually recurring feeling within every man of this free faculty of determination, a feeling which can and indeed often does invade him, even when all the inclinations present in the subject are clearly recognised to be sensuous, and conscience or moral injunction does

not enter into the case at all, and we then proceed to inquire whether there can be any *natural* explanation why he should possess this feeling of freedom, and, if so, what, under diverse circumstances, the explanatory links in the etiological sequence may be. How far thought can be divorced from mere feeling, whether indeed any such positive estrangement can take place at all, whether, peradventure, one of them may not ultimately be inclusive of both, we do not need now to inquire. We start from the indisputable fact that sensibility is our portion in this life, however much any particular instance of sensibility may be shown to be compounded of or reducible to what we recognise as thought, and whether or no mere sense-affection can be made conscious as such for a thinking subject without the assistance of any conceptual admixture. Such considerations dealing with the morphology of knowledge need not, we repeat, form an integral part of such an inquiry as the present, which is directed merely to the fact of a particular kind of affection of sensibility in human nature which is nearly always present with it in some degree of power in its daily walk of conscious life, and which it can never wholly escape from, however it may try.

With the advance of the sciences, there is nothing which can be predicted with greater certainty than that the so-called causes of everything which comes

within the purview of human consciousness will in the future gradually more and more be sought for in the region of natural law, and natural law alone. Doubtless, also, the time will come when many sensuous manifestations that, up till now, have been inexplicable to our intelligence, and therefore referred by out ignorance to supernatural agencies outside the sphere of a possible experience, will claim their due place in the empirical complex of ordered nature. In fact, hardly a day passes but some fresh light is thrown upon the world of objects; hardly a day but links are discovered which join up what have hitherto been isolated and therefore uninterpreted phenomena in the sphere of sense; and with this increase of knowledge our consciousness grows ever proportionately deeper of the vast realm of things unknown, but knowable, which science has yet to win. With the progress of every department of science, and in particular of epistemology and other branches of noetics, man will cease little by little to rely upon transcendent solutions of problems which present themselves to his mind, solutions which may, it is true, temporarily save him a considerable sum of mental labour or intellectual disquiet, but which, if he be of a conscientious and exacting disposition, will ever afford him less and less satisfaction in his daily life, for the good reason that such solutions, though, maybe, posited as something unknown and capable of bare

verbal assertion, can never be objectified in their transcendence by a finite intelligence as real and intuitible explanations of what, after all, for us are merely empirical problems. Unknowable, yea, and unthinkable too, must such interpretations always remain, nothing in fact but the empty makeshifts of an untrained or slatternly mind.

To discover a natural explanation, on the contrary, is to discover one more link in the endless chain of causal connection, or, to express it more accurately, one more brick in the sublime architectonic of truth. How exceeding precious each such discovery is, can only be realised by those who believe that the more complete our knowledge of the laws of nature and of the vast inter-communal relationship of all phenomena can become, so much the nearer shall we be able to approach a perfect state of social man. And if these *natural* explanations are forthcoming in any given problem, what need can there be to look further afield? If nature in her perfect ordering shall present some day to the colleges of science a far more comprehensive etiological explanation of all that can enter into human consciousness than that which we possess to-day, this consummation will only be effected step by step; and, as each fresh problem is surmounted, it would be but a superfluous and thankless task to search for some yet further solution of that same problem in regions beyond our ken, as

well as an effort which could only cloud our minds with the impenetrable fog that hangs round the confines of the finite understanding.

The surest way to truth in respect of certain cardinal, self-appointed problems dealing with the thinking subject is, in the first instance, by a strict interrogation of that reasoning self-consciousness which interested advocacy can rarely deceive. If our thinking self-consciousness cannot support those solutions of problems which tradition and authority have imposed upon us, such solutions, whatever social or other advantages they may be held to possess, are absolutely worthless *for us* in the interests of truth. On the other hand, if solutions, which we have been accustomed to accept at second hand without demur, are, after inquiry, borne out also by the more direct testimony of a reflective apperception, they will then have impressed upon them such a stamp of probability as may well suffice our limited requirements until some yet stronger consciousness stands up to contradict them.

B

THE EMPIRICALLY PREDOMINANT IMPULSE AND THE FEELING OF VOLITIONAL SPONTANEITY

The Moral Law

If there is anything which can be unhesitatingly asserted without fear of contradiction when treating of the problem of freedom, it is, as stated already, that we possess within us, almost continuously throughout our conscious lives, a feeling of a faculty of determination or selection which is independent of the sway of "moral" or sensuous impulses, that is, independent, whether what we call "conscience" or the "moral law" participates in any decision we may come to, or whether what we feel to be merely sensuous affections are exclusively present; and this faculty it is which we term *free-will*. In fact, the only thing we can maintain with apodeictic certainty on this head is that, in spite of the fact that every one of our actions, conscious or otherwise, can be shown without exception to be irrevocably linked with preceding phenomena accord-

ing to natural laws, there is yet within us a feeling of freedom in respect of very many of them.[1]

In order to illustrate in as simple and rudimentary a fashion as possible what generally goes by the name of *free-will*, three supposititious cases may be taken. In the first (*a*), free-will is supposed to choose between two conflicting sets of sensuous inclinations; in the second (*b*), between what is believed to be a non-sensuous impulse or "moral" injunction, that is to say, "conscience," and an opposing sensuous inclination; and in the third (*c*), to freely determine the subject to action in accordance with a sensuous impulse, where that sensuous inclination to act is practically subjectively unopposed, that is, where there is virtually no

[1] Schopenhauer agreed with Kant in the latter's doctrine of the intelligible character being outside time and space, and the empirical character being the phenomenal manifestation of the intelligible character. But he appears to have gone further than Kant, at least in his published writings, for he maintained that although the intelligible character was merely the will-in-itself, and thus free and original, yet that the *feeling* of its originality must accompany its acts in self-consciousness, although these acts were already determined in the empirical character and in self-consciousness. Hence arose, according to him, the consciousness of an empirical freedom of the will. But how can there be such a conception as a direct intelligent consciousness of something as empirical which at the same time is recognised to be purely transcendent? Although Kant presumably believed, contrary to the doctrine propounded in this Part (Part II), that the feeling of freedom was the consciousness of the intelligible character, that is to say, of the transcendent, yet, unlike Schopenhauer, he surely would never have claimed that this consciousness of freedom could be the intelligent consciousness of it *as empirical*.

consciousness of any conflicting stimulus, sensuous or otherwise, to alternative action.

(*a*) I happen to be reading one evening, when suddenly I hear a stealthy footfall under the window, which may possibly be that of my servant, who is anxious not to disturb me, but, on the other hand, may be a stranger's. For a moment I hesitate whether to interrupt my reading in order to make sure of the identity of the person outside, or to remain seated and take the chance of the latter being merely a domestic of my own. The conflict is finally decided by my going to the window to relieve my curiosity. In doing this I am conscious of my selective faculty having exerted itself; that is to say, I am conscious of having made a free selection between two possible alternatives, and, still possessed of my feeling of freedom, of having gone to the window and looked out. What, however, in fact, has really taken place? The inclination to retain that particular sense-affection of comfort before the fire; the impulse to preserve undiminished the intellectual interest excited by the book; the opinion, too, that the individual outside was probably some one who had a right to be there, prompted me to proceed with my reading undisturbed. But, on the other hand, a feeling of uneasiness, caused by the recollection of recent burglaries in the neighbourhood, or, in other words, an impulse of self-preservation, added to a consti-

tutional nervousness and a sudden access of curiosity, urged me to rise and investigate the matter. These discordant and perfectly natural inclinations, then, met and disputed, and the stronger set of stimuli won the day. That is to say, the impulse of self-preservation, &c., predominated by a certain margin of power over the impulse to retain unimpaired certain affections of sense, and the natural phenomenal and necessary result followed of my going to the window to look out. Nevertheless, I was conscious at the time of exerting a perfectly free, selective faculty, and, that free selection having been made, of freely performing the action which had been thus freely determined, *uncoerced* in any degree by the greater strength of any particular sensuous impulse.

Again (*b*)—A man is standing behind a relative, of whom he is the heir, on the brink of a precipice. With a slight movement he could send the latter to a sudden and certain death, and indeed has actually raised his hand for that purpose. After a moment's inward conflict, however, he lowers his arm and abstains from murder. In common parlance, his free-will has exerted itself, and he has made a free choice between the two alternatives. Now, what has really happened in this case also? Greed or the acquisitive impulse, exasperation at having to wait so long for his inheritance, several years' abode, maybe, among a lawless community which have

been conducive to a disregard of human life, inclined him to the deed. On the other side, dread of discovery, scandal, and punishment—or, in other words, the impulse of self-preservation ; the knowledge, moreover, that his relative had become more feeble of late, and would therefore probably die a natural death ere long ; a habit of mind, also, due to the example of less degenerate acquaintances, as well as to early inculcation that murder is a dreadful sin and must not be committed ; that is to say, his *conscience*, or, in other words, the empirically and independently self-acquired (as will be explained later), as well as the sensuously imparted and thereupon sensuously assimilated *moral law*, the impressions of which upon his mind were not entirely erased in later years—all these influenced him to hold his hand. The result of this desperate conflict between all these various habits, impulses, and inclinations was that he refrained from murder, the moral inculcation which he received from those in authority during the most impressionable period of his life, and to which, as will be shown in the sequel, his own human nature was more or less adaptable irrespective of any outside human agency, together with the dread of discovery and the expectation of his relative's natural death before long, proving too strong for his recently superinduced callousness and constitutional greed. But in spite of these natural causes, which necessarily produced

as their effect the external phenomenal action of lowering his hand, the world would nevertheless maintain, as indeed he himself would do, if in after life he should happen to confess to the murderous temptation that had beset him, that his *free-will* had made the choice between the evil and the good.

Lastly (*c*)—While strolling beside some water I pick up a pebble and throw it in. In this case, probably, there is little or no conflict between different states of the subject in regard to that action; the impulse, maybe, to afford myself the evidence of the possession of a particular kind of physical dexterity, or the impulse to affect the organ of sight in a certain manner by causing ripples upon the smooth surface of the lake overcoming any natural indolence to move at all which may possess me at the moment. The sensuous impulse to throw the stone is in fact practically unopposed. But although this action has its so-called cause in nature, which cause again must have had its own constitutive conditions in the iron-bound nexus of natural law, yet it would be universally asserted, and I myself would indubitably have had the feeling that, quite independently of the strength of the sensuous impulse, that is, unnecessitated by it, I had of my own free will abetted and indulged that sensuous inclination and elected to throw the stone at that particular moment.

And we have therefore here reached a point where

it is difficult to see eye to eye with Kant, if we read his doctrine aright. He was of opinion that in certain of our actions we do not feel ourselves to be coerced into the particular phenomenal activity by any sensuous impulses, but constrained only by the commands of an inexplicable moral law or by what he terms the *categorical imperative*; and he appears to have held conversely that when the *ought* does not enter into the question of an action at all, then the subject does indeed feel that action to be more or less necessitated by the particular sensuous impulse thereto. It is submitted, however, that in those cases (such as (*a*) and (*c*), for instance, which have just been given in illustration) where the moral law has no part nor lot in the performance of the action, and in which the subject is conscious of its ascendant and sensuous inclination in regard to the latter, that is, where it can connect its phenomenal action in consciousness with the immediately preceding predominant empirical impulse thereto, that there is no feeling in the subject of necessitation by that sensuous predominance, but, on the contrary, a feeling of freedom, the peculiar reason of which will be dealt with later on.

In each of these cases (*a*, *b*, and *c*), therefore, the subject is conscious of having acted in accordance with the election and determination of a perfectly free will. But notwithstanding this, it would most

assuredly be found, on the other hand, if that same self-consciousness were subjected to a rigorous interrogation, that in every one of these suppositious episodes the more powerful of the *natural* impulses and inclinations to alternative action had carried the day. In fact, one cannot conceive the possibility of such an occurrence as a predominant natural impulse of the subject being actually overborne by a weaker or less pronounced natural impulse in the same subject through the purely adventitious and metempiric agency of an *absolute* or unconditioned force, called *free-will*, whose very spontaneity would in itself be completely beyond the conceptual limits of a finite comprehension. For let us take a man whose habit of mind has been moulded from his earliest years as a member of one of the strictest monastic orders, during a period, moreover, when its self-renunciatory discipline was at its height, an order indeed by whom a self-indulgent existence would be regarded as anathema. Let us also picture another man, who has belonged since he was a child to a strolling company of players, whose moral code is at the very opposite pole; and let us suppose both of them in some situation where those appetites natural to the frailty of humanity could be easily, but, from the point of view of average public opinion, only immorally satisfied. The highest probability is that the Trappist, as we will suppose him, would resist the

temptation to gratify those illicit affections, and that the strolling player would yield to it. In the case of the first, what he has always been accustomed to call the "moral law" would stand in the way of his unlawful desires like a flaming sword, and the hardening effects of an ascetic régime, as well possibly as some hereditary propensity, would add their weight to its influence. That is to say, a life-long inculcation, commencing at his mother's knee and almost with the birth of experience, of what he *ought* to do, that is, *must* do, in order to deserve and so reap happiness in another and a different world and a measure of inward peace and consolation in this; a doctrine which he was taught by sensuous and empirical methods to revere as soon as he could understand anything, the violation of which also he was trained to dread; a code of law, in fact, which has gradually permeated his mental system and become what is known as a "second nature" to him, would overcome the temporary desire to break it. In the case of the second, the inclination to indulge his passions would have nearly everything in its favour. The possible influence of heredity, lifelong habit, the daily example of loose associates, and the want of any early inculcation to the contrary, would probably overwhelm any transient influence that might oppose them. In each case, however, the man would maintain that his free faculty of will had

certainly determined his conduct, uncoerced in the first by the acquired mental and physical habit, or in the second by the sensual desire ; although in each of them it would be demonstrable that this free faculty of volition had been acting, if acting at all, coincidently and in perfect accord with the *natural* predominant impulse of the thinking subject, whose action, therefore, one way or the other, would have to take its ordered place in the web and woof of nature as the phenomenal outcome of its natural and *constitutive* conditions. If, contrary to all expectation, the Trappist proved licentious or the player chaste, we should all no doubt be extremely surprised that either of them had acted in direct opposition to hereditary influences, early training, habit of mind and body, and daily surroundings. But, if we did not let the matter rest there, but diligently pushed our inquiries into all the circumstances, we should most certainly find that some *sensuous* conditions had been present which, exquisitely fitted into the context of empirical law and unknown to us at the time, had proved in each case to be influences at the moment of temptation too strong to be resisted and overriden even by what we had reasonably supposed would be the predominant state.

In every instance which can be adduced, free-will invariably acts, if it acts at all, on the side of the predominant *natural* state of the thinking subject

In some cases the more powerful impulse is merely animal or sensual; in others, what is known as "moral," that is, a state in which we feel ourselves to be internally and non-sensuously impelled by the dictates of what is termed "moral duty"; namely, a state of human nature due to our very finitude and therefore wholly sensuous in its origin, as will be explained in the following paragraphs of this section, and which has usually been harnessed for us to a particular code or course of conduct, which from our infancy we have probably been taught by parental and pedagogic or other empirical methods to know as right, and from the violation of which we have been trained to expect an undefined, but, at the same time, the severest and, maybe, an everlasting punishment; the breach of which, therefore, would necessarily all the more create in us a deep and mysterious mental uneasiness. Had we been born members of some savage community instead of members of a civilised race, that same code would have had no place in our mental economy, and no mental or "moral" disquiet could follow upon its breach. In that case, the so-called "free-will" of a man, whose dominant state was "moral," might, in the absence of the aforementioned predominant "moral" state empirically produced by the lifelong teaching of the civilised code, be found acting in a diametrically contrary, and, to a civilised community, immoral direction;

for that contrary subjective state might then represent and be the sensuous result of the lower "moral" code of that savage fraternity, and therefore be the stronger one.

Now, why is it, when the feeling that we *ought* or *ought not* to do something invades the subject, that this moral imperative seems to be in no way either identical with or conditioned by any sensuous inclination, and that we have the feeling of a free elective faculty in carrying out the behests of that imperative, irrespective of and often directly contrary to what we feel to be the most powerful sensuous impulses of our being? That this feeling of a supersensuous injunction arises with every man at intervals more or less frequent, according to the character of his disposition, training, and surroundings, is an undoubted fact of consciousness, and the only thing with which we are at the moment concerned is whether any natural explanation of this feeling is possible; that is to say, whether it can be etiologically deduced, if not perhaps with as much meticulous precision, at least with equal certainty as many other things in nature, as a sensuously conditioned sequent in the phenomenal order of events. In the case of what is felt as a purely sensuous desire, the subject is always conscious of an empirical inclination, that is, of an impulse which is immediately and consciously derivable from some excitatory conditions in the phenomenal complex

of nature; and where that recognised sensuous impulse is the strongest inclination present in the subject, it is able, in the absence of any sufficiently controlling non-subjective force, to find its sensuous expression in external or internal phenomenal activity, and in this manner to obtain the natural satisfaction that it sought for. In the case of an impulse, on the other hand, which is regarded by the subject which experiences it as a moral injunction or dictate of conscience, that subject is conscious of what it believes to be a supersensuous inclination, that is to say, a non-empirical impulse of a mandatory character which it cannot immediately link up with the homogeneous context of natural law, and therefore feels disinclined to attribute wholly or even in part to the so-called causality of sensuous conditions. In this case also, should that inclination happen to be the most powerful impulse present in the subject, it would be able similarly in its turn, in the absence of any sufficiently opposing non-subjective force, to find its sensuous expression in internal or external phenomenal activity, and likewise obtain for itself in this manner the particular satisfaction that it sought for.

But as the sensuous manifestation of any conscious state of the subject must, in accordance with our forms of thought, be necessarily provided by the understanding with its constitutive conditions

in the ordered architectonic of nature, we are obliged, although we may proclaim with unthinking sincerity that the inward injunctions of moral duty, which impelled us to phenomenal activity in sympathy with them, took their rise in feeling as a sensuously unconditioned and therefore metempiric causality, to concede at the same time that that feeling of impulsion, as sensuously expressed and satisfied, must also have been sensuously determined, within the web and woof of nature, by so-called causes that we may not at the moment be able to indicate with any certitude or exactness, but which would undoubtedly be empirically discoverable, were all the manifold conditions of our upbringing and mental and physical constitution known, in the dynamical series of phenomenal occurrences. As, moreover, human thought is restricted within the bounds of the phenomenal ego, and, although it may presume to be assertory as to what is trans-subjective (after all, merely an empirical, limitative concept, without any content, of *something unknown*), cannot possibly project itself conceptually into that trans-subjective region or posit anything outside the forms of the cognitive faculties in a trans-subjective fashion, we are obliged, in trying to think of the "moral" impulse which prompts us to any sensuous activity, to think of it, not trans-subjectively as the primal causality itself or the mere absolute "ought" of conscience apart from the manner in which we

are sensuously affected by it, and which we insist upon declaring to be unconditioned and thus supersensuous, but as the sensuous and resultant expression of that causality, inseparable from its empirical constituent conditions; that is to say, not as the alleged metempiric imperative itself, but as the "moral" phenomenal action into which we picture that unconditioned impulse as translated, together with various empirical conditions which belong to that action in time. In other words, whatever it may please us verbally to affirm about this so-called unconditioned moral impulse, we are constrained, when once we try to think about it as such, that is to say, in the light of its alleged undetermined spontaneity, to regard it sensuously as an impulse *in phenomenal translation;* mysterious indeed, because elusive in its exact composition and origin, that is, in the precise import and interplay of many of its constitutive and natural conditions, but nevertheless as necessarily bound up with the various empirical states of the subject, memorial and other, and inseparably connected with the interlocked temporalities of our existence.

Now, it is submitted that there are two general grounds for the intermittent consciousness within every man of impulses prompting him to sensuous activity, impulses untainted, however, as it seems to him, by any sensuous considerations.

It is, in the first place, in the very nature of the

limited capacities of our being that a consciousness of that state of limitation should continually be present to the mind; for the very essence of limitation in any active subject of the world of sense is the feeling of effort and the experience of failure to extend its mental and physical activity beyond a certain point. Thus a limited subject of the world of nature must ever be seeking, by very reason of those natural boundaries which confine its energies, to pierce that world beyond of which it knows and can know nothing. But very soon it discovers that it is a helpless, imprisoned creature beating its hands unavailingly against invisible walls that hem it in on every side, and the result of this inevitable consciousness of human limitation is that there is produced by these perfectly natural causes a feeling of profound mystery in all of us, and a constitutional mental uneasiness which accompanies every man from the cradle to the grave. In fact, the psychogenetic ground of what is known as the "moral law" in every man is nothing but the incognisable character of the totality of the constitutive conditions of ourselves and of the world around us, a problem which will be dealt with more fully in a later section, and which, in accordance with the very constitution of the human understanding, must always be present to the mind as an unknown quantity and as a reminder of our own finitude in empirically varying degrees of insistent power.

In the second place, the whole moral and religious training to which the young are subjected during their earliest and most impressionable years is directly founded upon this very feeling of mystery and uneasiness which exists in all their parents, elders, teachers, and others in authority, as well as to a lesser extent almost congenitally in themselves. We are taught in fact from our earliest days what we find only too easy to believe, what indeed is but natural and right that we should believe, namely, that this world, as we know it, and the short span of our mortal lives are not all ; that there is something beyond all possible cognition on our part, a something which will yield no ideational product for us, and consequently a something not only beyond, but superior to our intelligence; in fact. some mysterious hypostatised power directing possibly the destinies of a teleological universe ; and that therefore finite or sensuous things, although the only ones of which we can have any experience, form but a subordinate part of a vast system unknown to us in its (because unknown) all-wise and perfect entirety. From the dawn of our experience the importance of this non-sensuous and unknown sphere is impressed upon our imagination, on account of its mystery and metempiric character, as something beyond our mortal clay to fathom, and which therefore our mortal clay is bound to reverence. Particular courses of conduct are consequently deemed

to be lacking in ultimate truth, that is to say, bad or *sinful*, as having limited, sensuous aims too much in view, whereas other courses are held to partake of ultimate truth, that is to say, to be good or *moral*, as having less regard to the sensuous or finite aspect of the world, and being shaped with a due and reverential sense of the mystery of the supersensuous, which, being unknown and unknowable, is looked upon as more important than the phenomenal which we do know. In fact, in many cases, what are confessedly merely finite impulses pure and simple tend, as such, to become altogether suspect, and on the birth of such an impulse the empirically-conditioned feeling of the non-sensuous mystery arises in protest, and inclines us to have regard not so much to the purely finite aspect of the world of phenomena about us, as to the teleological possibilities of a world beyond our ken, which, as we can cognose nothing whatever about it nor imagine anything, we believe to be different from our own world of daily experience, with a different scheme of cause and effect, and reward and punishment, and a totally dissimilar state of existence. As, moreover, what we term sensuous impulses are continually in our experience successfully urging us to give them phenomenal expression for the attainment of finite ends, so too do we reason analogically that, if those inpulses which have in reality been empirically generated in us through the very con-

sciousness of our limited capacities, that is, of our finitude, but which we believe by very reason of their limitative origin to be non-sensuous and "moral," can be given phenomenal expression, we shall thereby successfully attain, outside the finite world of nature and independently of all empirical conditions, some mysterious and supersensuous ends.[1]

Finally, it may be added that as all human kind without exception is bound down irrevocably in the world of nature to the sensuous limitations of time and space, and therefore of necessity experiences varying degrees of reverential awe for the unknowable Supersensuous; an awe which, as explained above, takes the form of what is commonly known as the "moral law," as distinguished from and opposed to purely sensuous or finite aims, or what is generally known as "sin"; what goes by the name of "original sin" is not only no inexplicable problem as such, nor even a curious or inconsistent feature in the scheme of human life, but, on the contrary, is, in the present restricted state of our thinking being,

[1] Schopenhauer's doctrine was that, with one exception, phenomena are bound together by necessity. That exception was human *self-renunciation*, or, in his own phraseology, *the denial of the will to live*. He maintained that this self-renunciation was the direct action of the free will-in-itself, unnecessitated by any empirical conditions, and he evolved the theory in an elaborate manner in his *World as Will and Idea* (*i.e.* World as thing-in-itself and phenomenon). Cannot this self-renunciation, however, be more easily, because empirically, explained by the suggestion contained in the text, a suggestion which might also for the same reason be substituted for Kant's transcendental doctrine of the unknown *ought*!

metaphysically necessary, and a primary and perfectly natural result of that very limitation. In fact, it is impossible to conceive how such a limitation could exist unaccompanied by what we call "sin." For the constitution itself of our nature must irresistibly give rise to a sharp distinction, and thus discordance, in our thinking being between *what is* and *what ought to be ;* that is to say, between the cramped and impassable territory of our phenomenal existence and that unattainable Non-Sensuous ; and "sin" takes place whenever a natural impulse with a confessedly purely sensuous or finite aim in view conflicts with and predominates over an equally empirically superinduced inclination to have regard, not to our phenomenal world and self as all in all, but to their more truthful aspect of finitude or phenomenal limitation, and indirectly consequently to their mystical and supersensuous antithesis. In fact, the real problem is, not why "sin" exists in the world, but why finite beings exist at all.

From what has been already said, therefore, a state of *sin* will be seen to be one in which a conscious and predominant empirical impulse produces internal or external phenomenal activity on our part concerning a thing, such thing being regarded in a finite and therefore untruthful way, that is, from an aspect of a limited number of its constitutive conditions, as though that limited number constituted the totality, rather than from the point of

view of the unknown totality of its constitutive conditions and a nearer approximation to that totality; as against a weaker and equally empirical and conscious impulse concerning a thing which is regarded from the point of view of closer approximation to the unknown and supersensuous totality of its constitutive conditions, and therefore in an aspect of greater truth. What is known as *virtue* is the reverse of this. That is to say, a virtuous state is one in which a conscious and predominant empirical impulse produces internal or external phenomenal activity on the part of the subject concerning a thing which is recognised as unlimited; that is, which is regarded from the standpoint of the unknown totality of that object's constitutive conditions, a totality, indeed, which, as such, is supersensuous and cannot enter the mind, but which nevertheless the subject believes to be the unknown truth and ultimate reality of that thing, and towards which, therefore, a less finite and untruthful attitude is taken up; the weaker empirical and conscious inclination concerning the thing, viewed imperfectly, and thus untruthfully, from an aspect of a limited number of its constitutive conditions, as though that limited number constituted the totality, having been overborne.

What in the popular mind is known as *religion* may therefore be said to be nothing else than the metaphysics of the multitude. To view finitude

sub specie æternitatis, that is, to view it from the standpoint of an ever-increasing approximation to the totality of its constitutive conditions, is not only an attitude that is metaphysically true, but is what the good as well as the *religious* man is continually striving, often quite unconsciously, to do, and what the teachers of all creeds the world over, for the most part equally unconsciously, are never weary of inculcating in their own idiosyncratic terminology. *Sin* to them is what to the philosopher is nothing less than a metaphysically untrue envisagement of a particular, namely, finitude regarded, as it were, *sub specie individuationis*; in other words, stereotyped at any moment in an aspect of a limited number of its constitutive conditions, as though that number constituted the totality. In fact, the whole trend of human nature is in the direction of the truth. Whether he be a professed metaphysician or a virtuous or *religious* man of low degree and little education, in either case he is striving to view life and to treat its problems under the aspect of the infinite and eternal, and in either case necessarily fails to grasp the ultimate reality. Indeed, the only use of philosophy is in a manner to lessen the mystery, in so far and only so far as to show what the problem really is against which ploughman and schoolman are beating their heads in vain, and so to clear the way to at least one conclusion—namely, that, as thinking human beings are at present

constituted, it is a problem that never can be solved.

Those who in later days have opposed the deterministic doctrine [1] (a doctrine which in its cruder necessarian form, ignoring, as it usually does, the claims of a spiritual world, cannot command much sympathy) argue that a man's moral attitude does not depend directly upon physical (and, since their argument is based upon the metempiric freedom of the will, by *physical* they probably mean *natural*) circumstances, but upon the object which, upon occasion and in view of the circumstances, he presents to himself as a self-conscious being. The character which makes the same natural circumstances so diverse in their moral influence has doubtless, so they say, had its history; but the history which thus determines moral action has been a history *of* moral action, that is, of action in which a man has been an object to himself, seeking to realise an idea of his own good which he is conscious of presenting to himself. For a man's character, they urge, is only formed through his conscious presentation to himself of objects as his good, as that in which his self-satisfaction is to be found; and just so far as an action is determined by character, it is determined by an

[1] As, for instance, T. H. Green in his *Prolegomena to Ethics*, an elaborate argument against the creed of the utilitarian or the universalistic hedonist (Book II. Chap. I., § 106).

object which the man has thus consciously made his own. But this line of argument, although, maybe, unimpeachable in itself, does not in any way prejudice the statement that no such thing as an absolute faculty of free volition, or, in other words, free-will, can exist or even be conceived in the present constitution of human nature. The *object which a man consciously presents to himself as his good, as that in which his self-satisfaction is to be found*—whether that object be self-sacrifice for the sake of a particular individual, the highest possible realisation of his faculties, the perfection or happiness of mankind in general, or the purification of his own life as an end in itself—may indeed be the proximate cause of what we call a "moral action"; but this does not justify us in affirming that cause to be an absolute one, for we are bound to look behind it and ask why one man presents to himself some particular object as his good, whilst another man presents to himself as *his* good some totally different object. The only answer to the question is, that in each case there are the empirical and constitutive conditions of the self-presentation, whether they lie hidden within the network of a transmitted nervous system, or whether they be somatic (hereditary or otherwise), or concerned with early training or any other natural influences, and that, were it possible to investigate the ramifications of these conditions sufficiently, a satisfactory

empirical history, not only of a "moral action" itself, but also of the particular causal self-presentation that led to it, would be discovered. A man, in fact, may consciously present to himself a certain object in which he seeks his self-satisfaction, and which he consciously makes his own, and this object, thus presented, may lead directly to action either "moral" or "immoral" as its result; but in every such case he is not a *free* agent, in the indeterministic sense of his being endowed with a spontaneous faculty of mental action, but is determined to that mental activity, that is, to the particular form which the presentation to himself by himself takes, whether that presentation lead directly to "moral" or "non-moral" action as its effect, by the causality of sensuous and discoverable conditions which must take their necessary place in the ordered nexus of nature, as we know it.

C

INVALIDITY OF THE ASSIGNMENT OF AN ABSOLUTE CHARACTER TO THE HUMAN WILL

THE *CAUSA SUI* OF THE HEGELIAN DIALECTIC

THE difficulty which we create for ourselves when dealing with the problem of free-will consists in our taking for granted that the faculty of which man is conscious exists as an unconditioned or *absolute* volitional force, acting (*a*) either as a sort of impartial arbitrator in a dispute between two equally or unequally divided parties, or (*b*) where some conscious impulse of the ego happens to be practically unopposed, as an auxiliary or abettor of it, or else (*c*) when the activity of the subject is imagined to be untinged by any immediately conscious inclination, exercising itself through that subject on its own account among the phenomena of nature. If we cleave to this unphilosophical opinion, we cannot reasonably complain if the problem of free-will remains for ever insoluble. Though few things are more apodeictically certain than that man in his conscious actions, both mental and physical, feels within him what he believes to

be the presence of a free faculty of determination, whenever he is able to connect those actions in consciousness with the immediately preceding impulses thereto, we take a wrong turning and lose ourselves in a maze of barren speculation, aye, and of contradiction, when we leave the broad and trodden highway of nature, and instead of seeking for the natural interpretation of that feeling by empirical methods, adventure into regions beyond the range of our thought in search of some transcendent solution.

Now, we leave out of account the obvious argument that a faculty cannot be free which is perpetually being forced to choose between the performance or non-performance of a phenomenal action. If free-will has no power of abstention in respect of alternative decision (and the devotees of the doctrine of free-will maintain that every conscious human action without exception, that can be connected in consciousness with a subjective impulse thereto, is a result of that faculty), but is compelled to elect whether such an action shall take place or not; that is to say, if free-will has no option but to make its selection; in other words, if it cannot adopt a passive attitude of neutral indifferentism, but if its participation on one side or the other in the controversy of sense be necessitated,—then that elusive faculty, with which man is said to be

endowed, can no longer be held to be spontaneous and absolute or unconditioned and undetermined. Indeed, the argument may be passed over as sufficiently self-evident, and there still remain five valid reasons, on the lowest estimate, why we should hesitate to embrace a metempiric explanation of our feeling of freedom, whereby the mysterious faculty of which each of us is conscious would be made to act in the last resort independently of all empirical conditions.

The possibility of such a faculty, in the first place, cannot be seized by the cognitive faculties in their present state of limitation, since an *absolute* cause of phenomenal action, that is, a cause itself independent of any conditions in time, and totally unaffected by the comparative degree of empirical insistence of any of them, is outside the limits of a possible experience, and therefore, as far as human beings are concerned, transcendent and incapable of conceptual presentation. For every phenomenon in nature we are bound to look for some of its immediate conditions in that same nature, and when we think we have discovered *them*, to proceed in our genetic search to a still higher causality; that is to say, to a still more amplified enumeration of its constitutive and sensuous conditions, as in turn *their* own conditions in time, and so on *in infinitum*. However far we may push this alternately analytical and synthetic inquiry into the constitution of any

phenomenon, however industriously we may try to exhaust the multitudinous congeries of conditions in which it ordinarily appears to be embedded, or, rather, out of which it is itself constituted, our reason can never obtain the full satisfaction that it yearns after; for there must always be some remoter conditions in the background of our most distant horizon, and those again must in their turn possess their own constitutive conditions in accordance with the unchangeable law of our experience. An *absolute* cause, therefore, of a phenomenal effect, that is to say, a cause primal, original, and spontaneous, and thus outside the bounds of possible experience, cannot be seized by the human mind or come within the outermost range of the understanding. It follows upon this, then, that an *absolute* faculty of selection and determination, or, in other words, *free-will*, likewise cannot be seized as possible by human thought in its present state of finitude or comprised within the realms of empirical knowledge, and therefore cannot be asserted to be real and existent without equal inconsistency and contradiction.

The whole fabric of the Hegelian philosophy depends upon an answer to the question dealt with in the last paragraph. The nerve centre of that elaborately constructed system is free self-activity or the free self-separation of that activity into what is commonly known as cause and effect. If this

principle cannot be shown to be presupposed in all experience, the entire structure of the Hegelian dialectic crumbles to the ground. One of Hegel's most conscientious exponents takes care to point out that the proof of a first cause, which has come down to us from Plato and Aristotle, has formed the vital nerve of all pure theology, and that nothing less than disaster to speculative thought would follow if it could really be shown that causality does not presuppose an original cause. In fact, he goes so far as to say that Hegel's system would have no basis whatever to rest upon if causality did not presuppose *causa sui*.[1]

Now the word *cause*, as popularly employed, is made to fulfil a kind of threefold office. It is sometimes used as regards its effect in what Hegel is pleased to call a tautological fashion. The rain, for instance, is said to be the cause of the wetness of the ground. The rain (cause), however, is, according to him, the same as the wet (effect) on the ground, or rather it is the rain in a different position from what it was before. The term, again, is employed, where the pleonastic use of it is not apparent, for any single and particularly salient

[1] Hegel's doctrine of causality will be found in his *Wissenschaft der Logik* (translated in part by J. H. Stirling in his *Secret of Hegel*, as well as by W. H. Harris in his *Hegel's Logic*); also in his smaller *Logik* under the head of the "Doctrine of Essence" contained in his *Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften* (translated by W. Wallace).

condition out of many attaching to an effect, as, for instance, when it is said that the bite of a snake was the cause of a certain man's death. Thirdly, the word is made use of as representing an undefined plurality of conditions or the various conditions which may happen to be present vaguely or otherwise in the mind of the person who employs the expression, as when it is said that a certain European situation was the cause of the resignation of some foreign Minister. In each of these cases the word *cause*, as so used and generally understood, is radically inadequate and incomplete, incomplete in the last example given, still more incomplete in the second, obviously even more incomplete yet in the first, which is the particular example chosen by Hegel. But even in this, the most inadequate and incomplete of the three popular uses of the word, Hegel would have us see the all-important principle of *causa sui* or free self-separation at work. In his smaller *Logic* he says, as may be seen in Wallace's translation—"The cause consequently is in its full truth *causa sui*. . . . Even in the finite cause and its conception we can see this identity between cause and effect in point of content. The rain (the cause) and the wet (the effect) are the self-same existing water. In point of form the cause (rain) is dissipated or lost in the effect (wet): but in that case the result can no longer be described as effect; for without

the cause it is nothing, and we should have only the unrelated wet left."

Now, in the first place, the rain (water *falling*) and the wet (*fallen* water) are not identical "in point of content," and cannot be interpreted as such for the understanding, as Hegel would have us believe. The only way, as will be explained later, in which they could be regarded as identical in point of content would be the complete knowledge of each in the totality of its constitutive conditions. Were this attainable by the cognitive faculties, the *falling* water and the *fallen* water would be for the understanding a perfect unity without difference, because whichever of them you took would not only be *a* but *the* perfect totality. This, however, it is hardly necessary to point out, is impossible for a finite intelligence. In fact, the *falling* water and the *fallen* water, being each of them merely a particular aspect of finitude, a fleeting glimpse in each case of an infinitesimal part of the totality of their constitutive conditions, are for the human understanding and as empirical experiences—the only experiences of which we can have any cognition—not self-same in point of content, but *necessarily* different, since the very nature of finitude consists in differentiation and limit. In short, Hegel's error lies in supposing that thought can posit them conceptually as identical in point of content, before first having conceptually posited the totality of their constitutive conditions.

The truth is, that the latter would in any case have to precede the first, but being itself impossible of conceptual presentation, the former therefore must also remain outside the limited scope of our finite understanding. The rain (water *falling*) is a particular affection of the subject's sensibility during a particular interval of time ; the wet (*fallen* water) is another and dissimilar affection of that subject's sensibility during a subsequent interval. They each have, as affections of human sentiency, synthetised by the understanding into objects of experience, their imperfectly constitutive sum of empirically comprehensible conditions, *a sum or content which is different*, and, so long as our cognitive faculties are merely applicable in the finite world, must necessarily remain different in each. Being therefore, so far as their envisaged conditions are concerned—and that is all *we* can know about them —perforce differently constituted in quantity and quality for the understanding in its empirical activity, they necessarily cannot be made the *same* in point of content for that understanding or translated into a perfect identity one with the other. The law of the understanding connects the two and associates them together, it is true. They have a multitude of intuitible conditions in common, a multitude which in itself tends perhaps to overshadow the differences that fall outside it, but as affections of sensibility—and only *as* affections of

sensibility, intellectualised and expounded by the empirically active understanding, can they be considered so far as we, human beings, are concerned —they are not the same, but, on the very showing of sense and understanding themselves, different.

In the second place, there is no such thing as what Hegel calls a "finite cause." The rain as seen falling from the clouds, a particular and composite affection of the subject's sensibility, is *one* condition merely, or rather a mere parcel of conditions, chosen from *all* the conditions out of which the fact of the position of the water upon the ground, a different composite affection of the thinking subject's sentiency, is constituted. Without the condition of the rain falling from the clouds there would be for the subject, it is true, no position of that fallen water in the shape of the wetness of the ground. But it is merely one small constitutive portion of the vast framework of the constitutive totality, and cannot properly be called a *cause*. There are innumerable other conditions constituting the fact of the position of that wet upon the ground, or that particular affection of the subject's sensibility, no less indispensable than the condition of the water falling from the clouds, as, for instance, the particular surface temperature at the point of contact between ground and water and not any other temperature, such as would be one of the constitutive elements of a totally diverse

affection of the subject's sensibility, such as ice or steam. In fact, these indispensable conditions are outside the possibility of human enumeration, and it is only the totality of all these necessary conditions, a totality unintuitible by a finite intelligence, which reason urges us to believe would afford us a full knowledge of how the fact of that wetness of the ground was constituted, or which could be called with even any *semblance* of truth the *cause* of it.

The true cause, the only thing that could be given the appellation of "cause" with even a *semblance* of authority, is therefore a *complete cause*, and, as will be shown, such a perfect explanation, if ever discovered, could then no longer be termed a cause in the sense of an irreversible process, that is, of an antecedent followed by a consequent in time determination and linked together by the category of causality, the only sense in which mind can grasp cause. There is thus no such thing as a "complete cause," and properly no such thing as a "partial cause." Indeed, what is ordinarily conceived by humanity as the immediate *cause* of anything (Hegel's "finite cause") may be defined as *the last remaining condition or parcel of conditions, in time, of which at the moment we are conscious, for the completion in consciousness, under yet one more of the shifting aspects of finitude, of the undefined totality of constitutive conditions—that completion, as entering into*

consciousness under the guise of infinity viewed from a different finite standpoint, in other words, that undefined and imperfectly interpreted totality in its new position of limited perspective, being what is known by us as the effect. What are popularly known as (partial) causes are therefore merely conditions that fit like bricks into the totality of the constitution of a phenomenon, that is, into the fabric of the thing which is popularly known as an effect, and which in their whole sum form its own most innermost texture and constitute its very being; an effect, however, of which if we could envisage the constitutive conditions in their entirety, would from that very moment cease indeed to be a phenomenon for us at all. A real cause, that is, a cause in its completeness, and even then, as has been already shown, the term could not be used without the employment of a paralogism, would be the entire sum of all the manifold constitutive conditions without any one of which the particular so-called effect would not be. This is the only way in which the term *cause* can be applied with even a semblance of truth, although the word in that sense would not only be a paralogism, but wholly superfluous as a term of explanation, for, as will be explained later, the totality of conditions would then not be of the nature of a cause at all, but rather a complete knowledge of the constitution of that which had been first described as an

effect, in fact, would be the effect itself in its totality.

A pebble, for instance, thrown by Y impinges on a window without breaking it, the tinkling sound of the impact being heard by X. The impelled pebble, however, is merely one condition, or rather parcel of conditions, constituting the resounding of the glass, or, in other words, the particular affection of X's organ of hearing at that moment. The other constitutive conditions, to mention but a fraction of them, are (*a*) X himself, who, as subject and the result at that moment of the whole of his life's experience with his inherited and acquired sensibilities, hears the sound, that is, is affected in that particular manner and no other; (*b*) the circumstances that constituted the fact of the same sensible subject being on the scene at that particular moment, in other words, the entire temporal sequence of his own life's actions as well as of those of others; (*c*) the manifold climatic and other conditions constituting the custom of that part of the world where a peculiar thickness of glass for window purposes was in vogue; (*d*) the particular atmospheric resistance to such a moving body at that time and in that clime; (*e*) the innumerable conditions constituting the throwing of the pebble by Y with an especial force and at a certain angle; (*f*) those that constituted the building of the house and the choice of its site; (*g*) and the countless geological con-

ditions of the weight, shape, and consistency of the pebble. If any single one of these or any of the other unenumerated constitutive conditions had been in the slightest degree different, *that* X—that is, X as the peculiarly constituted object phenomenon as he existed for himself at that particular instant, a phenomenon object which, let it not be forgotten, afforded the unique and indispensable occasion and material as a background or canvas for that therefore correspondingly unique affection of his sensibilities—*that* X, we repeat, would not have heard *that* stone strike *that* window impelled at *that* speed under *those* atmospheric conditions by the hand of Y at *that* moment. The only cause, therefore, of that particular affection of X's organ of hearing, which with any semblance of truth could be called the complete cause, were the whole of the conditions constituting that affection of his sensibility, a totality which, with the due reservation in respect of the paralogistic use of the term, as explained above, we may, for the moment, verbally regard as the supreme, true cause without the understanding being any nearer able to form a concept of this ultimate totality or out of it to construct any ideational thought content.

In one sense, however, any *single* condition observable in the world of phenomena may be said to be the *complete cause* of an effect in the paralogistic use of the term which has been temporarily

admitted here for the sake of argument. For no single phenomenal condition could be at all, were it not for the totality of all those conditions that constitute the very nature and structure of its own composition. It is the whole of its own conditions that constitute it a condition. Therefore, not only is it the so-called result of all its conditions; not only does it possess within itself and embody their history and lineage, but being actually compounded of them as a totality, that is, the totality itself constituting the very being of the particular condition, it is also, under this aspect, itself the totality of those conditions, and, if this totality could be seized by the understanding, could be regarded from this standpoint, with the reservation in respect of the paralogistic use of the term, as the complete cause of its so-called effect. Thus, the particular manner in which X was affected by the stone's collision with the window (viz., the sound of the impact) was the co-operative result or embodiment of all the catalogued conditions set forth above and of infinitely more besides. It was a microcosm of the Universe, and had to be because of all its conditions, that is, had to be because of the Universe. The whole of the past and present conditions of the Universe might figuratively be obliterated with the exception of that sensible affection, but the whole of the conditions of the Universe would still remain and be bodied forth in it as constituting it, for

being in its complete truth and interpretation nothing less than those conditions in their totality, it would contain within itself and indeed actually be the history of the world, the necessary incarnation of the all of things. In this sense, therefore, any *single* condition may, with the afore-mentioned reservation, be regarded in its complete interpretation, that is to say, not *sub specie individuationis*, but *sub specie æternitatis*, as the complete cause of an effect, and, considered thus as the totality and not merely as *a* condition, as a sufficient explanation of it.[1]

Since, therefore, every condition or parcel of conditions, as well as every so-called effect, completely understood, would be seen to be nothing less than the totality of the Universe in microcosm, it follows that every cause, so-called, which now appears to be followed in a non-identical and uninterchangeable fashion by its effect, would then be seen to be merely its own effect from another standpoint. The microcosm of the Universe, or the *cause* apprehended as the totality, would be seen under a different aspect and non-disjunctively as the same microcosm or the *effect* apprehended as the totality. In fact, the microcosm would be self-relating or identical with itself in what, by reason

[1] Compare, in the field of mathematics, the theory of self-representation as the principle of the number system, a theory which is at least not inconsistent with the above argument.

of the present limited powers of synthetical apprehension possessed by the cognitive faculties, are now regarded schismatically as cause and effect, these sensualised differences being imposed upon our reason on account of the temporal and spatial medium to which the intellect is subdued, bound down, as it is, to the laws of the sensuous life which allow it only imperfect, finite glimpses into the unearthly grandeur of the metempiric whole. In this sense, therefore, every condition might, with the above-mentioned reservation, be said to be a complete cause of itself or *causa sui*. Cause and effect could thus be regarded as transposable and, as it were, perfectly interpenetrable, each of them a totality constituting the other—the effect indeed being the cause itself.

This argument, which might be introduced by a Hegelian in apologetic support of his master's doctrine of *causa sui*—although, indeed, the argument has been directed to a cause which in its complete apprehension is seen to be itself its effect, rather than to a cause which actively produces its effect by freely separating itself from itself, that is to say, to a realm which contains, as it were, a static diversity of aspect, rather than to one where self-born dynamical alteration is continually taking place—and which would be valid so long as the totality of conditions could be *presupposed* as given and comprehensible to the intelligence ; so long also

as the category of causality could be applied to that totality without a paralogism—is, however, not defensible, if turned to such a use, so far as the human understanding is concerned, for precisely these two reasons, namely, that such a totality could only be regarded as a *cause* by indulging in a paralogism and, in the second place, is not and cannot be *presupposed*, however cunningly devised a term might be applied to it, being by the laws of thought unthinkable. In fact, the doctrine of *causa sui*, which bears upon its shoulders the heaven-aspiring fabric of the Hegelian system, can be regarded as nothing more than a splendid but empty formula which the understanding cannot translate into the concept which that formula pretends to embody. The difficulty arises because Hegel would have the understanding accept the word *cause* in the sense of a freely creating, freely self-separating cause, that is to say, a cause which out of itself, by a free act of self-scission or, rather, self-evolution, produces an effect in time, an effect though, which is really once more the cause itself in partial manifestation, having lain within its own womb as a possibility. But such a perfectly self-contained and self-sufficient principle of causation is wholly incomprehensible and outside the sphere of any possible activity of the intuitive faculties, although, if, as we have attempted to describe above, the totality of conditions could be synthetised by

the understanding and thus afford a complete knowledge of the constitution of a phenomenon, we can see that such a totality, which in the present state of our being, however, can discover no thought content to fit it, would not be the complete *cause* of that phenomenon, but the phenomenon itself, viewed, however, no longer finitely as a phenomenon, but in its entirety as a totality, and therefore as ultimate reality.

The only *cause* which the understanding can properly deal with under its laws, the term *partial cause* having been shown to be a misnomer and *complete cause* incomprehensible and a misnomer as well, is in fact not a cause at all, but merely a partial glimpse into the constitution of a phenomenon, that is, merely some more or less proximate condition or parcel of conditions, which can come within that empirical series which is capable of ideation; that is to say, merely some aspect of the totality which, by very reason of the state of finitude to which we are yoked, must be imperfect. Of every so-called effect in the phenomenal world the human understanding is bound to look for the empirical conditions, conditions which, in the arbitrary regressus imposed upon the understanding by the sensuous time multiples in which it works, must be supplied with their own conditions and so-called antecedent causes in their turn, and so on *in infinitum*; and therefore no complete or free self-active cause is

observable or conceivable in connection with the world of appearance. The incompletable series, in fact, has not been invented by the cunning of philosophers in order to confound the intelligence, but is the necessary result of the data which are presented to sensuous perception. For it is a law of the mind that everything phenomenal should be supplied in an ever-increasing regressus with its empirical conditions, and thus it is always seeking to probe phenomena to the bottom, and by exhausting the regressus, or, in other words, by gathering all the constitutive conditions into a totality, to reach a final, free, complete cause of the objects of its experience. Indeed, this is not only a commonplace, but a commendable and legitimate intellectual exercise. For it does not involve the presupposition of the true infinite, but is merely the ceaseless excursion of the heuristic understanding into the complexities of what, in contradistinction to the true, may be termed the spurious infinite. The true or actual infinite is what cannot be increased any further, that is to say, what is complete. The spurious infinite, on the other hand, is what is capable of being increased to infinity, or, in other words, the variable large at will or the infinite *in potentia*. In the same way, the true or actual infinitely small or the true infinitesimal is what cannot be made any smaller, or what, in other words, is irreducible; whilst the spurious infinitely

small or infinitesimal is what is capable of being indefinitely or infinitely reduced or made smaller, in other words, a variable small at will or the infinitesimal *in potentia*. Now, the human understanding in its unsatisfied and asymptotic search for the totality of empirical conditions is, like the mathematical calculus, serviceable only in respect of the spurious forms of the infinite, as defined above, and not in respect of those of the true infinite. Never satisfied with the content of a present experience, it peers through the regressus of conditions in the hope of completing its knowledge and finding an ultimate free cause or totality, a hope, however, which through that regressus is never destined to be fulfilled. Hegel's " true," " real," or " efficient " cause can be, in fact, nothing but this knowledge completely attained, but nevertheless unattainable, which, as such, would have as its content the totality of conditions, a free, original, and perfect unity. But it is a totality and freedom with which the laws of the cognitive faculties can hold no communion. The mind cannot grasp it and can nowhere find it. Hegel, however, notwithstanding this, would have the understanding not only presuppose it, but categorically predicate its *essentiality* and paralogistically supply it with the function of a cause, laying hold of it as the true and cogitable explanation of the various phenomena of our existence.

Thus in demonstrating the category of *causa sui* he argues :—

(*a*) That all things are necessitated to be what they are by the totality of conditions :

(*b*) That the changes in things, however, thus necessitated, imply that the totality of conditions has had corresponding changes within itself. For that, if a given state of things implies a given state of the totality of conditions necessitating it to be what it is, another state of things (the state preceding the present one) presupposes a different totality of conditions which necessitated that :

(*c*) That hence the doctrine of necessity presupposes a change in the totality of conditions, which cannot have been necessitated by any being beyond it, for the precise reason that it is the totality :

(*d*) That the change, therefore, in the totality of conditions is spontaneous or self-determined and not necessitated, and that freedom thus contains necessity, but necessity does not contain freedom : and

(*e*) That causality, therefore, presupposes self-separation, self-activity.

Now—to resume and finally conclude the arguments that have been employed in this section—there are two ways in which the phrase, *complete*

cause or the *totality of conditions* may be made use of in an enquiry of this description, the one valid, if, as before explained, we overlook for the moment the paralogistic use of the word *cause*, and the other necessarily invalid. Thus we are justified in saying that no object can be understood by us in its completeness and truth because we are unable to synthetise the totality of its conditions. We are also justified in asserting that the greater the number of its conditions that could be subjected to such a synthesis, the more intimate and thorough-going would our knowledge of the phenomenon be, and that the natural impulse of the understanding is to arrive at a complete interpretation of the thing by an envisagement of the totality of conditions, an ideal, however, which is impossible of fulfilment. In this manner of regarding, as it were, negatively the so-called complete cause of a thing—the term *cause* being used paralogistically in this special sense for want of a better—there is no *before* nor *after* in the sense of a necessary processional order, that is, of a cause preceding an effect or an effect as following in time upon a cause. The progressive envisagement of conditions is merely the ever richer apprehension of a thing, by seeing in that thing more and more of the sensuous relations that constitute it a phenomenon. As stated before, the thing comprehended in its full import would be the envisagement of the totality of the conditions,

the relational progression, as well as the relative character even of its parts having ceased to exist, and the totality of the conditions would be seen to be, not the whole of which the phenomenon was only part, not even a vast complex of relations, interlocked, but nevertheless reducible to analytical arrangement, of which a few only had previously been sorted out, but the thing *per se*, in other words, viewed not finitely as a phenomenon in a limited and imperfect aspect, but in its reality as completely interpreted, a unity and not a compound. This is the valid manner, and the only valid manner, in which a so-called complete cause could be regarded. The human understanding can aim at arriving at the totality of conditions without ever being able to do so or to form any concept of such a totality, and can assert that in so arriving an exhaustive explanation of the thing would be attained; that, in fact, the so-called complete cause of the thing would be grasped, but with no characteristics of a *before*, and the so-called effect likewise seized in its entirety, but with no characteristics of an *after* attaching to it. So-called cause and effect would be one and the same totality, and knowledge would be perfect.

The invalid manner in which *complete cause* or *totality of conditions* is sometimes employed is not, as in the preceding paragraph, to apply a certain

paralogistic terminology for want merely of a better, whilst appreciating the paralogism in so doing, but actually to accept the paralogism as true, that is, to presuppose that totality and to regard it as the cause preceding its effect in time. That Hegel does so regard it is manifest from the above paragraphs (*b*), (*c*), and (*d*), where he speaks of *change* taking place in the totality. No change, however, can take place for the understanding without a *before* and *after*, that is, no change can take place according to the laws of thought without something coming into existence for a discerning subject in a given moment of time that was not in a previous moment of time. But the totality of conditions is transcendent, not empirical. It is outside the scope of the cognitive faculties and any possible experience; for not being subdued to the temporal determinations which govern the sensuous world of phenomena, it cannot be dealt with through the medium of those pure forms of the intellect which are valid only in that world. Hegel, in fact, is attempting to apply the conception of change and the category of causality, which can only be used with objective validity in the empirical world of time determinations, to something which is outside all time determination and metempiric. There can be no before and after in a totality which is timeless and therefore unthinkable, and hence there can be no change in it for the understanding, nor any con-

nection in the shape of causal action between what is supersensuous (the totality) and what is merely empirical (any of the particular conditions). The categories of thought are applicable to the sensuous world only and not to the supersensible. We recognise indeed in our present limited existence that a complete knowledge of a thing can never be attained because the knowledge of all its conditions is unattainable. We recognise, too, negatively that, were we able to acquire a complete knowledge of all the conditions, we should know the thing through and through in its entirety as a perfect totality—so-called cause and effect would be one and the same with no *before* nor *after*. But that is a very different proposition from indulging in a double paralogism by asserting that a change in any given state of things, that is, in any particular parcel of conditions, is *caused* by a *change* in the totality of conditions; that time determinations are, in fact, applicable to the totality, and that effects arise out of it. For the terms *cause* and *effect* are merely the shackles of our finitude, stages in the imperfection of human knowledge and necessary makeshifts of the understanding, tied down, as it is, to the time determinations of the sensuous matter in which it works and to the empirical world of appearance, and can therefore by no possibility be applied to what is transcendent and infinite, that is to say, to what lies outside all temporal

determination and the sphere of mind, and is therefore unthinkable.

Thus a change in a given empirical state of things cannot by any possibility presuppose a change in the totality of conditions of that state of things, and Hegel in asserting it falls into the very same kind of paralogism, by attributing change to the metempiric and supersensible and applying the category of causality to it, as those earlier philosophers who used to insist upon the simplicity and permanence of the soul, forgetting, as they did, that substance can only be predicated of something that persists in space. To say, therefore, that this transcendent totality changes or is freely self-active does not help us forward in the least. We utter the words *totality* and *free self-activity* by very reason of the fact that the cognitive faculties are bound down to their own sensuous laws and cannot comprehend a totality as within those laws, neither a purely free self-activity. That is to say, the terms *totality of conditions* and *free self-activity* are employed, because the understanding makes efforts to complete its knowledge and break through the boundaries set by its laws, but finds that it cannot do so, and therefore gives a name empty of all thought-content to that sphere which it is unable to reach—*e.g.* " totality "—as well as other predicates to suit that unknowable and inconceivable, predicates which are made use of to convey the idea of

something beyond the range of the cognitive faculties, in fact, to the human mind a *blank nothing*, such, for instance, as *free self-activity*, &c. &c. So far, however, from *presupposing* that sphere which lies outside the bounds of conceptual presentation, as Hegel would have the laws of thought do, it is only the activity of the understanding, prompted by *given* sensuous data, and working ever further afield within its own domain upon the data presented to it, that induces the consciousness of the limitation of that domain, and hence of the antithesis of a knowable and an unknowable. The totality of conditions is therefore not *presupposed* by the laws of thought and brought to bear upon the data of sense as a sort of *a priori* machinery, but is rather *superinduced a posteriori* as a limit to its ability, when engaged upon the work of fashioning experience. For the straining and breakdown of the capacity of any conscious force can only become present to its consciousness, when data have been afforded on which that force can exercise its power and functions. It is only by acting upon data that the consciousness can arise of the inability to work beyond those data. In short, a *beyond its power* cannot be recognised as a limitative concept unless a *within its power* has first of all been made plain to consciousness. A *beyond its power*, therefore, cannot be *presupposed* by the laws of thought, but can only *supervene* in a negative manner in the consciousness

of an active intellectual force by the previous knowledge and consciousness of a *within its power*.

A *totality of conditions* is a *beyond its power*, and is negatively recognised as such. This Hegelian, free, self-active cause, therefore, apart from the especial paralogistic vice attaching to it, which has been already dealt with, is outside the purview of the cognitive faculties. But the understanding recognises its failure to reach this transcendent sphere only because it has already functioned in its proper empirical domain and become conscious of its own laws and the limitation of its capabilities. Therefore this transcendent sphere, this *totality of conditions*, in which there is no time, no causation, no change, cannot be presupposed by the laws of thought and brought *a priori* to the consideration of sensuous data, but is continually being superinduced in a negative, *a posteriori* manner as a result of the empirical activity of the understanding and the consciousness of the restriction of that activity to the finite world of phenomena. It is recognised as a *beyond its power*, as something non-sensuous, as a realm where empirical law no longer holds good, and thus as *absolute* (in contradistinction to *relative*) and free. It is not, however, seized by the cognitive faculties, but is a purely negative and limitative concept devoid of reality and content, and only thought as an unknown

antithetical to what *is* grasped, an unknowable in relation to a knowable and known.

Other instances might be cited from the Hegelian philosophy, in which it is taken for granted that the human mind can think what is transcendent and objectify it by means of empirical predicates in a sort of mental image. The author, for example, of the *Pathway to Reality* gives a description of the Hegelian notion of infinity, in which occurs the following sentence: "But the true notion of infinity is not an infinity which is numerically different from the finite self, but is the self conceived as higher than the distinctions which go to the making of its finiteness, distinctions which therefore really fall within it." Now, this is all very well, but it is not a concept within the range of human thought. Whenever the human mind thinks about the self, that is to say, whenever it is conscious in thought of *I*, it invariably thinks a *sensuous* self, that is to say, a phenomenal ego—a self combined out of the phenomenal materials of life's experience, a self, too, in conscious antithetic relation to the pure thinking subject. Moreover, whenever it thinks such an objective and sensuous self, it is obliged to posit a sensuous *non-self* in simultaneous objectivity. That is to say, it thinks *finitely*. It thinks a sensuous or finite self ("finite" *because* in conscious antithetic relation to the pure-thinking subject) in abstraction from the

totality of conditions, with a finite world also in abstraction as opposed to or contrasted with it. Without the latter there cannot be the former. In fact, there can be no thinking of the self by the human mind in which these finite distinctions do not occur. Therefore a "self conceived as higher than the distinctions which go to the making of its finiteness, distinctions which therefore really fall within it"—that is to say, a self which is not thought in conscious antithetic relation to the pure-thinking subject, nor sensuously posited in thought in abstraction from the totality of conditions with a non-self in objectivity also in abstraction as distinguished from it, cannot be thought at all. Such a self cannot be "conceived"—it is impossible for the human mind, and the human mind, although this is sometimes forgotten, is the only instrument we have with which to do our thinking. This sort of higher self is therefore transcendent. But, notwithstanding this, Hegel applies to it the predicate of activity. Now whatever the aspects may be under which we think of *activity*, there is at least one indispensable and invariable aspect without thinking it under which we cannot think it at all, namely, *motion in time*. But motion or restlessness in time can only apply to the phenomenal or finite world of experience. It cannot be predicated of what is transcendent and therefore timeless; and consequently to apply the term to "the self conceived

as higher than the distinctions which go to the making of its finiteness " is merely a verbal sequence or contradictory form of words ; a sequence, in fact, of different concepts which cannot themselves be synthetically subsumed under a concept ; a sequence, therefore, without the conceptional equivalent in the human mind which in its synthetical union its framer would have us believe it to possess. In fact, the ascription of finite predicates to what is transcendent is one of the chief stumbling-blocks in the Hegelian system. That system, even the most carping critic must admit, is one of the most remarkable efforts of constructive metaphysics in the history of philosophy. Its author, however, finds himself most unfortunately engaged in a perpetual struggle with the termini of thought, and in attempting therefore to delineate the articulation of the transcendent, frequently becomes in this unequal and hopeless contest almost inarticulate himself.[1]

[1] A few instances taken at random from Hegel's smaller *Logic* (Wallace's translation) may be cited here in illustration of this statement :—

§ 12. " Awakened, as it were, by this stimulus [viz. experience], thought is vitally characterised by raising itself above the natural state of mind, above the senses and inferences from the senses into its own unadulterated element, and by assuming, accordingly, at first a stand-aloof and negative attitude towards the point from which it started. Through this state of antagonism to the phenomena of sense its first satisfaction is found in itself, in the Idea of the universal essence of these phenomena : an Idea (the Absolute, or God) which

We see, then, that the reason we refer phenomena to an unknown, supersensible ground is because we cannot interpret them, *as phenomena*, in their full

may be more or less abstract." [Comment here would really be superfluous.]

§ 19. " . . . the theme of Logic is in general the supersensible world, and to deal with that theme is to dwell for a while in that world. Mathematics is concerned with the abstractions of time and space. But these are still the object of sense, although the sensible is abstract and idealised. Thought bids adieu even to this last and abstract sensible: it asserts its own native independence, renounces the field of the external and internal sense, and puts away the interests and inclinations of the individual. When Logic takes this ground, it is a higher science than we are in the habit of supposing."

[It must be a high science indeed, when even Time and internal sense are done away with, that is to say, even thought itself !]

§ 60. "This stage of 'appearance' however—the phenomenal world—is not the terminus of thought: there is another and a higher region. But that region was to the Kantian philosophy an inaccessible 'other world.'"

[But if a higher region, it must necessarily be beyond and different to, or other than, the lower region. Thought, we are told, can deal with it moreover. Thought, therefore, must be able to define the distinction between the higher and the lower. But in limiting the lower as against the higher region, it is also limiting the higher as against the lower. A limited higher region, however, is finite and not infinite—phenomenal, therefore, and not supersensible.]

§ 82. "A certain theory of some conditions and circumstances of nature or mind may be, say these people, very fine and correct as a matter of speculation, but it contradicts experience, and nothing of the sort is admissible in reality. To this the answer is, that the speculative is in its true signification, neither preliminarily nor even definitely, something merely subjective: that, on the contrary, it expressly rises above such oppositions as that between subjective and objective, which the understanding cannot get over, and absorbing them in itself, evinces its own concrete and all-embracing nature."

[But this is no answer; for no speculation in which mankind can engage can be otherwise than human, and no human speculation can proceed without the machinery of the Categories and the ever-present consciousness of antithesis between the thinking subject and

meaning and truth; that is, we cannot envisage the totality of their constitutive conditions, a totality which is metempiric. In other words, this,

the object of thought. The opposition, in fact, between subjective and objective is immitigable, and can never be overcome in the human mind, however adventurous may be the particular excursion of the imagination into the regions of hypothesis and conjecture. Fichte, to whom Hegel owed so much, shows this very clearly in the *Wissenschaftslehre*—(II. Theoretical Part of the Science of Knowledge D. 4 (3)—translated by A. E. Kroeger.]

§ 86. "When thinking is to begin, we have nothing but thought in its merest indeterminateness; for we cannot determine unless there is both one and another; and in the beginning there is yet no other. The indeterminate, as we here have it, is the blank we begin with, not a featurelessness reached by abstraction, not the elimination of all character, but the original featurelessness which precedes all definite character and is the very first of all. And this we call Being. It is not to be felt or perceived by sense, or pictured in imagination: it is only and merely thought, and as such it forms the beginning."

[To think any thing, no matter what, inevitably involves the machinery of the categories. For thought cannot be active apart from its own forms, since it is in the guise of those very forms that its activity as human thought is able to take place. But those forms are the Categories. What category, however, could be made use of in this case? But if no category is applicable, neither can there be any thought. Moreover, Hegel seems to imply that the *a priori* precedes the *a posteriori* in time and can be considered apart from it in thought. As, however, the *a priori* does not arise prior in time to the *a posteriori*, but is the very condition of the possibility of the latter, that is, of there being any human thought at all, and is nothing apart from the *a posteriori*, the argument that it can be seized by thought in its purity independently of the *a posteriori* is fundamentally unsound.]

§ 88. "In its beginning, the thing is not yet, but it is more than merely nothing, for its Being is already in the beginning. Beginning is itself a case of Becoming; only the former term is employed with an eye to the further advance. If we were to adapt logic to the more usual method of the sciences, we might start with the representation of a Beginning as abstractly thought, or with Beginning as such, and then analyse this representation; and perhaps people

for us, incognisable, non-phenomenal substrate is the totality of the constitutive conditions of the Universe, which, if ever grasped by us in its entirety, would necessarily lead to the abrogation, not only of the phenomenality of the cosmos we are conscious of as external to our sensuous ego, but of our own phenomenality as well, and show us ourselves and it as the Universe in its perfect and complete teleological unity and unconditioned self-sufficiency. This totality of conditions, therefore, for ever unattainable, indeed, in its *full* reality for mortal men, but a goal nevertheless towards which continuously progressive approaches may be made by us, might well in the permissible manner of regarding it, as described in this section, take the place of that equally unknowable ground of phenomena to which Kant gives the name of the *thing-in-itself*, but towards which he holds out no possible hope of any nearer advance in this life, whatever efforts we may make. It might also be substituted, without certainly any loss of consistency, for that eternally changing, self-active, self-causal principle embodied in Hegel's doctrine of the *Absolute*, a principle which, though, as such, utterly removed, as we have

would more readily admit, as a result of this analysis, that Being and Nothing present themselves as undivided in unity."

[But we cannot think of "Beginning as such," that is, of *absolute* Beginning. The mind has to furnish some conditioning prerequisite. There can, therefore, be no such mental "representation" as absolute Beginning, nor consequently any "analysis" of it by the cognitive faculties.]

seen, from human ken and incomprehensible and contradictory for human thought, he would yet, in striking contrast to the Kantian point of view, force within the range of an intelligence restricted to the phenomenal, and empirically hold up to man's view as the *ideationally reasoned* explanation of the world.

D

INVALIDITY OF THE ASSIGNMENT OF AN ABSOLUTE CHARACTER TO THE HUMAN WILL (*Continued*)

SECONDLY, to assert that free-will or the faculty of spontaneous volition is an active force *in* nature, which, though untrammelled and uncoerced by nature, and sometimes acting even in opposition to nature, can only manifest its power by working in accordance with the irreversible process of antecedent and consequent, that is, in harmony with the dynamical law of time-determination which rules throughout the world of phenomena, is a contradiction in terms. All that we know or can know as finite, sentient beings is a complex of phenomena inseparably bound together in an unbroken causal nexus, all of them dependent upon their constitutive conditions in time. The possibility of our knowledge can go no further than this, for whatever point our expeditionary experience may reach, the law of nature is to be found invariably working according to an inviolable rule of connection, and outside that rule (*i.e.* the law of the conditioned) it is not given to us percipient beings to be able to frame a single conception with any content to it. If, nevertheless, we persist in

verbally maintaining without, however, being actually able to think it, that free-will can, as an unconditional agent in nature, determine internal and external activity on the part of the subject independently of, and even in opposition to, that same nature, and according to a supersensible order of laws totally different from that of nature, although clothed in the garb of phenomenal compulsion; and if we insist that experience daily bears witness to the fact, we immediately find ourselves not only clinging to a proposition which has been shown to lie outside human cognition, but, what is a good deal more serious, involved in a contradiction that is wholly irreconcilable. For the two doctrines of freedom and natural law cannot then be squared, and to save one you must sacrifice the other. It is true that nothing intrinsically contradictory is contained in the admission that freedom, as a merely metempiric faculty of which we know and can know nothing, may act spontaneously *outside* nature and consequently outside the range of all possible experience, and take part in the same phenomenon *with* nature; and that this would involve no positive contradiction Kant indeed has successfully shown. But to affirm that *within the limits of experience* freedom and nature can and do take part in phenomenal presentation, sometimes in opposition, and sometimes in unison, but always without reference to one another, in spite of the fact that free-will

can only manifest itself phenomenally, and that we must refer every phenomenon without exception to its constitutive conditions in time according to empirical law, is a contradiction on the face of it, which, though we may assert it verbally, we can have no idea of and form no conception.

In the third place, if free-will were in truth an *absolute* faculty ranging the universe of mind, independent in its selective and determining capacity of the comparative importunity of empirical conditions, and thus able to throw its powerful and victorious weight upon the one side or the other of the various conscious impulses of a subject of the world of sense, there could be no conceivable reason why it should not at times cast in its lot with the weaker natural inclination of the thinking subject as against the empirically stronger one. A wealthy citizen, for instance, might be possessed of such a feeling of patriotic devotion to his country, the result not only of a long series of peaceful and happy years spent under the ægis of its Constitution, or of innumerable honours showered upon him by a grateful people for his services to the State, but also of systematic mental or moral training sensuously assimilated during his early youth, as to absorb his whole being and overwhelmingly outweigh any transient inclination to swerve from the loyalty due to his citizenship; notwithstanding which, we should see this absolute faculty of volition

choosing for him the easily discoverable betrayal of his fatherland for some paltry pecuniary advantage, a line of conduct directly antagonistic to the whole trend of his most powerful natural propensities, and a course of action which, in the absence of this incomprehensible and irresponsible free faculty (or of the intervention, of course, of some totally unexpected and sufficiently powerful *natural* "cause") would have had no possible chance of assertion. We should see the leading runner representing his country in a neck-and-neck race stop within a few yards of the winning-post with some utterly trivial object, and so lose the plaudits of his compatriots and the prize which he might have gained. In fact, countless examples could be given in which the strongest possible mental ("moral" or otherwise) or physical inclination, or both combined, would, *for no reason*, be passed over by this unconditioned faculty of free-will in favour of physical or mental inclinations so weak as to be almost imperceptible. And the words "for no reason" are used advisedly, because, were there any determining natural reason present for this free faculty becoming active in any given case in a particular manner and no other, that is to say, were there any empirical cause of its special activity, that faculty would no longer be unconditioned or spontaneous, and to call it free-will would be a contradiction in terms. If man therefore in truth possessed an original, *absolute*

faculty of volition, his whole empirically constructed temperament and disposition, the acquired habit of his mind, the entire system of his congenital constitution, physical and mental, his "moral" and sensual proclivities, in fact, the strongest natural impulses of his being—impulses determined by whatever constitutive conditions can enter into a temporal experience, varying from early moral inculcation, sensuously imparted, to inherited taste or later associations—could and would, *without the smallest reason whatsoever*, be turned upside down by free-will, and rendered completely nugatory. This, however, never happens within the sphere of human experience. For in every instance, without fail, the empirically predominant state of the thinking subject carries the day; and, without exception, were an adequate investigation possible into all the bearings and circumstances of the case, the natural and sufficient constitutive conditions would be discovered for every such necessary state and therefore for every conscious human action.

In the fourth place, the theory that mankind does indeed possess an *absolute* power of determination is by no means to be embraced without inquiry as the necessary explanation of the problem why we do most undoubtedly *feel* within us, when we are consciously acting either physically or mentally, the presence of what we believe to be such a faculty; because, if it is possible to discover an empirical

interpretation without straying outside the limits of a possible experience, there will be no further need for the exhausting mental exertion involved in trying to project ourselves from the sphere of conceptual possibility into the region of the unknowable and inconceivable. If we could find some natural ground to satisfy the demands even of probability, it would be an unprofitable task still to insist upon an expedition in search of a solution, which, unable ever to be otherwise than a mere empty, limitative concept without any possible perceptual filling, could never relieve the cravings of human nature.

E

INVALIDITY OF THE ASSIGNMENT OF AN ABSOLUTE CHARACTER TO THE HUMAN WILL (*Continued*)

The Subject-Ego and the Object-Ego: The Reflective Reference

Lastly—and this is our fifth reason—to predicate freedom in regard to the ego is either contradictory under one aspect, as we have shown, or, even if true under the other, completely barren of human interest. The ego of every man's consciousness, unaware of it though he may usually be, is compounded of two aspects—the *subject-ego* and the *object-ego*. In the same way that he knows objects external to himself and to one another, he knows himself and is conscious of himself as an object-phenomenon among other objects, determining and determinable by them; an object-phenomenon, however, which has no precisely defined territory within the boundaries of which it holds sole and undisputed sway, shut off from the rest of the sensuous world by a dividing line which is permanently and irrevocably fixed; but an object-phenomenon separated from other phenomena by a line which is continually shifting backwards and

forwards, so as to include rather more or rather less on either side of the limit—an object-phenomenon, in short, which encroaches upon and is itself encroached upon by the rest of the finite world. In addition to this, however, he is conscious of himself in an indirect, elusive, antithetical manner as a pure-thinking subject also. In the same way, too, that he necessarily in his mind, whenever his thought dwells upon the problem, refers every phenomenon external to his object-ego to an unknown, supersensuous substrate, the totality of its constitutive conditions,[1] so does he also by a similar *reflective* process refer the object-ego, which he knows and thinks about as an object among other phenomena, to a non-phenomenal subject or *Soul* as its metempiric ground. Again, in the same manner that the knowledge of objects external to the ego is dependent on a pure knowing subject which is conscious of the object-ego and antithetically distinguishes those external objects from it, so similarly is this knowledge of the object-ego only possible at all, inasmuch as the pure subject-ego is indirectly aware of itself in a sort of subliminal consciousness, and can thus distinguish the object-ego from itself by antithesis. This correlation, therefore, of the subject and object-ego which takes place in the mind, that is, of the sensuous and the supersensuous, is, as sug-

[1] For the reason described in Section C.

gested above, something more than that mere reflective reference of the phenomenal object-ego to its metempiric ground (*i.e.* the totality of its constitutive conditions), a reference of the sensuous to its non-sensuous basis which results in the case of all objects of knowledge without exception from the limited nature of that medium in which the understanding works. For it is here a question, not only of a *reflective reference* of the phenomenal to the supersensuous, which takes place, it is true, in the case of the object-ego just as much as in that of phenomena external to the latter, whenever our thought is directed in a contemplative fashion to what the complete truth of any phenomenal object may be, but, as we have said, of a kind of *sub-consciousness*, or, more properly speaking, indirect and negative self-consciousness, of the subject-ego pure and simple ; a consciousness which, apart from its indirect and antithetical character, is devoid of all thought-content, and which probably by the vast majority of mankind is confusedly absorbed into their direct consciousness of the object-ego ; the twofold consciousness, thus combined, being then regarded by them as the undivided consciousness of their subject-selves.

Now, in referring a phenomenon external to the object-ego to its supersensuous ground, which, we repeat, is a necessary, limitative act of the mind, whenever we begin to reflect upon what any pheno-

menon may be in its complete interpretation, we obtain no knowledge of that ground, except a negative idea of it, and our thought of it consequently has no content. The reference is merely limitative; that is to say, it is the result of the impossibility of subduing the relativity of the phenomenon, or, in other words, of appraising it in the totality of its constitutive conditions. On the other hand, in the case of the object-ego, there is, as we have said, more than a mere empty *reflective reference* of it to the totality of its constitutive conditions, that is, to a non-phenomenal subject-ego as its supersensible ground. There is also a kind of *sub-consciousness*, or, to express it more accurately, indirect consciousness, superinduced in a negative, antithetical manner, of that unknowable and unrealisable pure-thinking basis which anticipates, and, if it always remained for us distinctive in character, would render supererogatory any merely reflective reference to it; a sub-consciousness, which, to repeat, is not a direct, but an indirect consciousness of that pure subject, necessarily induced by the very dependence itself of knowledge of an object on a knowing subject; that is to say, by the direct antithetic relation itself within the ego of subject and object. For, although this so-called sub-consciousness of the transcendent ground of the object-ego is only *indirect*, the consciousness of the fact of antithesis within the ego

is *direct*. In other words, we are *dirccctly* conscious of the object-ego, and hence necessarily of the fact of division and antithesis within the ego as a whole; but since we cannot seize one side of that antithesis in thought—namely, that of that subject-ego—we can only be conscious of that side in an, as it were, *indirect* manner through the medium of that fact of which we are *directly* conscious, namely, the existence of contrast and division. This peculiar kind of negative or indirect consciousness, it is hardly necessary to point out, the ego does not feel in respect of the relation between a phenomenon external to the object-ego and the supersensuous ground of that phenomenon, since that antithetic relation is on both its sides wholly objective to the ego, one side not being, as it were, swallowed up through identity with the subject that observes the antithesis, and therefore enters into our thought as a reflective reference merely, due to the limited nature of our understanding.

If, however, we choose to reflect upon our phenomenal object-ego, and thus, in addition to our own indirect and negative consciousness of its non-phenomenal ground, that is, of the pure-thinking subject-ego, to obtain a sort of limitative concept of this metempiric antithesis by reference, we find that this reflective reference is more vivid in the case of the ego than in the case of external phenomena and their supersensuous ground. And this

accession of distinctness in respect of the reference is only natural, for the crude externality of the reference has here been partially overcome, and is made by the ego in regard to itself, with the superadded advantage of that auxiliary but elusive subconsciousness, or rather negative consciousness, which is ever present with us. It is a reference, in short, to the supersensuous groundwork, that is, to the totality of the constitutive conditions of my own phenomenal personality by the subject-ego itself, which, however, in this reference, as in the case of the reflective reference by it of things external to the object-ego to their metempiric substrate, is only able to make use of those forms of thought which rule in the world of appearance, and cannot therefore turn its thought upon its subject-self on account of the impossibility of applying the machinery of the categories to what is transcendent. In this reference, therefore, *to* the subject-ego *by* the subject-ego there is, as in the case of the reference by the thinking subject of external phenomena (*i.e.* external to the object-ego) to their supersensuous ground, no thought-content, and consequently no knowledge. The result of the reference is merely a limitative concept. In fact, leaving out of account the elusive kind of subliminal consciousness already alluded to, we know as little of the non-phenomenal groundwork of the object-ego in our reflective reference to it, although the

reference, it is true, is more intimate and insistent, as we do of the supersensuous ground or the totality of their constitutive conditions to which we refer phenomena external to that ego in our efforts to overcome their relativity. Moreover, if I now drop my merely reflective reference, empirically made, and, without thinking of myself as an object-ego at all, try to concentrate my thought upon this so-called sub-consciousness, then, as soon as I attempt to do so and to form a subject "I" out of it, even this phantom of indirect, negative consciousness recedes into the extreme background of apperception, and like an *ignis fatuus* eludes me altogether, becoming, as it were, merely an object-ego for me. In fact, if it were indeed possible to transfix the subject-ego in thought, it would then no longer be a subject, but an object. How often have some of us, perhaps, imagined that we had arrested it in thought, when it seemed instantaneously, in the very moment even of our introspective effort, to dissolve and transform itself into the object-ego, and we found the subject-ego to be as unplumbed, as deeply hidden from us, and as evanescent to our thought, as ever! But this, again, is only what might be expected, for how could we presume to envelop in forms of mental action, forms which are applicable to the sensuous life alone, something which lies outside the sphere of phenomena, in this case the ground of a particular

phenomenon, namely, the pure-thinking, non-phenomenal "I," the totality of conditions of the object-ego? Thought, in fact, can, in the case of human beings, only know itself when operative under the forms of time and space, or, in other words, when it is no longer pure, but clothed in the garb of phenomenal activity, that is to say, when it has become an *object*, and consequently cannot direct itself upon itself as a pure subject.

There is a further point to be considered in this connection, namely, the question of personal identity. The indirect or negative consciousness of the subject-ego, of which we have been speaking, is always more vividly present in us, whenever we happen to be engaged in such action, physical or mental, as does not involve either any speculative reflection upon the mystery of our phenomenal object-ego or any profitless attempt to reach that same elusive, antithetical consciousness of the subject-ego by means of thought. It is therefore in all probability more clearly defined for us in extreme youth, when the reflective reference is weaker, than in our later and more contemplative years. Or to put it in another way, the consciousness of antithesis between subject and object-ego is more distinct then than later, and the synthetic unity of the ego more susceptible of involuntary subjective analysis. A very young child, for instance, usually speaks of itself in the third person,

treating its phenomenal being with its manifold of inner sense as an object, and in all probability sharply differentiating that object in consciousness from its pure-thinking subject-ego; for in order to place itself distinctly as an object before itself, it must be distinctly conscious of itself in an antithetical, negative manner as a subject as well. That subject, however, it is only aware of indirectly in what may be termed a sort of sub-consciousness, as explained above, and cannot apply the "I" to it in thought, being, as it is, metempiric. But with the growth of experience the *reflective reference* by the subject-ego of the object-ego to its metempiric ground, or the undefined totality of its constitutive conditions, becomes more persistent, and the gradual result of this change is that the feeling grows ever stronger that this supersensible background or subject-ego, in its relation to the object-ego, remains identical. The reason of this is not far to seek. As the pure subject-ego is for us always unknowable in this reflective reference, and therefore devoid of any thought-content, it remains for us as thinking beings, on the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, *changeless*, and therefore always identical and never ending; for there cannot exist differences and distinctions for human thought in what is transcendent and devoid of all empirical conditions. Indeed, it is in part thus that there arises what is one of the most abiding of human beliefs, namely,

the belief in *immortality*; a belief which rests, not on that negative and indirect consciousness of the subject-ego, the elusive and metempiric character of which can afford no basis for reflection, but on this reflective reference empirically carried out by us. The belief, in fact, is not original, but empirically generated, and people, consequently, are sometimes heard to say that the more they *reflect* upon the problem of their own existence and of the world around them, the more convinced do they become of the immortality of the soul and of a future life.

But the growing reflective reference of the object-ego to this perpetually unknowable and therefore for us changeless and identical substrate (the totality of its constitutive conditions) leads us by the logical and unconscious movement of thought to suppose that an identical groundwork must carry an identical superstructure; that what, in fact, is always being referred to the same unvarying basis as its ultimate reality must itself retain an identity of essence, and that therefore the object-ego also, with its manifold of inner sense, must possess a personal identity through life. A feeling of phenomenal continuity is thus set up. The consequence of this is that the object is regarded as no less a primary and, in some respects, permanent part of the ego than the subject. In fact, the object-ego being, unlike the other, immediately present to thought, soon occupies the chief place in our con-

scious being, and we apply the " I " to it in thought, thus displacing with it the " third person " of our tenderer years. In this manner does the elusive, antithetical consciousness of the subject-ego become, *as such*, less and less distinctive in character with the growth of reflection, until we almost lose the conscious antithesis of subject and object-ego and involuntarily absorb the indirect, negative kind of consciousness of the one into the stronger and more direct consciousness of the other. In fact, the really important antithesis for us becomes, not the subject-ego on the one hand and the object-ego and other objects on the other, but the ego and the non-ego, that is to say, the ego in its entirety on one side as a subject and objects external to that ego on the other.

It may be argued—" This is all very well, but how can I reflectively refer a past object-ego, *recognised as having been mine*, to its non-phenomenal ground, unless there be a connecting link between the thinking subject then and the thinking subject now; that is to say, unless there is something in common between the two, something identical, in fact, which enables me to *appropriate* the past phenomenal ego in order to refer it, on reflection, to its non-phenomenal ground? Does not the very fact of my being able to refer a past object-ego, as *mine* (that is, as described in a former paragraph of this section, through the instrumentality of an, as it

were, negatively and indirectly superinduced consciousness of the metempiric side of the antithetic relation within the ego), to its unknowable, timeless ground prove the identity of the subject ground then and now?" We have, however, to bear the following points in mind: namely, (*a*) that *Time* is a purely ideal or subjective condition of all our experience; (*b*) that what is known as "memory" enters into practically every immediately conscious moment of the life of man; (*c*) that the mental images we are conscious of in memory are merely particular affections of our inner sense or conscious modifications of our phenomenal ego which have been fashioned by pure thought into objectivity, just as fear, curiosity, or sympathy are inner sense-affections, each of them possessing its own characteristics; (*d*) that every kind of affection of human sensibility, without exception, and in its entirety, is an *immediately present* affection of the phenomenal ego, that is, of sense, inner or outer as the case may be, an affection in direct [1] and objective conscious relation with its metempiric antithesis or subject-ego, and which that pure subject deals with in each case according to its own fixed laws of objectification; (*e*) that the multiform

[1] For to repeat, at the risk of somewhat wearisome iteration, the consciousness of antithesis between subject and object ego is *direct*, although the self-consciousness of the subject-ego itself is only *indirectly and negatively*, or, as it were, sub-consciously superinduced through the direct consciousness of the object-ego and therefore of a necessary antithetic relation within the ego.

images of memory, or the various idiosyncratic affections of inner sense that go by that name, having been adjusted in accordance with certain rules of relativity by the pure-thinking subject, are therefore merely *immediately present* affections of our phenomenal sentiency of which the ego is conscious, and which the pure-thinking subject fashions into objectivity according to the synthetic laws of thought : in other words, modifications *here and now* of our phenomenal or object-ego, however much 'we may feel them under a certain aspect resulting from our own finitude—compelled, as we are, to accord to every immediate affection of our sentiency its particular and limited parcel of empirical and temporal conditions—to be mere present shadows thrown by real prototypal objects in antecedent times ; and (*f*) that when I therefore remember myself as suffering great physical pain, for instance, a year ago, I am able to call that so-called antecedent state *mine*, solely because that state, as thus remembered, that is, as the actual manner in which my inner sense is *now* being affected, does not concern a non-present phenomenal or object-ego as affected in this particular manner, but is an immediate affection or modification of my present object-ego, and therefore in present conscious relation, indirectly and negatively superinduced though the consciousness of the metempiric side of that relation may be, with its supersensuous

antithesis, or, in other words, with my subject-ego.

The direct conscious antithesis, however, of subject and object-ego, by means of which, as we have said, the "antecedent state" in the case of a memorial affection is able to be appropriated by the subject *as its own*, is concerned *only* with the immediate and present affection of the object-ego, and not with that purely prototypal and non-present aspect of it, as such, which is due to a subjective rule of causality in us, or, in other words, to the ideality of our time-determinations; the law of that ideality in this particular kind of sense-affection constraining us to regard the affection, in that aspect, that is to say, in disruption from the immediacy of the affection, as the real antecedent state which has cast the present affection as its shadow through the medium of thought, and whose metempiric antithesis, therefore, in that aspect of disruption, we can only speculatively and non-subjectively, that is to say, not, so to speak, sub-consciously be aware of in that indirect, subjective manner, as before explained, but only objectively aim at, as in the case of any other objects external to the present object-ego, through *reflective reference*.

But we have already seen in several preceding paragraphs how we always, whenever we *reflect* upon the matter, refer our phenomenal ego in a general sort of way in all its manifold modifications to its

non-phenomenal ground or the totality of its constitutive conditions. It has been shown, moreover, how this reflective reference of the phenomenal ego to an incognisable ground induces the belief in the general identity of that ground throughout the multiplicity of the modifications, and, as consequential thereto, the feeling also of continuity of essence in respect of the impressionable phenomenal ego itself. The results in the case of those present modifications or sense-affections termed images of memory must therefore be analogous to those produced by any other present affections of the object-ego, except that, in the case of these peculiar affections, our reference is influenced in a particular manner by those ideal conditions through which we construe that particular kind of affection ; and thus, whilst we are induced to believe, on reflection, in the general identity of the ground of the phenomenal ego, whatever its modifications may be, we all the more distinctly feel that ground, in the case of memorial images, to be that of a phenomenal ego as affected, not merely in various co-existent or coincident ways, but as affected in different and antecedent times or, in other words, during what we term the natural past life of a man.

For, to repeat, this belief in the identity of the supersensible ground of our phenomenal being could not be effected, in the case of images of memory, by means *solely* of that elusive kind of self-con-

sciousness of the subject-ego, superinduced indirectly by the direct consciousness of the object-ego and therefore of a necessary antithetic relation within the ego, an antithesis within the ego which on its metempiric side we only recognise to be directly related to what we also recognise at the same time to be exclusively immediate and present affections of the phenomenal ego, and not therefore to those peculiar affections under their ideally determined and purely prototypal aspect, which, in that aspect of diremption from immediacy, although, even then, necessarily in every part of them equally immediately present to sense in actuality, or we could not be conscious of them at all or perform the act of reference to their ground, we are constrained by the idiosyncratic operation upon them of that subjective temporal medium, in which our thought works and to which it is subdued, to *reflect upon* as causal and existent in antecedent times. In this latter case, although we can appropriate the memorial affections in their generality *as our own,* that is, recognise them as the way in which *our* phenomenal ego was affected in the past, on account of their being in fact nothing less indeed than immediate and present affections of our object-ego's sentiency, we, nevertheless, in reflecting upon that aspect of them which we are constrained by the subjectivity of those particular temporal conditions with their resultant law of causality to regard as

not immediate and present, but as non-present and prototypal, are obliged to aid and abet, as it were, that direct consciousness of the antithetic relation of subject and present object-ego which here partially fails us, by *referring* them under that non-present aspect, in the same general sort of way that we refer on reflection all other things external to the present object-ego, to their non-phenomenal ground, thereby unwittingly constructing our belief in the perpetual identity of that ground throughout the manifold changes of phenomenal man. The much-vexed question, therefore, whether we really retain our personal identity through life loses a large part of its significance. It would be beyond all human ability to deny such identity without presumption; it would be equally presumptuous to affirm it categorically. All that has been argued and suggested here is that we do not *feel* that we are identical in different times by means *exclusively* of our direct consciousness of the fact of antithesis within the ego of subject and object, or solely on account of that peculiar kind of indirectly superinduced sub-consciousness, so laboriously defined above, of the supersensuous side of that antithetic relation, that is, of the pure subject-ego; but very largely through our habit of reflective reference, a reference which builds up this feeling of continuity by empirical means open to investigation, whether that feeling be ultimately a true inter-

pretation of the real state of the case or no, a matter, indeed, which, even if not wholly meaningless, must at any rate continue to be beyond our ken.

We thus appear to derive, in a measure, the feeling of and belief in our personal identity from our *reflective reference*, empirically carried out, of the phenomenal to the supersensuous, and not exclusively from that indirectly superinduced *consciousness* of the metempiric subject-ego, which from moment to moment is merely a sort of negative result of the direct consciousness of the object-ego, and therefore of a necessary antithetic relation within the ego. To the question, therefore, why human beings *feel and believe* that their ego preserves a personal identity throughout the various vicissitudes of their existence, a partial answer may be given. To ask, however, whether the subject-ego *does in reality* remain identical is a conundrum devoid of any reasonable meaning. For "identity" involves the condition of permanence or time-duration, since it implies that *something now* is the same as *another previously*. But it has just been shown that the subject-ego is metempiric in character, that is to say, outside all conditions of time and space, and therefore elusive to thought. Consequently to inquire whether man's subject-ego, that is, the supersensuous substrate or the totality of the constitutive conditions of his object-

ego, does in fact preserve identity through life, is merely to speak of the unthinkable in terms of human thought, in other words, to apply sensuous predicates to what is transcendent, and to try to lop and shape the infinite so as to fit it into the Procrustean bed of the finite understanding. We must therefore remain content to inquire why it is that human beings *feel and believe* that their subject-selves retain their identity through life; but it is meaningless to ask whether, and equally futile, as well as contradictory, to affirm that their subject-ego is in reality an essence which preserves its identity through all the phases of phenomenal change.

The problem of the ego is indeed the profoundest of all psychological and metaphysical problems, and the key, perhaps, to all the others, for is not "I" the Atlas that bears upon its back the secrets of the Universe? A simple, undivided ego we certainly are not—our own reflection and that elusive, indirect consciousness tell us as much—but an ego compounded of subject and object. The "I" which every man fixes in thought and has knowledge of; the "I" which he has pity, ambition, and love for; in whose behalf he slaves throughout a lifetime; of whom he feels proud or ashamed, is not the pure-thinking subject-ego which lies behind his so-called personality like a canvas behind the paint, but the phenomenal or object-ego. That object-ego is the

whole of his past and present experience; the countless associations of his ideas; his mental peculiarities and physical organism; his memory, passions, and hereditary and other instincts; his temperament, nature, and manifold of inner and outer sense; the sum, in fact, of his whole conscious life and being empirically known to him. It is therefore bound down by natural law, and in the light of that law alone can its various springs and impulses be reached by human thought. But the subject-ego cannot be known or thought, and for the reason that it cannot be empirically known or thought, to predicate *freedom* of it is, even if true, devoid of interest for human nature. Directly we attempt to predicate any property concerning it, and by means of thought to fit that predicate to its object, it immediately eludes our grasp and the cloak of our predicate falls on the shoulders of the object-ego, of whom freedom cannot be predicated without contradiction, subdued as it is to natural law. That there is a subject-ego in each of us we all believe. It is not only with us, as has been explained, in the shape of that fugitive and indirectly superinduced consciousness which is present to every man as an undefined something in necessary antithetic relation to that object-ego which he knows and posits by that very self-same pure thought, although it becomes, it is true, less distinctive in character with the growth of experi-

ence, until we almost lose sight of its origin and transfer it in our imagination to the object-ego to which it does not belong; but it is also a matter for *reflective reference*, a reference which is the necessary and natural result of the peculiar function of the human understanding, which cannot overstep the phenomenal sphere marked out for it, and which for that very reason is forced to admit a non-sensuous background to its knowledge as a limitative concept, an ultimate reality, in short, which must be for ever beyond the scope of its powers. More than this, however, we none of us can say.

For all practical purposes, however, the ego may be regarded as one undivided thinking subject with external phenomena for its objects. For we cannot separately attach the metempiric part of it in thought, and though there is in all of us a kind of sub-consciousness of it, like the distant tinkling of a bell, the whole of our consciousness in this life upon which the thought of the subject-ego can be directed appertains to the object-ego alone. Throughout this Part (II), therefore, the term "subject" or "thinking subject" has been employed as comprising the ego in its entirety, that is to say, the phenomenal or object-ego, with its manifold of inner and outer sense, as well as the pure-thinking subject-ego, whatever it may be.

F

INNER AND OUTER SENSE

A CLEARLY defined distinction has therefore been drawn between that general *reflective reference* by the subject-ego of the phenomenal object-ego to its unknowable metempiric ground, or, in other words, to the totality of its constitutive conditions, and that elusive kind of self-consciousness of the subject-ego, which is superinduced in a negative and indirect way by the direct consciousness of the object-ego, and, consequently, of a necessary antithetic relation, within the ego, of subject and object. It has also been pointed out that, although this reflective reference is made with respect to both the object-ego and phenomena external to that ego, the direct consciousness of the fact of antithesis within the ego of phenomenal and non-phenomenal, as well as the above peculiar kind of sub-consciousness, indirectly generated through that direct consciousness, of the supersensible ground of the phenomenal, only exist in our present state of finitude in the case of the object-ego and its subject. Indeed, it is this distinction which especially characterises what we recognise as the world around us as con-

trasted with ourselves as objects in it. In spite of this, however, the gulf which divides the two is possibly not quite so immitigable for thought as might appear at first sight. In fact, it may be due to an apparently subordinate feature of our organism that we are not self-conscious in a similarly elusive, indirect manner of the supersensuous ground of nearly the whole of our world of nature as our own subject-ego, in antithetic relation to that world in another form as that subject's object or object-ego.

In order to make this observation plainer, it may be as well to define more precisely what is meant by the terms *inner* and *outer sense*, as made use of in connection with the object-ego in the last paragraph but one of the previous section, so as to avoid the confusion which is sometimes brought about by different interpretations being placed upon them. There is no need here to discuss whether indeed the actual terms can ever properly be employed in antithetic juxtaposition or no ; whether possibly they may not be crude and misleading and even in some respects contradictory. There are those who would go so far as to abolish the very distinction. That there is a distinction, however, for the everyday consciousness of man is beyond dispute, and the question for the moment is merely the analysis of that differentiation in feeling of which all men are aware. What is commonly known as an affection of *outer sense* may be said

to be *whatever part of that modification of my phenomenal or object-ego's sentiency I am conscious of as* GIVEN, *that is, as independent of and not immediately constituted by the activity of my own thought, in other words, as not merely made up of or consisting of the manner in which my thought is acting at the moment*, however clearly I may recognise, on consideration, the purely phenomenal character of the whole world, as I know it. An affection of *inner sense*, on the contrary, may be defined as *whatever part of that modification of my object-ego's sentiency I am conscious of as* NOT GIVEN, *that is, as dependent upon and immediately constituted by a particular phenomenal movement of my own thought, in other words, as merely made up of and consisting of the manner in which my thought is acting at the moment*, let the excitatory causes of that thought-movement be what they may. Sights, tastes, touches, smells, and sounds, for example, will be recognised, so far as a certain *given* part of the object-ego's modification in each of these cases is concerned, as falling under the first head; whilst doubts, fears, hatreds, loves, sorrows, joys, curiosities, ambitions, and so forth, will be felt, as such, that is to say, in so far as they are *not given*, to fall wholly under the second. We say *as such* advisedly, because what is known as *outer sense* is not in the ordinary unreflecting consciousness of mankind always easily discerptible in any clearly demarcatory fashion from what is

known as *inner sense*, or *vice versâ*. Fear of a viper seen in the grass, for instance, is an affection of outer as well as of inner sense according to the definitions which have just been suggested. I am conscious of what I term my outer sense of sight as being affected, in part, independently of the movement of my thought, but I also feel a modification, called fear, taking place in what I term my inner senses, and I recognise that change to be immediately and wholly compounded of particular phenomenal movements of that thought or, in other words, to be the proximate result of the peculiar manner in which my thought deals with that, in part, *given* affection of my organ of sight. Music, again, which is an affection of the organ of hearing, and also in many cases produces pleasure, affords an instance of a similar possible combination of the two kinds of sense-affection, and, in fact, countless other examples might be given in illustration of the argument.

Bare memory of an event, however, such as the Press announcement, a year ago, of the natural death of some Chinese Viceroy unknown to me, or the mere imagining of a thing, such as a quadrilateral figure in space, do not, it may be argued, properly come under the head of either outer or inner sense-affection, for the reason that, although a conscious modification of the inner phenomenal ego necessarily accompanies, or rather coincides

with, the form of that mental activity known as an act of *memory* or *imagination*, we are not conscious of those particular acts, as such, as ordinary sense-affections at all, but only as phenomenal thought-movements barren of feeling. For sense-affection, it may be urged, is a *recognised* or conscious modification of the object-ego's sentiency, and unless that *sensibility* is felt to be modified in some manner, no such thing as sensation can be said to be present. When I recollect the announcement of the death of the Chinese Viceroy, I do not, so it may be said, feel my object-ego's sentiency to be in any way affected. I am aware, it is true, of the bare thought-movement of memory with its particular object, but that is all, whether space be a condition, as in this case, of that particular object or not. When, again, I construct in imagination a geometrical figure, I do not feel my object-ego to be sensibly affected, although I am aware of the thought-movement which has again for its object something in space. If, however—so the argument may run—I carry my thoughts back to the death of a dear friend in a certain room a week since, I am not only aware of the activity of my own thought in that act of memory, which *as* an act of memory does not consciously affect my sensibility at all, but I am also aware that my object-ego is being strongly affected by that remembered event in a certain manner, which I call the inner sense of grief. Again, if I

picture to myself a summer's day in a garden full of exquisite flowers, with a fountain of sparkling water playing in the midst of it, I am aware of the activity of thought which has for its object something of which space is a presupposition, and which as a mere act of the imagination does not consciously affect my sensibility, but I also feel that my object-ego is being affected by that abstract conception in a certain manner, which I call the inner sense of pleasure. But in reply to this argument against a bare image of memory or imagination involving an affection of inner sense, it may be said that, although such an image may be generally regarded as merely a bare thought-movement, yet the very fact of our being conscious of that movement proves that the internal sentiency of the phenomenal ego is being consciously affected in a certain manner. Therefore, although the designation of *sense-affection* in its ordinary application may be considered hardly suited to so delicate a modification of the phenomenal ego's inner sentiency as a fleeting image of memory or imagination, yet the very consciousness of that modification proves that, however faint it may be, it is just as much an affection of inner sense as those other modifications of the object-ego, such as fear or joy, to which the term is usually accorded.[1] Now, it

[1] There is corroboratory testimony on this last particular point in Wilhelm Wundt's Sixth Lecture on *Human and Animal Psychology*.

will be found that, broadly speaking, we are conscious of the affections of inner sense, *as thus defined*, as in time alone (for although a memorial image may be projected conceptually in space, the actual memorial thought movement is an affection of sensibility which the subject is conscious of as in time only), and of the affections of outer sense, *as defined above*, as in space as well as in time.

The argument, therefore, has reached so far, namely, that when I am conscious of an affection of my object-ego's sentiency as in time alone, I am conscious of that affection as, in its entirety, proximately dependent upon and immediately constituted by a particular phenomenal movement of my own thought, in other words, as merely made up of and consisting of the manner in which my thought is acting at the moment, and I name it *inner sense*. When, on the contrary, I am conscious of an affection of my object-ego's sentiency as in space as well as in time, I am conscious of that affection as being largely independent of the activity of my thought or, in other words, as, in part, *given* to me, and I call it *outer sense*. Now, it will be seen, on consideration, that the consciousness of any affection of the object-ego's sensibility as in space necessarily implies a *localisation* by the subject of that affection;

He there says: "Even the fainter pictorial ideas which constitute abstract thinking are not wholly without this sense-accompaniment" (translation by J. E. Creighton and E. B. Titchener).

whereas the consciousness of any affection of the object-ego's sentiency as in time alone necessarily implies a corresponding absence of such localisation. In the same way, the localisation of a sense-affection by the subject is equivalent to saying that the subject is conscious of that affection as in space as well as in time. But directly the subject (man) is conscious of any sense-affection as in space, it means that he is conscious of it as external, for in order that the subject may be conscious of anything as in space, he must be conscious of it as in spatial relation to all other objects of his consciousness or as external to them, and therefore to the whole of the rest of his own conscious self. And being conscious of that affection as external, the law of the understanding has to provide for it, as such, that is, so far as that part of it which is felt to be *given* is concerned, its external or spatial so-called cause, of which it, the internal, spaceless, understanding, can itself therefore consciously form no part. Hence, to him, this localised sense-affection is not, as such, proximately dependent upon or immediately constituted by a particular phenomenal movement of his own thought, but, so far as that part of it is concerned which is felt to be *given*, is the effect of something external and spatial of which a spaceless, internal thought-movement of his own can consciously form no immediate portion. When, on the contrary, the feeling of localisation of any

sense-affection, such as of sympathy or malice, for instance, is completely absent, the subject cannot be conscious of that affection as in space, but only as in time, and therefore the affection cannot be for him external, but is regarded by him as proximately dependent upon and merely made up of a particular internal, spaceless thought-movement of his own, whatever the excitatory and natural conditions of that constitutive phenomenal thought-movement may happen to be.

Thus we, in part, localise an affection of the organ of *sight*—indeed the statement itself is pleonastic—and the localisation results, in accordance with the afore-mentioned dianoetic principle, in an external object of perception for us (the sun, for instance) as the spatial and proximately determining and constitutive "cause" of that particular affection; but we altogether fail to localise that peculiar affection of the object-ego's sentiency to which we give the name of *vanity*, and therefore, debarred from the consciousness of any external conditions immediately and directly constitutive of it, as such, that is, so far as that part of it is concerned which we recognise to be *not given*, we catalogue the first as an affection of outer and the second as an affection of inner sense. But they are both of them affections of our sensibility, and were it possible to localise in our consciousness that sense-affection we term *vanity*, we should then necessarily

be conscious of that affection as partly in space. It would consequently then be *outer sense* for us and, in part, *given*, and, as such, therefore, not immediately made up, so far as our consciousness was concerned, of the mere activity of our own thought. Even as it is, we find at different times certain modifications of the phenomenal ego that seem to hover on the border-line between inner and outer sense, and that even appear to belong sometimes to one side of the domain of sense and sometimes to the other. Thus that particular modification of the ego's sentiency which takes the form of sound is not always so clearly localised by the subject as touch, sight, taste, or smell, for instance. A single violent sound-shock, for example, is more clearly localised in consciousness as an external affection of the organ of hearing than certain successions of notes forming a composite harmony, and this is what may have led T. H. Green and Henry Sidgwick and others to fall foul of Kant's dictum that space is the condition of external and time only the condition of internal phenomena, a distinction, it is true, which only holds good if the terms *outer* and *inner* are restricted to the definitions of them suggested in the second paragraph of this Section. For there may be such a series of notes as are not, perhaps, in their composition, always easily localised in consciousness as a direct external affection of the ego, and consequently the per-

ceiving subject is probably the less inclined to be conscious of that particular affection as partly in space, especially, if an access of melancholy or pleasurable sensation supervenes upon the harmony, which inclines the subject to assimilate the consciousness of the primary and external oral affection to that of the spaceless affection of the *inner sense* of sadness or pleasure, which latter, being unable to localise in consciousness, he is only conscious of as in time.

Indeed, so closely allied do the subjectively passive and the subjectively active seem to be, both of them, as it were, enjoying a common base, that the most distinctive characteristics of the one seem to be able to melt and disappear into the most distinctive features of the other. Thus certain physical pains are an example of the occasional transformation or convertibility of the characteristics of subjective receptivity into those of creative activity. When, for instance, anticipation or apprehension of more physical pain in the immediate future constitutes a large and perhaps incalculable part of the intensity or degree of present physical pain; that is to say, where an external or *given* affection of the subject's sensibility can sometimes be recognised by that subject to be after all, in its whole or in a part of its degree, merely a change in its internal state, and thus not given, but subjectively generated. Or, again, in the case of

certain sounds. When, for instance, distant bells have actually ceased to ring, the organ of hearing may, at times, be distinctly affected by the sound of their striking, until the reasoning subject may become aware that this change in its external state is after all nothing but that peculiar change in its internal state, known as "recollection" or "memory," a modification of sense which is avowedly constituted in its entirety by the peculiar activity of the reproductive imagination. In this latter case, therefore, as in the first, and indeed in similar cases, the subject comes to recognise that the particular affection of sense, which was at first felt to be merely external and given, is now no longer felt to be such, but, in its whole or in a part of its degree, is, and could all along have been interpreted as, internal and not given; in other words, to that extent of degree or intensity, exclusively constituted by the particular movement of the subject's thought at the moment.

On the other hand, what is commonly regarded as an affection of inner sense may sometimes seem to be capable of partial localisation by the subject. Extreme terror, for instance, is occasionally almost equivalent to a direct, external feeling of abdominal contraction or of sinking in the pit of the stomach, and the subject on these occasions is consequently less inclined to be conscious of that affection of its sentiency as merely in time, but being able partially

to localise that particular affection, is, as it were, half conscious of it also as spatial, and thus feels that it is not altogether immediately constituted by or compounded of the mere activity of its own thought ;—and illustrations of an analogous character might similarly be adduced in respect of various other emotions to which the human race is liable.

Let us now suppose, merely as a curious piece of speculation, that the human faculty of localisation of sense-affections were either so greatly developed and intensified as to comprise a large number of those affections which we now catalogue as *inner sense*, or were almost completely taken from us. In the former case, many of those inner affections of our sentiency—such as pride, vanity, curiosity, despair, fear, expectancy, joy, love—would, being localised by our thinking subject, become, in part, *given* or externalised for us, and thus, as such, instead of being, in their entirety, as they are now, immediately and wholly made up of, or constituted in our consciousness by, the particular empirical activity of our own thought at the moment, would, like all other affections of outer sense, which cannot as such be thus interpreted by the self as merely compounded of the phenomenal movements of the subject's thought, have to be necessarily supplied, so far as that part of them which was felt to be *given* was concerned, with external conditions proxi-

mately determinant and constitutive of them in consciousness and taking their place beside the rest of the world in space. In other words, instead of being linked up by us in proximate or immediately determinant and constitutive connection with the particular movements of our own thought or way of thinking, whatever external determinants there might be of the particular conceptual activity, they would then be linked up in *proximately* determinant and constitutive connection with external phenomena. There would then be for us hardly any affection of inner sense or material for introspective examination of our own internal states. We should be almost exclusively conscious of an objectified universe in space, and almost every affection of our sensibility would be perceived by us as external. In fact, on this extreme and almost impossible supposition, hardly any affection of our sentiency would be felt by us to be immediately constituted by and merely made up of the empirical activity of our own thought, that is, of the manner solely in which we happened to regard anything. Our lives indeed would become *animal* and soulless, for the history of our being would be forced upon us and we ourselves should contribute to it nothing whatever. In the event, on the contrary, of an almost complete loss of our faculty of localisation of sense-affections, there would be scarcely any objective world for us in space at all. Almost every affection of our sen-

sibility would be for us internal and spaceless, and thus recognised by us in consciousness as proximately due to and wholly constituted by or made up of the particular manner in which our thought happened to be acting at the moment. In fact, we should then every one of us be open and confessed subjective idealists of what would perhaps to-day be considered an exaggerated type, consciously spinning the Universe out of our own thinking subject. The result, therefore, of this latter alternative, an apparently subordinate, but in reality momentous modification in the laws of the phenomenal ego, would be—and this is what the argument in the present section has been leading up to—that we should then be able to extend our present peculiar kind of indirect or negatively generated consciousness of the metempiric ground of our own object-ego to the metempiric ground of almost every object of our thought. That is to say, we should thenceforward not only make a *reflective reference* of all phenomenal objects of thought to their unknown, non-phenomenal ground, or the totality of their constitutive conditions, but we should also be directly conscious of the fact of the antithesis *within us* of nearly the whole of our phenomenal Universe on the one side and its transcendent substrate on the other. In other words, besides the *reflective reference* of the whole phenomenal content of our thought to an unknowable ground,

we should also be *conscious*, in that elusive, antithetically superinduced manner, of the metempiric ground of nearly the whole of our sensuous world as our own subject-ego on the one hand, whilst directly conscious too of that same sensuous world as our own object-ego on the other. In short, the *divine intellect* would gradually become ours, and the whole universe nothing but the conscious result of its own creative activity.

G

GENESIS OF THE FEELING

In order to grapple satisfactorily with the particular problem undertaken in this Part (II), the problem, namely, whence the feeling of free-will arises; that is to say, what is the *natural* reason, if any, why we have the feeling of a free faculty of determination, even where the subjective states are admittedly unaffected by what is known as the "moral imperative," we must secure a firm foothold before proceeding further, and for this purpose ask ourselves the following question—At what psychological moment during the different sentient states of the subject does this feeling of freedom arise?

Now, it is submitted, in the first place, that no feeling of *active* free-will can exist within a thinking subject during the actual conflict in that subject between two sets of conscious impulses whose strength for the time being is equally divided; an *impulse* being here defined as the result of the self-presentation by the subject of something regarded as desirable and attainable by various means, this self-presentation being itself in every case, without excep-

tion, linked up by the law of empirical necessity with its sensuous and constitutive conditions in time. This proposition may be tested either in a supposititious case, where the conflicting impulses are merely imagined, or, if the opportunity should arise, in fact also, where the conflicting impulses are real. Thus if, to take a fictitious case, two equally beloved sisters were on the point of drowning before a brother's eyes, and he knew that he could save but one of them, such a conflict would rage between the opposing affections of his being that, until one side had proved the stronger through the adhesion of some further and unilateral consideration, he would, so far as this particular crisis was concerned, be unconscious of any *active* faculty of free determination whatsoever. In common parlance, he would be "torn asunder" and without the *active* faculty of volition, and only upon one of the alternative sets of subjective forces predominating in favour of one of the sisters, and action in accordance with that ascendant and empirical summons following in due course, would he be conscious at all of the possession of such an *active* faculty.

Let another supposititious case be taken, where equal conflicting impulses are again imagined. A fond and upright father has a son who has committed a crime which, if discovered, will be deservedly punished by death upon the gallows. On

finding out his son's secret by accident, a desperate conflict immediately begins within him, whether he shall follow the instincts of a devoted parent and shield his son from the consequences of the deed, or obey the law of the country of which he is a citizen and surrender him to justice. If the two impulses fighting against one another in the subject are of equal strength at any time during the period of conflict, then, during the internecine struggle, and as long as this equality endures, the father is unconscious, so far as these particular alternatives are in question, of the existence within himself of any *active* power of free determination; and it is only when one or the other side obtains the mastery through some additional consideration joining one of them, and thus rendering one of the alternative objects of the subject's self-presentation the more desirable of the two and the impulse therefore which is consequent upon that self-presentation the empirically predominant one—the feeling of a religious man, perhaps, that his son is not in a fit moral state to die—that he becomes indeed conscious at all of an *active* free power of will. In fact, such cases could be multiplied indefinitely, and may be tested, although imperfectly, by means of abstract concepts founded on experience, that is to say, in the imagination; whilst instances of less vital import come under observation in the circumstances of real life; and it is submitted that, whenever the

conditions prevail of there being two alternative objects of self-presentation regarded as equally desirable, in other words, of there being two opposing sets of conscious impulses in the subject equally divided in strength, the feeling of an *active* free faculty of determination *during the equal conflict* between them is non-existent in respect of them, and only begins to assert itself when the ascendency is decided on the one side or the other.

In both of the above supposititious instances, however, and in any cases of a similar kind, we must not be taken to deny that there is, even during the equal conflict between different conscious impulses in the subject, a feeling within it of a power of free choice between the opposing alternatives. But it is a feeling of a *potential* and not of an *active* free faculty of volition, a feeling which can invariably be produced in the subject whenever it pictures to itself the performance on its part, or the abstention from performance, of any conscious physical action. The reason for this feeling will be dealt with later. Here it is sufficient to remark that during each of the above conscious and equal conflicts, which were cited as examples, the thinking subject is continually aware of its own objects of self-presentation with the conative phenomena or empirical impulses attendant upon them, and the mind therefore frames abstract conceptions of possible alternative physical action in accordance with these impulses, which

necessarily produces in the subject a feeling of a *potential* free faculty of determination in respect of that imaginary action. But it will always be found, whether the faculty of freedom of which we are conscious be *active or potential*, that, in every case, without exception, the particular feeling of a free selective or determining faculty depends in time either upon the imaginary performance of the action to which that feeling immediately refers, or upon the consciousness of the real action to which it has immediate reference, and consequently in the latter case upon the *consciousness* of the immediately preceding predominant, empirical state of the subject of which that real action is the expression; but that in no instance does the imaginary performance of the action, or a real action that can become conscious and linked up in consciousness with the immediately preceding predominant and empirical inclination thereto, depend upon the particular feeling of freedom in regard to it as its preceding condition in time. To put the proposition even more plainly, and leaving out of account for the moment the question of the merely imaginary performance of an action—a real action, of such a nature that it can become conscious and linked up in consciousness with an empirically predominant inclination thereto, is not necessarily dependent for its performance on the feeling of a free faculty of volition in respect of itself as its

preceding condition in time, for the adequate reason that it can be shown that such an action can take place without any such feeling of freedom whatsoever; but, on the other hand, the feeling of a free faculty of volition in respect of such an action can be proved to be dependent on the consciousness of that action, and consequently on the consciousness of the empirically predominant inclination thereto, for the sufficient reason that instances can be adduced to show that it is only when the subject becomes conscious of that natural predominance that the feeling of freedom in regard to such an action arises at all.

A simple illustration can readily be found to exemplify this truth, so far as real physical action is concerned. For instance, I am walking rapidly, along a familiar road as the result of a subjective and predominant empirical impulse to reach some particular destination, and my thought has become strongly concentrated upon an attempt to solve the problem of a crime committed in the neighbourhood the day before. During this mental effort I am not only without any feeling of free-will in respect of my physical action of walking, but am practically unconscious of the successive movements of one leg after the other. That is to say, my mind in popular language is "far away," or, in other words, not accompanying, except in a disjointed and feeble fashion, the phenomenal motion of my body, which motion therefore for

the time being may be regarded as semi-mechanical or automatic in character. Notwithstanding this, the conditions by which the self-presentation, with its afore-mentioned impulse to that particular physical motion, was constituted, must be continuously present in the subject, unaccompanied by the mind, and therefore unconscious though they and their external expression may be, as otherwise that motion could not take place. For in our experience no physical change on the part of the subject can be spontaneous; every such change necessarily requiring by the law of our understanding some *particular* causal and empirical condition or parcel of conditions which takes its place in the temporal order of nature, and which must continue throughout the whole of the change, whether that condition is capable of becoming for the subject a *conscious* predominant impulse in attendance upon an empirically-conditioned self-presentation, as in the case we have taken, or whether it be some natural so-called cause pertaining to our being, which, though the understanding may have cognition of it, cannot be immediately conjoined with its effect in actual consciousness. In other words, there is no justification for supposing that, because consciousness happens to be temporarily withdrawn from any such particular external activity of the subject as, when conscious, can be connected by the latter with the immediately preceding and pre-

dominant empirical inclination thereto, those same natural conditions of the process of that activity, as existed previously when the action was conscious, no longer apply in their entirety. Indeed, the contrary must be the case. For the elimination of consciousness in respect of such action does not spell the elimination of the empirical conditions of it as an actual event in nature. Those conditions must remain in their unchangeable order, or the event cannot take place. All that consciousness does in the matter is to interpret for the subject those previously and temporarily unfelt or unconscious conditions as a preponderant impulse or inclination towards the phenomenal event.

Now, should my thought after a while abandon the problem of the crime and become once more centred in the fact of my physical activity, and in particular of the successive movements of my legs; that is, should I become conscious of that physical action, and, consequently, of the previously and temporarily unfelt, but nevertheless throughout necessarily existing empirical conditions constitutive of the predominant subjective state of which that action is the so-called effect and expression—for I cannot be conscious of an action on my part which *can* be connected in consciousness with the immediately preceding empirical and predominant inclination thereto, without also being in fact conscious of that predominant impulse to act in that

manner—there immediately arises within the subject a feeling of an *active* free faculty of determination in respect of each of my steps. Indeed, during the period that my mind is directed to my walking, that is, so long as I am conscious of that action, and consequently of the empirically conditioned self-presentation with the accompanying predominant impulse of which that action is the expression, I cannot, even if I wished it, avoid this feeling of *active* free-will in respect of every one of my strides, and the only way to get rid of that feeling would be for my thought to become diverted to some other object. Should my thought stray back to the problem of the crime and become once more strongly concentrated upon it, the feeling of free-will in respect of the motion of my legs would again disappear, and, although my steps would continue as regularly as before as the particular and necessary expression of certain continuously present but unconscious empirical conditions constitutive of the predominant state of the subject, they would to a large extent, being perfectly accompanied by the mind, become once again semi-automatic or mechanical in their character.

This, surely, is a clear proof that the feeling of a free faculty of volition is generated in the subject, in respect of such a physical action as can be linked up in consciousness with the empirical and predominant inclination thereto, through the *conscious-*

ness of the real action to which it immediately refers, and consequently, as explained above, through the *consciousness* of the immediately preceding empirical and predominant impulse of which that action is the expression, and that such an action consequently does not necessarily depend for its performance upon the feeling of a free faculty of volition in regard to it. Because, if an active free faculty of determination were necessarily, as many assert, the immediate and deciding cause of all that class of human activity which the subject is not only capable of becoming conscious of through the direction of the mind to that activity, but also of connecting in consciousness with an immediately preceding predominant inclination thereto; then we should necessarily be always conscious of the free causality of that will itself during the *whole* course of that external activity. For, in the first place, a causal, free, unconditioned faculty, unlike a predominant empirical impulse which has to take its place in the sensuous context of phenomena, could not from its very nature, or rather non-nature, be dependent in any way for its own 'consciousness upon the sensuous and conscious conjunction of the particular physical action which was held to be the expression of that free faculty, and the empirical stimulus thereto. And because, secondly, if we were not conscious of that free faculty of determination, whilst some external

action on the part of the subject was in progress as the alleged result of it, we could not determine that action by means of, and in accordance with, the commands of that free causality, which its advocates have always particularly asserted is our *conscious* absolute will; and not only would their so-called conscious free-will therefore disappear, but the action as the alleged phenomenal expression of that faculty could not take effect. We often find, however, as, for instance, in walking, that we have in fact no feeling of a free faculty of determination in respect of the particular external action, although such a class of action on the part of the subject may be in progress as, when we do become conscious of it, we also necessarily connect in consciousness with a predominant empirical inclination thereto. As soon, however, as our thought becomes directed to the particular physical action, that is, as soon as we do become conscious of it, and, consequently, of the predominant empirical impulse thereto which, though previously and temporarily unfelt, must, as already pointed out, have nevertheless been present, so far as its constitutive framework was concerned, as the conditioning predominant and empirical state of the subject throughout the whole of that external activity, uninterpreted as such by the subject though that framework may have been, since without those empirical conditions constituting in their temporal order each moment

of external action the phenomenal activity could not have proceeded—we say, directly we become conscious of these, that is, directly the mind accompanies them, the feeling also of free-will in connection with the external action is produced within the subject as a result of this accompaniment.

This, therefore, affords justification for submitting —in those cases where physical action *can* be connected in consciousness with the immediately preceding predominant empirical impulse thereto—that such a physical action on the part of a subject of the world of sense may be in progress as the result of a predominant empirical state of that subject, whose constitutive conditions take their place in the order of Nature; that this action may proceed as a result of that predominance without any feeling within the subject of a free faculty of volition in regard to it, and without that subject being even conscious of that action or predominance: but that, as soon as the mind becomes directed to that action, or, in other words, directly the subject becomes conscious of it, it immediately becomes also conscious of that predominant empirical state and connects it in consciousness as a predominant impulse, with the action as its immediate effect; and that the result of this consciousness of predominance is that a feeling of free-will in respect of the action is produced in the subject. It may, therefore, be said that the *consciousness* of the

empirical conditions constituting a predominant inclination of the subject, that is to say, the consciousness of the desirable object of an empirically conditioned self-presentation, is the origin and necessary condition of any feeling of *active* free-will within a subject of the world of sense.

The example of breathing, perhaps, might have been taken instead to illustrate the present argument. It is true that the conjunction in consciousness between the predominant subjective impulse and each separate external breathing action is not nearly so easy or immediate as in the case of steps in walking; but, on the other hand, the example of breathing is particularly fitted in other respects to demonstrate the truth of *the identity of the feeling of active free-will with the conjunction in consciousness of any particular phenomenal action with the predominant empirical inclination thereto.* During almost the whole of our lives we are completely unconscious of the continuous and alternate respiratory action of the lungs and of the natural subjective impulse that prompts this external activity; and it is only when our thought becomes concentrated upon the alternate intake and expulsion of breath that we also become conscious of this powerful and almost irresistible empirical inclination. It is not always immediately, however, that we have a feeling of active free-will in respect of this impulse and its expression, even when we become conscious of the

former. The reason of this is that our thought has so rarely been directed to our respiratory action, and, therefore, to the natural impulse prompting it ; in other words, our respiratory activity has been so generally unconscious, and therefore automatic in character, and thus from our point of view *necessary*, that, when our mind does indeed become concentrated upon these particular external actions, and, consequently, upon the successive subjective impulses thereto which we are then immediately aware of within us, the consciousness of these predominant impulses does not at once give rise to the feeling of a free faculty of determination in respect of their external expression, by reason of the very fact that the whole habit of our mind is averse to the feeling of freedom in the matter, and has always been accustomed to regard this external action as something apart from will, and therefore as necessary and automatic. Gradually, however, if our thought should continue to be directed to our breathing, we acquire a feeling of a free and active faculty of volition in respect of every intake and expulsion of breath during this mental concentration. That is to say, we are distinctly conscious of each natural and predominant subjective impulse to every one of these external or spatial actions, and, at the same time, we become possessed in an accessorial manner of a feeling of active free-will in respect of each one of them, and thus of every one of the actions which are

their external expression. In fact, the longer our minds remain concentrated in this manner, the stronger does the feeling of freedom become, because the more distinctly do we become conscious of the conjunction between the predominant natural impulses within us and the particular external activity, until at length the idea of automatism almost disappears from our minds in respect of our breathing; the *necessary* action of each intake and expulsion of breath becomes, *as such*, weaker in our consciousness, and we are more and more left with the feeling of active free-will in respect of every one of these acts. Should our thought, however, abandon the phenomenon of our breathing, the old state of affairs would be resumed. The external action and the impulse thereto would become unconscious, the feeling of freedom would necessarily disappear, and, as far as the thinking subject was concerned, the successive respiratory acts would once again become automatic and mechanical in character.

As we have admitted, however, many people may find that, although they are fully conscious of the external action of breathing, whenever their mind accompanies it, they yet have considerable difficulty in attaining the consciousness of the particular subjective impulse to each respiratory act. Breathing may thus be said to stand, in regard to the facility with which the connection between external action and the immediately preceding subjective impulse

thereto can be presented in consciousness, midway between such action as that of walking, which has been cited above as an example, and that activity which invariably remains altogether unconscious, such, for instance, as the normal activity of the digestive organs or the circulation of the blood. In these latter cases there is and can be practically no immediate consciousness of the external action, whatever mental efforts we may make, and consequently none whatever of the immediately preceding subjective impulses thereto, and the feeling therefore of an active free faculty of volition in respect of the action is unable to be produced. In the case of breathing, on the other hand, the subject can with a little trouble become conscious of each subjective impulse and connect it in consciousness with its own particular outward expression, and this consciousness becomes accentuated if the inhalation or exhalation of breath should be experimentally delayed at any particular point by a few seconds; this very delay proving indeed that the action of breathing is not necessary in the sense of being unalterable through any other transient and conscious inclination. When this delay takes place, the subjective impulse to inhale or exhale is much more strongly appreciated, and the immediate connection between the empirical inclination and its satisfaction (*i.e.* the external action of breathing) being thus vividly presented in consciousness, the feeling of

active free-will is also more distinctly set up in the subject.

There appears in the second place (for the first, see the second paragraph of this section) to be no feeling in the subject of the possession of a free faculty of determination either active or potential, when there is neither any *conscious* real action in progress on its part, external or internal, as a result of conscious impulse, nor any imaginary external action; that is to say, when the subject is inert, neither consciously active physically or mentally, nor picturing itself as performing any physical action. Thus, if I am lying awake at night not consciously active physically, and my thought is in no way concerned, by reason of a conscious inclination thereto, with any idea or the performance of any intended or purely imaginary action on my part, but is involuntarily, that is, without any consciousness of an impelling inclination, directed, perhaps, to the stillness of the night—or black space about me; then, as long as this passivity of physical and mental state continues, I am not immediately conscious of any faculty of free causality, either *active* or *potential*. But, should I happen to think of the phrase "free-will," and ask myself whether in truth I am conscious of such a faculty, I should immediately proceed, in order to test my consciousness so as to answer this mental question, either to exert my mind in some direction, irrespective of any imagined physical action of my own;

or, secondly, to exert myself physically; or else, thirdly, to conjure up in my fancy some form of conscious physical activity or action on my part, and in this way I should be able to prove to my own satisfaction that I did at any rate possess a feeling of *active* freedom in the first two cases, and, as regards the imagined performance of the physical action itself apart from the mental energy devoted to the imagining of it, a feeling of *potential* freedom in the last. For directly I exert myself mentally, as the result of conscious inclination, and irrespective of any imagined physical action by me; or else physically; or, thirdly, imagine myself as consciously active physically, I also of necessity feel within me during the two former mental or physical actions an *active*, and during the last mental action, as regards the imaginery performance of that action, a *potential* faculty of free determination, neither of which feelings possessed me during my previous state of subjective inertia. It seems, therefore, that there is no feeling of the possession of so-called free-will in the subject, either potential or active, where there is no mental or physical activity on its part as a result of conscious and natural inclination, and where the mind, too, is not imagining the performance of any conscious physical action on the part of the subject.

There remain, therefore, two general states (*a*

and β) of the thinking subject in which a feeling of *active* free-will is possible.

(α) There is a feeling of an *active* free faculty of determination when the struggle between two equally divided sets of conscious empirical impulses to physical action has been rendered unequal by the unilateral accession of some additional empirical inclination, and the more powerful conscious state of the subject carries the day; or again, whenever a conflict arises between two sets of conscious impulses, "moral" or material, to sensuous activity, and where the sides are unequally divided from the start, that is to say, where one of the conscious states of the subject is more powerful than the other; the potency of this feeling varying in both cases in proportion to the empirical inequality existing between the two parties to the contest.

(β) Secondly, there is a feeling of an *active* free faculty of volition when conscious impulses prompt the subject to purely mental activity, irrespective of whether the imaginary performance of any physical action by the subject forms any part of the object of that mental exertion.

Lastly (γ), there is a feeling of a *potential* free faculty of determination, whenever, through the medium of an abstract concept, we imagine ourselves as consciously doing or refraining from any physical action, and where no inclinations need

even be pictured as prompting or resisting that imaginary activity; the feeling of freedom here being merely the result of experience.

These three cases (α, β, and γ) may now be dealt with in their order :—

(α) In the previous illustration of the sisters who were on the point of drowning, we should have found, had we been the brother with all the natural emotions that beset him in that crisis, that directly the conflict of antagonistic forces had become unequal, there would have emerged in the subject a feeling of an *active* free power of determination. The contest was terminated in the above fictitious instance by one of the two opposing subjective forces becoming empirically stronger than the other; in this particular case, we may suppose, through the supervening consideration that one of the sisters was married and a mother. Directly one of the sides was reinforced by this additional and empirical emotion being added to the balance, that side or constitutive part of the subject's whole conscious state outweighed the rest, and its active and external expression took the form of the saving of the married sister. In that moment, and simultaneously with the deflection of the balance, there would have arisen within the subject the feeling of an *active* free faculty of determination on the side of the most powerful empirical impulse. During the earlier part of the

conflict the subject felt himself deprived of active will power, and it was only the access of a further natural stimulus in favour of one of the sisters that impelled him to save her life. And yet, in spite of the fact that it was clearly only an empirical interposition which turned the scale, he would nevertheless in all probability maintain that, although the accession of a further natural stimulus had certainly influenced his decision, it had not *necessitated* any physical action on his part, but that he had been conscious of making a free choice between two sets of natural forces independently of coercion by any empirical causes whatsoever. If free will, however, were an unconditioned volitional faculty, as the advocates of freedom so confidently assert, freely exercising its selective powers amid the empirical conditions with which it is surrounded, and through the medium of which it is only possible for it to find expression, would it not sometimes select one of two equal empirical impulses and act upon it, rather than wait, as it always does, until some additional empirical motive has joined the ranks of one of the conflicting sides, in order to join it too ?

It should here be added, however, that as two sets of conscious impulses are rarely equally divided in actual experience for a sufficient length of time for consciousness to test this law, but as one of them generally predominates almost immediately over the other ; as, moreover, the subject can be

conscious of a *potential* free faculty of determination, even during a struggle between two equal sets of conscious impulses, whenever the mind by means of an abstract concept imagines any conscious physical action on the part of the subject in conformity with the impulses of one side or the other, it follows that the feeling of freedom, although sometimes very feeble, is nearly always present in the subject in some degree of power.

The same general argument applies, where the feeling of an *active* free faculty of determination is not confined, as in the previous illustration, to the latter part of a more or less prolonged conflict between two conscious sets of impulses, but is present immediately, the strength of this feeling, as before, being exactly proportionate to the empirical inequality between the opposing inclinations. A dishonourable athlete, for example, who is engaged to fight an inferior adversary for a valuable prize, is, other things being equal, strongly conscious of possessing an *active* free faculty of refusal when an insignificant bribe is offered to him to allow himself to be defeated early in the contest. But if he had been offered an inducement approaching in his eyes much more nearly in value the rich prize and the reputation to be gained by a victory, as well as any other advantage he might place on the side of defeating his opponent, there would have been a far keener struggle between the two sets of impulses,

and his feeling of an *active* free faculty of refusal would have been proportionately weak to the comparatively slender margin of empirical inequality between the opposing inclinations.

(β) There is not only a feeling of an active free faculty of volition when a dominant empirical state of the subject prompts the latter to external or physical action, there is a similar feeling when the dominant empirical state of that subject impels it to purely mental activity, irrespective of whether the imaginary performance of any conscious physical action by the subject forms any part of the object of that mental exertion. We say "irrespective of whether, &c," because, although there is no feeling in the subject of an *active* free faculty of determination in respect of the performance of a physical action on its part, when such performance is merely imagined, but only the feeling of a *potential* free faculty in respect of it; there is, nevertheless, a feeling in the subject of an *active* free faculty in all mental exertion, without exception, consciously promoted by a predominant empirical inclination, and therefore a feeling of an *active* free faculty of determination does most certainly exist in the subject in respect of its purely mental activity, irrespective of the particular character or product of that activity, even when a predominant natural inclination prompts it to direct its thought to the mere imagining of any physical action on its part,

although, as regards the imaginary performance itself of the physical action, as thought, there is only a feeling of *potential* freedom. Thus, to return to the argument, I may, as the result of a conscious impulse, direct my thought to the form of a rhomboid in space; if I then similarly proceed to think of a square, then of a circle, and lastly of an isosceles triangle, I feel in each of these successive mental actions an *active* faculty of free-will in respect of it. In fact, the subjective conditions, psychical or otherwise, that prompt me to think of a rhomboid, a square, a circle, and lastly of a particular kind of triangle in that order and no other, are governed by precisely the same law as the empirical impulses towards physical action in the world of external phenomena. For, were it possible to catalogue a sufficient number of those internal phenomenal conditions which constituted the several acts of thinking of these consecutive figures, the mental order of those figures would be found to have been the natural and necessary result of predominant associations of ideas and an empirical series controlled and conditioned by its sensuous causes in time.

Any one can examine the general validity of the argument in his own subject by means of test cases, where the constitutive conditions can be more easily explored and investigated than in the one quoted above. One more simple example, however, may be

given in further illustration. A mathematician, for instance, may be concentrating his thought upon some difficult problem, and a man may pass before him whose face seems familiar. If his mind had been occupied instead with some less absorbing matter, he would probably have relinquished it, and his thought would have become directed to an attempt to recall when he had last seen the man. But on this occasion the empirical impulse to solve the problem is supposed to be stronger than his passing curiosity, and in the transient conflict between the two he will find that he has no feeling of an *active* free faculty of determination to interrupt his meditation, that feeling of an *active* free force being wholly upon the side of the impulse to continue his reasoning. Had the passer-by, however, borne a striking resemblance to his dead son, the mathematician, other things remaining equal, would in all probability have relinquished the problem and exerted his mind upon the strange coincidence, in which case he would have had no feeling of an *active* free faculty of determination to continue his mathematical calculations, that feeling of freedom being wholly on the side of the more powerful empirical impulse to think of the remarkable likeness between the men and to compare in his imagination the features of the two.

And here it is not out of place to remark that there is necessarily a less potent feeling of freedom

in the case of impulses to purely mental activity than in that of impulses to external or physical action. The reason for this is that in the case of inclinations to purely mental exertion, where no imaginary external action on the part of the subject forms any portion of that mental activity, the feeling of an *active* free faculty of volition is never supplemented by that of a *potential* free-will. We can imagine the performance on the part of the subject of some conscious external or physical action which does not in reality take place at the moment, and perhaps never will, but which results in a feeling within us of a *potential* faculty of free action in respect of it ; but we cannot imagine thinking any object of thought without thinking it in reality and therefore producing in our subject the feeling of an *active* power of free volition in regard to it. In the conflict, therefore, between opposing impulses to purely mental exertion, where that mental activity does not involve the imaginary performance of any conscious external action on the part of the subject, we have, contrary to what occurs in the case of conflicting impulses to physical action, only the feeling of *active* free-will to depend upon for any feeling of freedom we may possess. Moreover, as the rapidity of action of impulses to purely mental exertion is incomparably greater than that of conscious impulses to external or physical activity, the period during which such an *active* free faculty can

be felt within the subject in respect of any particular mental action is by so much the less prolonged, and the feeling itself therefore by so much the less distinct.

(γ) In this third case, there is a feeling in the subject of a *potential* faculty of free determination; whenever it imagines a conscious physical action on its part. Thus a man may conjure up in his imagination, for purposes of psychological experiment, but without the remotest intention or desire ever to commit such a crime, and without even calling to mind any natural reasons which might prompt or oppose it as an external experience, the murder by him of his own father, and will feel conscious of a *potential* free faculty of action when imagining the deed. As it is merely an effort of the fancy, an abstract concept framed for the reason stated above, there can be no immediate and conscious impulse in the case either on the side of or in fierce opposition to such an enormity as an external experience, which is here merely imagined and therefore a purely fictitious action. In fact, the feeling of a potential free faculty of volition is here, in the absence of any predominant and empirical impulse to the real and external deed, or even of the calling to mind of any natural reasons for and against such a deed in its externality, merely the result of experience. For in every external action that we may consciously, and not merely mechanic-

ally or automatically perform, that is, in every physical action on our part which is connected by us in immediate consciousness with the predominant empirical impulse thereto, we always have the feeling of an *active* faculty of free determination having exerted itself within us. Thus—to take an extreme example to illustrate the argument—a man in torment may control himself for a time so as not to utter a single sound, and is conscious of an *active* free-will in this physical action of self-restraint. Gradually, however, his powers of endurance grow weaker, that is to say, the states of his subject undergo modification through the receptivity of his senses, and he begins to groan. Although he would probably confess to his friends, when the ordeal was over, that his will to remain silent had been overpowered, he would also probably have to admit, if he questioned himself closely, that in the action of groaning, after his will on one side had been defeated, he was conscious (so far as he *felt* an internal inclination as the immediately preceding cause of his groaning and not merely a coercive, non-subjective force) of an *active* faculty of free determination exerting itself upon the other side in favour of groaning in order to obtain for him a certain physical relief by it. It is true that if, soon after the commencement of his groans, the agony had become so intense as actually to force him to shriek aloud, the balance of mind and body being

by that time in all probability temporarily upset, the former would have been totally unable to connect in consciousness the predominant subjective impulse with the external phenomenal changes in the subject as its expression. Those external changes—in this case, the physical action of shrieking—might thus have become purely, or partly, automatic. The mind would not have accompanied the preponderance of the subjective impulse to shriek over any opposite inclination, and the feeling of *active* free-will in respect of that action of shrieking would have been unable to be present, because the causal conjunction of the action with the empirical impulse thereto would have been unable to be thought.

Man, then, knows no exception to the rule of the feeling of *potential* freedom which governs all those physical actions on his part the performance of which he merely *imagines*, and which, when real and external, are capable of being connected by him in immediate consciousness with the predominant empirical impulses thereto, for the good reason that he can never, when conscious of them, have experienced anything but freedom in regard to those external ones. For in all external actions on the part of the subject which can and consequently always must be connected in immediate consciousness with predominant impulses, whenever the former are themselves conscious or, in other

words, accompanied by thought, there is always the feeling of an *active* faculty of free determination in the thinking subject in respect of those actions, and no such action on its part can consciously take place without the feeling of the exertion of this free faculty. Therefore when we picture to ourselves the conscious performance by us of some purely supposititious physical action of this kind, we cannot imagine it as taking place apart from the feeling of freedom, which has invariably accompanied every such *external* and conscious action of ours in nature as has been of a kind to be consciously linked up with an immediately preceding predominant and subjective impulse thereto. In fact, to do so would be to imagine contrary to the whole range of our past external experience. It is for this reason, therefore, that we possess the feeling of a *potential* faculty of free determination, whenever, out of the materials at our disposal, we are creating imaginary physical actions on our part in our brain.

But although, in the example that was given a little while ago, a man full of filial sentiment is conscious of a *potential* free faculty of volition in the *imaginary* murder by him of his father, where not only no immediately active and conscious impulses beset him on either side in respect of the external act, but no reasons for or against such a deed in its externality are even supposed by him, he would not

be conscious of an *active* free faculty of determination to commit the *external* deed, if some one happened to suggest it to him, arguing that thereby he would secure his patrimony the sooner. Habit of mind, engendered by the laws and customs of the country in which he lives, combined with the vastly predominant state of acquired love for his father and the filial piety with which we may suppose early parental and pedagogic moral training to have suffused his being, would here overwhelm any lesser empirical impulse to the contrary, and an *active* faculty of free determination would be felt by him in what, in his case, would hardly deserve the name of a conflict, as well as during his subsequent action, as exerting itself on the side of indignant refusal. As, therefore, the feeling of *potential* free-will in the *imaginary* performance of physical actions on our part is owing to the fact that every one of our *external* actions, when it is conscious and of the kind described above, never fails in our experience to be accompanied by the feeling of an *active* faculty of free determination; and as the strength of the feeling of that active faculty in those external actions of our experience is dependent upon the degree of inequality between the opposing and conscious impulses present in the subject, a man who is conscious of possessing a strong, though, at the time, only potential will, is a man, therefore, who in his external actions has

experience of great inequalities between the opposing impulses which from time to time possess his being; that is to say, whose inclination, maybe, to cruelty, revenge, or vice, or to social reform, erudition, or personal aggrandisement, predominates by a large margin of conscious power over any other lesser impulses that may temporarily invade him.

Although the distinction may appear to be an unnecessarily fine one, it should nevertheless be borne in mind that there is not only in the subject a feeling of a *potential* faculty of free determination, when it imagines the performance of some conscious physical action on its part such as has just been described, and where the subject at the same time is without any immediate conscious impulses on either side in respect of such an action in its externality, and where too no such immediate inclinations are even supposed; but that it possesses a similar feeling, whenever a conflict between two equal sets of conscious impulses to external activity on its part is actually in progress within it. For during such an equal combat, and before either one side or the other has gained the ascendency, the subject, although bereft, as already explained, of any feeling of an *active* faculty of free determination, continues to be conscious of its states, or, in other words, the mind continues to move in accompaniment with the subject's opposite impulses to external action. But there can be no consciousness

of a subjective impulse to external activity without the imagination creating for itself at the same time some physical action on the part of the subject in conformity with that particular inclination, and directly this takes place there arises of necessity within the subject the feeling of a *potential* faculty of free determination in respect of the imaginary performance of that action. During the equal conflict between the conscious impulses of the subject the mind is necessarily in a constant flux between them, and is therefore perpetually imagining physical activity on the part of that subject in accordance with one set of inclinations or the other. It follows, therefore, that the subject during that undecided conflict of impulses is never without the feeling of *potential* free-will. Directly, however, the struggle is rendered unequal by one of the conscious sets of subjective impulses becoming empirically preponderant, a feeling of an *active* free faculty of volition is set up in respect of it, and the feeling of *potential* freedom perforce disappears. It is for this reason, to which a brief reference has already been made, that during every conflict between discordant and conscious impulses to physical action, the subject, whether that conflict be equal or not, is never without some feeling of freedom either of the active or else of the potential kind.

H

ANALYSIS OF THE FEELING

SUFFICIENT has now been said to show that what is known as *free-will* need not be, as it were, a *tertium quid* or third party which, when a conflict arises between two antagonistic sets of conscious impulses, is able to step in as a *deus ex machinâ* or *absolute* arbitrator, and decide the struggle one way or the other without any enforced regard to the comparative empirical strength of the two sides engaged. For it is not that I freely will *not to do* something, that is, that I determine negatively as regards some alternative possible action, and that I then proceed to the opposing set of sensuous impulses and, by means of my *absolute* faculty of choice, freely determine to pursue the opposite course suggested by them; but what happens is this, that the more powerful set of conscious impulses prevails over the weaker by a *naturally* preponderating impetus, and without the help, because without the need, of any *absolute* third party at all. Thus, if the alternatives of an honourable or dishonourable line of conduct present themselves to a man, one of which it will be necessary for him to follow, it is not that an *absolute* faculty of choice within him enables him freely to

reject the bad, and then proceeds to enable him freely to indulge the good impulse; but it rather is, that the dictates of the "moral law," working within him empirically as the natural and direct result of the conscious limitations of his finitude, strengthened and systematised, as that result may be, by the assimilated precepts of early moral inculcation sensuously imparted, combined, maybe with the daily example of those among whom he has always lived, have set an almost ineffaceable seal upon the particular kind of temperament and nervous system with which he was born and has perhaps inherited, and impregnated him with a well-nigh irresistible set of inclinations to particular kinds of action; and this empirical state of the thinking subject is so pronounced, that it outweighs by the law of nature alone any feebler impulses that may oppose it, and, in forcing the latter to succumb, impels the man at the same time to follow what is regarded as the more honourable course of conduct.

But, although there is no justification for maintaining the existence in man of an *absolute*, metempiric faculty of choice, a *liberum arbitrium indifferentiæ*, which, without any causal and constitutive conditions itself, and independently and regardless of the comparative strength of his natural impulses, can enable him freely to select and to engage in physical or mental action; it may nevertheless be said with perfect truth that in a conflict between opposing

sets of conscious impulses the more powerful or naturally predominant side or constituent portion of the whole conscious state of the subject, *in so far and by so much* as it empirically outweighs the rest, is *uncncumbered*, and, though not free in the sense of being *unconditioned*, is free, however, *because uncumbered*, to express itself in action in accordance with the law of those natural conditions, such as heredity, training, or the " moral " dictates empirically generated through the consciousness of human finitude, that themselves in turn constitute it and gave it birth.

It has already been submitted that the feeling in the subject of a faculty of free determination is strong in proportion to the inequality existing between the conscious and conflicting empirical impulses of that subject, and, in the same way, it is easy to perceive that the more pronounced this disproportion in any given case, that is, the greater ascendency any one side may happen to have over the other, the less must that predominating side be consciously embarrassed by opposing subjective forces, and the greater facility or *disengagement* must it therefore experience in expressing itself in sensuous action in accordance with the momentum of its constitutive conditions. As also the conflicting and conscious impulses of the subject are in themselves, in their turn, at any moment, nothing but the in part constitutive framework itself of the

whole sensuous state of inner consciousness in which the ego empirically finds itself, a conflict between these impulses is necessarily one which must begin and end *within* the subject—subjectively, that is, as far as our whole ego is concerned, and not objectively. In fact the duel, so to speak, is an internecine struggle for the mastery between constituent and empirically compounded parts of the same conscious subject. We have therefore arrived at this point, namely, that whenever one set of conscious impulses has become predominant, not only does it act, *in so far and by so much as it is actually predominant*, unencumbered by the presence of any conscious antagonistic impulses in the same subject, but, being itself a constituent part of the ego as *thinking* subject, that subject not only therefore feels that it is acting freely on its own account on the side of that ascendant impulse, but most undoubtedly is acting freely, not, however, in the sense of being *unconditioned*, but in the aforementioned sense that the empirically dominant part of its own inner state is, by the amount of the predominance, exerting itself *unencumbered* by and freed from any other subjective controlling force, and thus able freely to express itself in sensuous action in accordance with the empirical ordering of the conditions which constitute its being in time. We are, in fact, conscious of freedom at one end of the scale, and not at the other. The feeling of

freedom, in other words, is not the feeling of it as transcendent, but the feeling of it as empirical. It is the *freedom of disengagement*, not that of arbitration. For, if we examine our consciousness closely, we shall find that we are conscious, not of an *absolute*, arbitrary will or independent power of determination, ungoverned by the comparative insistence of empirical conditions, but of a subjectively unthwarted, *uncncumbered* will ; that is to say, not of a will which is spontaneous or free to initiate of itself, but a will which, when it has once been empirically determined, is free to act.

It is, however, important to realise that the whole of the foregoing arguments in this Part (II), touching the question of the feeling of freedom, are only valid, so far as the phenomenal changes in a subject of the world of sense are concerned, where those changes, internal or external, are the immediate result in consciousness of inclinations within the subject, and do not apply to any such changes as are the immediate effect in consciousness of objective forces outside the ego, and thus independent of any conscious intermediate subjective state of the latter. That is to say, it is only when natural conditions give birth to predominant and conscious impulses in the subject, and these in their turn give rise to conscious internal or external phenomenal changes on its part, that the feeling of an active faculty of free determination can exist. If, on the contrary, any

objective force outside. the ego produces conscious phenomenal alteration in the subject without previously giving rise to an intermediate subjective impulse thereto which becomes conscious, and which is therefore immediately connected in consciousness with that phenomenal change as its expression, then, in this case, there can be no feeling of an active faculty of free determination in respect of the change, since an essential part of the groundwork of any possible feeling of freedom is not there. For the phenomenal change is here the immediate effect in consciousness of that non-subjective coercion outside the ego, instead of being the immediate result in consciousness of an intermediate subjective impulse thereto, which itself indeed may well have followed on the heels of a determining non-subjective force.[1]

Thus, if some one insults me, and then leaves the room directly he has done so, two sets of discordant impulses may spring up within me; one of which exhorts me to treat the incident with contempt, and the other to rush after him and inflict the castigation he deserves. If, then, the latter is in the ascendant, I make for the door to

[1] Spinoza does not seem to have realised this distinction, for he maintained that if a stone which had been projected and was flying through the air had consciousness, it would believe that it was moving of its own free-will. The same may be inferred with regard to Leibnitz, who suggested that if the magnetic needle had consciousness, it would consider its direction to the North as a determination of its own free-will.

carry out its commands. If, however, some one hurries up, and forces me back from the door, whilst I struggle to get free, I am still conscious of an active faculty of free determination to dash after my enemy, because of the predominating impulse that possesses me, and which, though thwarted for the time being in respect of its full external expression by a non-subjective force, is actively and consciously striving to attain its ends. For the external and phenomenal change which takes the form of the backward movement of my body from the door is not the result of any conscious predominant impulse or internal state of my thinking subject ; because, although the strongest empirical force present is certainly the one through which that external alteration in my object-ego is taking place, that force is not the conscious predominating inclination within me, or, in other words, the ascendant and subjective state of my ego, but a non-subjective force outside that ego, which, moreover, has failed to give rise in the subject to any conscious predominant impulse in sympathy with it ; and, this being the case, that force cannot carry the feeling of freedom with it, nor can I therefore connect any feeling of an active faculty of free determination with its resulting external change. In fact, to maintain that I could do so would imply that I could feel a faculty of free determination acting in respect of some external

change in my ego that I did not consciously bring about, that is, which I did not freely will to effect, and which did not follow as a consequence any conscious inclination or determination of my own, which is contradictory and impossible. The arguments, therefore, employed in this Part (II) in connection with any feeling of freedom we may have are exclusively confined, so far as phenomenal changes in the subject are concerned, to those modifications which are able to be immediately connected in its consciousness with the predominating subjective impulses thereto.

In this manner, then, it is submitted, may the feeling within every man of the possession of a faculty of free determination be accounted for as the result of empirical and discoverable causes, without our having recourse for a solution to a violation of the laws of nature. And those who believe in the perfect freedom of the will have no reason to be afraid lest an empirical interpretation of the feeling of such a faculty should uproot a sacred doctrine which is necessary to them in the conduct of their daily lives. For, although the speculative theory of an *absolute* faculty of volition is neither permissible nor conceivable in this empirical explanation of our undoubted feeling of freedom, the dominating conscious impulses of every thinking subject of the world of sense do certainly express themselves in action, and *in so far and by*

so much as they are not encumbered or thwarted by other conscious and subjective forces, may indeed be said to be expressing themselves freely in exact accordance with the masterful laws of their constitutive conditions in time. In other words, these empirically constituted impulses give rise to different kinds of internal and external action on the part of the subject, and, so far as that portion of them which is predominant may go, without being hampered by a sense of subjective opposition. Moreover, as they are part and parcel of the ego, nothing less, in fact, than sensuously compounded phases of it, the subject is conscious of itself producing the action, and producing it *freely*, because, as explained in the above argument, its ascendant inclinations are unencumbered by sufficiently powerful and conscious antagonistic impulses in the same subject, and therefore able, unfettered, as it were, so far as their actual empirical superiority is concerned, to give expression to the laws of their own constitutive conditions in the world of nature.

I

THE JUSTIFICATION OF HUMAN EFFORT

THOSE, indeed, who have always upheld the transcendent doctrine of a *spontaneous* faculty of determination, far from having any real justification for a feeling of depression, would have every cause for exaltation, if they could lay aside those prejudices which are the necessary result of lifelong habit and early inculcation, and realise that an empirical interpretation of their feeling of freedom is not only possible, but far more satisfying than this ancient but illusory article of faith. For, up to now, the apostles of indeterminism have had to contend with the insuperable difficulty of endeavouring to realise in thought that which lies outside the possible powers of the human mind, and of reconciling a contradiction the absurdity of which is only too evident, as soon as the understanding tries to grasp it. Moreover, what is infinitely more serious for them from a practical point of view, should they happen to be social reformers, parents, teachers, or any others in authority, they are obliged, if they wish to persevere in their theory of an *absolute* will and put themselves to the pains of honestly examining the question, to abandon all hope of ever being able to

guide such a faculty along the path they may wish to see it follow. Because no *absolute* causality can be trained by human or any other agency in nature to confine itself within the grooves of particular courses of action; that is to say, its metempiric freedom cannot be moulded by empirical circumstances, for, if this were possible, it would then no longer be the unconditioned faculty, as is popularly supposed, but a causality which, like all other things in nature that are sensuously conditioned, would have to take its place in the series of *natural* events which are all linked together in one vast system of necessary connection. Those, therefore, who persist in maintaining that such freedom appertains to the human will, open up for themselves such a vista of hopelessness in respect of all those influences that can affect our being in this life, that it is their *transcendent* doctrine, rather than any *natural* solution of the problem, which must render it for ever impossible to expect that the human race can arrive at any future period, except by accident, at a social state of existence much more perfect than that in which it finds itself at the present day.

What has been suggested, on the contrary, in the second part of this volume discloses quite a different landscape, a panorama of hope and probability that in the distant future, and in the phenomenal world, there may be a state of man as far exceeding our own present state in social perfection and know-

ledge, as the winged and brilliant insect of to-day is superior in beauty to the grub of yesterday. For if we accept the explanation that what we term "free-will" is nothing but the feeling of the *predominance* of subjective impulses, themselves constituted in their entirety by empirical conditions, we must also agree to the conclusion which necessarily follows, namely, that, in that case, the members of successive generations can so be trained from their youth up by those in authority, whose own strongest propensities are on the side of social progress, that the inclinations which, in turn, shall consciously possess the pupils and impel them most powerfully to action, shall of a surety likewise be upon the side of the general welfare of the community. In fact, given sufficient and systematic training of the members of any particular stock through a long series of succeeding generations under the most favourable conditions, and it is possible to go even further and to assert that at the end of the period the general course of action of an individual member of that family under any set of circumstances could be foretold with almost apodictic certainty. To the circle of relations, acquainted with all the facts of the man's careful training and the hereditary influences present in his blood, those actions of his capable of being connected by him in consciousness with the various subjective inclinations thereto, would appear as naturally taking place according to

irresistible laws and as the expression of his predominant impulses, themselves the transparent result of their familiar and constitutive empirical conditions, and obviously following upon these so-called causes as their necessary and certain effect; whilst the man himself would nevertheless feel working within him a perfectly free faculty of determination in respect of every one of those conscious actions without exception.

The importance therefore of education lies entirely in the fact, that human beings who in their early years happen to fall under the influence of those whose own dominant natural proclivities are upon the side of the general social welfare, will themselves, if trained sufficiently under that authoritative influence, and fortunately exempt from the congenital dominion of overpoweringly adverse hereditary tastes and habits, develop *of necessity* in their turn social inclinations which, under favourable external conditions, will gradually predominate over the anti-social impulses of their nature. For early inculcation during the most impressionable years of a man's life will, if not impeded by stronger hereditary or other *natural* forces, never fail to develop and fortify a particular set of inclinations in the subject which by degrees will prevail over the antagonistic influences that may from time to time be brought to bear against them. Inherited influences are indeed among the most powerful of

the forces that may be arrayed against the efforts of those who undertake the instruction and discipline of the young, for what is already in the nerves and tissues of a human being is not to be counteracted at once even by the most drastic system that could be set up. But under a persistent method of sagacious parental and institutional training all but the most obdurate hereditary anti-social traits and impulses would show signs of surrender; the inclinations in favour of opposite courses of action would in the course of generations become little by little hereditary in their turn, until what would then be the new hereditary disposition, combined with the inclinations resulting in each individual from the particular influence of the home and the educational system of the day, would be able to vanquish and overcome the greater part of its opponents.

This thought should be a matter of encouragement to all those whose own strongest impulses are fighting on the side of the progress of humanity, and who, having long held to the opinion that there could be no good without "free-will," may have tardily begun to realise the inextricable contradiction in which that theory involves them. Especially should it be of help to them, if their position in life is such as to enable them to influence the youth of their country in the direction which they believe to be the best; if, for example, they happen to be parents, teachers, or others in authority. For, in

permitting this empirical interpretation of our feeling of freedom to take the place of the doctrine which up till now they may have verbally held and asserted, but can never have posited in thought or even reconciled with itself, when once they began to ponder upon the problem, they may well maintain, without fear of disproof, that in continuing their efforts to train others in the path they wish them to follow, they are enabling those under their authority to lay up such a store of *natural* strength as will stand them in good stead when any impulses invade them in later life in opposition to the precepts they have learnt.

But even this, at the best, would be a somewhat empty and colourless satisfaction, were it all. If it can be proved that transcendental freedom is not contradictory to the necessity observable in nature, a mighty advance has indeed been made against the sensualistic doctrines of those who would reduce the whole mystery of human endeavour to the bare clockwork of psycho-physics. But if, this once accomplished, it can be subsequently shown that the *feeling* in every human breast of a free faculty of volition is to be attributed to the side of necessity and not to that of transcendental freedom, a step would then assuredly seem to have been lost. No gain, however, would in reality have been wrested from us, for although necessity rules paramount in the physical and psychical life of man, we may yet

consistently with the laws of thought believe that it is nothing but an aspect of freedom, empirical and truncated though that aspect may be. We may further believe, with equal right, that human effort can so become directed by natural means in those various forms of energy which characterise human existence, that the personality of the individual shall more and more be brought into conscious harmony with the world of things in their aspect of totality, and hence become by patient degrees ever less sharply estranged from that ultimate metempiric freedom that belongs to the Universe only as a whole ; that, in fact, such progress to perfection is, *in the very nature of humanity*, itself the sufficient and all-satisfying destiny of mankind.

For the complete truth of anything, as we have already seen in one of the previous sections of this Part (II), can only be discovered through the abrogation of its relativity, that is to say, in the totality of its constitutive conditions. The more comprehensively, therefore, we may find ourselves able at any time to envisage these conditions, by so much the nearer shall we be to the envisagement of the totality itself ; that is, by so much the closer shall we have approximated to an appreciation of what anything is in the entirety of its truth and reality. Thus, a few dozen bricks, forming part of a building that peeps from behind a hill, can give us but little, if any, idea of the size and contours of

the fabric to which they belong ; but let a far larger and more important part of it be made visible, and it takes upon itself in the imagination the structure of the whole. We cannot, however, gather up these constitutive conditions into our own consciousness in any extended degree without practising the habit and attitude of self-denial. In other words, this progress in knowledge of the vast and inexhaustible inter-relationship between ourselves and the world, and between the things of that world among themselves ; this insight into the universal interdependence which reigns among phenomena ; this step forward, in short, whereby we see ourselves mirrored in other things and the universe mirrored in ourselves, cannot take place so long as we are inclined to regard our objective world merely or chiefly from the point of view of our own personality or the possibilities of the relation of that world to our own will, that is to say, one-sidedly or egoistically. To put it in another way, it is not possible to progress in the envisagement of ourselves and the world, that is, to embrace them more and more in their complete totality, unless there is a catholic and encircling sympathy for all Nature—a sympathy which can only thrive in an atmosphere of never-ceasing communion with the interests of humanity and by unselfish participation in that great cosmic movement which is always going on around us.

But another consideration now forces itself to

the front; namely, that the nearer we approach an envisagement of the totality of the constitutive conditions of ourselves and those things of the world that fall within our purview; that is to say, the nearer we attain to an aspect of the Universe in its entirety and truth, so much the more shall we necessarily feel ourselves to be in harmony with the truth of that totality; so much the nearer, therefore, shall we draw to a consciousness of freedom; so much the closer to a just appreciation of what we are in our ultimate or complete reality. In other words, the more clearly shall we become conscious of the inwardness and secret of our destiny, and therefore the more in harmony with the truth of it. The argument comes to this, then, that the more unfaltering our altruism and self-denial, the less shall we feel ourselves to be fettered by the law of our particular temperament or the circumstances of our particular environment; the more shall we be brought into conscious harmony with the ultimate freedom and purpose of the Universe. But the more in harmony we find ourselves with the freedom and purpose of the Universe in its totality, the happier shall we of necessity be, since it will mean nothing less than that we shall be conscious of the fact that we are in unity with the truth of all things, and that our destiny, therefore, is in conformity with the truth and destiny of the whole. Since, however, the

destiny and purpose of a transcendent and unimaginable whole must be the destiny and purpose of something which cannot fall within the empirical range of the understanding, or for that reason be tainted with the imperfection of sensuous nature, but must of necessity be the destiny and purpose of a perfect unity, free and self-sufficient, and thus teleologically at one with itself, we shall be conscious of our own destiny and purpose as bearing something of the nature of the destiny and purpose of that totality, and therefore, in that aspect of it, as free and self-sufficient and an end in itself.

Hence we see that, apart from all those manifold considerations which religion and ethics may urge with the assistance of arguments more peculiarly their own, we may confidently assume without violating the laws of finite thought, that the more our natural impulses lead us to deny ourselves in this life; the more we eschew that self-centred and egoistic attitude of existence, which, like a bandage over the eyes, blinds us to reality and hides the destination of our journey from us, the greater will be our happiness or mental satisfaction; the more will our thought become clothed in the vesture of the Infinite, and the more shall we have every *Right to Believe* that we are progressing towards perfection, and thus fulfilling the destiny of our being; a destiny which, were we able to see it in its perfect truth, would undoubtedly be revealed

to us, as indeed it can partially be disclosed to us under a certain aspect even in the present state of human limitation, as the free and perfect purpose of an absolute, self-sufficient unity, whose end is in itself. This indeed was the secret of the great Nazarene. His was not the case of a mother sacrificing herself for her child, or a general for his army, or a scientist for the sake of a particular experiment. But he offered himself up for blind and groping humanity, in the belief that he was thereby obtaining absolution for the vast catalogue of human finitude, past, present, and to come. This is the profoundest act of self-abnegation in the pages of the book of life, and being thus the least tainted with abstraction of any recorded in the history of men, is justly regarded as the nearest approach to the truth of things, the most divine achievement that the world has ever known.

It is the recognition of this *Right of Belief* that supplies the true hope and consolation of mankind. For, as the necessity of the world is but the sensuous veil that freedom wears, the contours of that covering cannot fail to betray the teleological and spiritual lineaments of the face that lies behind it. Though but a coarse wrapper for that God-like freedom, it cannot entirely conceal the evidence of its origin or office, and therefore, bound down, as we are, to the laws of natural necessity, we may yet believe

that we are carrying out the purpose of a free and absolute Spirit, and that as finite beings we form a part—an essential, maybe, a mighty and tremendous part—of the great scheme of the Universe. Such a conviction alone must tend to purify the aims of man and ennoble his ideals, rendering him, in the "fitful fever" of this life, and amid all the necessity and heart-aches of the world, reconciled to his lot and a believer in his divine destiny.

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